Page 46

Alonzo Aldrich remained a very private man but was an effective 
leader at the Iron Works for the r& t of his life. His style as an * 
industrialist was to oversee personally the work that went on in the 
shops. Draftsmen, engineers, and regular workers got used to the feel 
of his breath upon the back of their necks as he inspected the work, made 
suggestions, and bestowed praise and criticism when it was warranted. 
He was an innovator with a talent for getting good men. He wanted men 
with natural abilities gained from "early environment or inheritance." 
He especially looked for dedication as he expected his employees to work 
as hard as he did. His standards were high, and he was especially careful 
to hire only those people who met those standards. In addition to the 
usual letters to employment agencies, Aldrich would send his own men to 
visit reputable manufacturing companies in search of "live wires." If 
he found a prospect he would wait and hope that the men would become 
"discouraged or hampered by conditions, and quit." In the meantime he 
would personally interview any potential candidate's references because 
he believed that letters were "valueless." 1 Consequently, if someone 
became available, Aldrich had the inside track. 

Thus, Aldrich, as President, was also the de facto personnel 
director at least when he was interested in men he thought had the 
potential to reach leadership positions within the company. This was 
a time-consuming task but it paid off when innovative men like D. C. 
Roberts, G. A. Macklem, Burt Larson, and C. T. Ramsden joined the Iron Works.

Page 46

This may have been the way he spotted E. H. Neese, Sr. If so, 
he was fortunate to have a daughter who conveniently fell in love and 
provided Aldrich with a wonderful excuse to hire Neese away from Beloit's 
competitor, Pusey & Jones. 

Even with Neese in the family and in the company Aldrich did not 
change his hardworking ways. He began many working days with a tour * 
through the factory beginning in the pattern shop, continuing through the 
erecting floor, and ending up in the machine shop. This may have put 
added pressure on the employees, but it created a measure of camaraderie 
that made the Iron Works different from most industries. In fact, 
employees were encouraged to see Mr. Aldrich personally to make suggestions 
or complaints. One employee not satisfied with his wages complained that 
Aldrich's work shoes were better than his Sunday best. Aldrich responded 
by giving the man ten dollars for a new pair of shoes. The fact that 
Aldrich took a personal concern for so many of his employees resulted in 
an interesting reputation for the Iron Works. It was called the "Old 
Folk's Home" because so many men stayed with the company for their whole 
working lifetime. The nickname lasted long after Aldrich's death.

 
Aldrich was a great believer in proper decorum for all employees. 
He certainly ran the business the way he wanted to, but whenever disputes 
or disagreements occurred he demanded courteous and gentlemanly action. 
He was a conciliator amongst his underlings because he wanted everyone 
to pull together for the good of the company." These beliefs may have 
been tested in the summer of 1916 when E. H. Neese, Sr., joined the 
company. 

The Iron Works had been in existence for 30 years at that point, 
and the directors and stockholders were a remarkably stable group. 

Page 47

Except for Fred Messer who had died in 1889, the original founders were still 
with the company. Even Messer's shares were still in the company as 
his widow was both a stockholder and a director. This was a longstanding, 
tightknit group which had received substantial financial benefits from 
their ownership of Iron Works stock and their confidence in Aldrich and 
Noble Ross as leaders. Then in 1916 the President's son-in-law was pro-
posed as the new Vice-President. He was the first outsider in the history 
of the company, and he was to take over the Vice-Presidency which had been 
a non-paying ceremonial post under W. H. Grinnell. Now it was to be a 
salaried position, and Neese was charged with the task of improving sales. 
Perhaps as a compromise Hamilton N. Ross, Noble's son was also brought 
into the company at that time as Secretary. Noble Ross in turn resigned 
from the combined Secretary-Treasurer position but retained his post as 
Treasurer. All the changes were done by consensus, and there is no 
evidence of hard feelings. But it is interesting that Aldrich's salary 
was lowered $1,000 per year by the Directors while Noble Ross, now 
strictly a Treasurer, was paid at the same rate as before, which was now 
$800 more than Aldrich. This was the only time that his salary was more 
than Aldrich's. 4 It certainly would have been in character for Aldrich 
to have agreed to this as a compromise agreeable to all since he may have 
been sensitive about bringing a favored son-in-law into the company in 
such a lofty position. 

At the time Neese and Hamilton Ross began work as officers the 
company was in very strong financial condition and the future looked 
brighter than the past. The previous six years had been extremely 
profitable ones, and a large surplus had been accumulated. Management 
had been very frugal, and although good dividends had been paid to 

Page 48

shareholders, the bulk of the surplus was available for expanding the 
company. In fact, for a decade and one-half after 1916 the company was 
increasingly prosperous. Nearly every year sales went up and profits 
followed. 5

 
This prosperous fifteen year period through 1931 was immeasurably 
aided by a number of factors -a few peculiar to the Iron Works and the 
rest due to the industrial and the national situations. The decision to 
bring E. H. Neese, Sr. to the company turned out to be a real coup. With 
his experience, contacts and personality, he was instrumental in the 
rapid expansion of sales and profits for the years after 1916. Nineteen 
sixteen had been one of the best years in company history for sales and 
profits, but 1917 sales doubled and profits remained high. By 1920 sales 
had doubled again. Within eight more years sales had doubled for the 
third time since 1916 and profits usually were excellent as well. By 
1931 sales were more than eight times the 1916 level, and the company 
had much better than average profits in nine of the 15 years. The only 
year profits were less than average was in the recession year of 1920 
when the company built a new foundry, and even then sales rose almost 
50% 6 Of course no single individual could take responsibility for these 
financial successes, but it was no accident that the Iron Works became an 
even more vigorous and competitive company after E. H. Neese, Sr. arrived. 

Neese came with some of his own ideas on how to improve papermaking 
machinery and undoubtedly some detailed knowledge of what was going on at 
Beloit's major competitor Pusey & Jones. Both kinds of information were 
put to good use at the Iron Works. When these ideas were added to the 
ideas of other Iron Works innovators like Alonzo Aldrich, Bert Larson, 
Earl Berry, George Macklem, C. T. Ramsden, ,and Lloyd Hornbostel, the practical results were impressive. 

Page 49

The time was also propitious for growth and profits. By 1916, 
World War I had been going on for two years and the United States was 
one year away from its entrance. Yet few Americans wanted war in 1916, 
and both Wilson and Republican candidate Charles Evans Hughes ran as 
peace candidates. Americans preferred to trade with whomever they 
pleased and remained neutral. However British control of the seas dictated 
that United States trade would be overwhelmingly with the Entente 
regardless of desire -although that usually was pro-Entente as well. 
Germany and the Central Powers were in a bind while the United States 
grew rich on the rapidly increasing war trade. Some of this war trade 
was in paper products and innovative uses for paper caused a strong 
demand for new and more efficient paper mills. In fact the war, both 
before and after United States entry, had a great impact on the paper 
industry, and the Iron Works was aided by this both in the sales of new 
machines and new parts to upgrade older machines.

 
A myriad of new paper products were introduced during World War 
I. Some of the most important included paper filters in gas masks 
(poison gas was a major weapon), paper containers for powder, and paper 
bags that replaced the gunny sack. Paper also was used in hospital 
dressings, bandages and as waterproof interliners. Even paper grenades 
were made. 7 By necessity packaging was becoming an art, and with peace, 
civilian uses for paper wallboard, corrugated boxes, and paper textiles 
would quickly expand production.

 
Other innovations in paper came about immediately after the war. 
The first involved a new use for cellulose wadding heretofore used for 
bandages and surgical dressings. Because it was soft and absorbent, 

Page 50

had discovered that it was excellent as a sanitary napkin. 
Kimberly Clark, the producer, then experimented and developed a new 
product trade-named Kotex. Kotex became so popular that by December 
1920, the company built new plants and converted two mills just for 
Kotex. Other less dramatic but ultimately more important successes 
involved the increased use of paperboard boxes and the increased substitution of paper bags for burlap bags. 8 

Newsprint was an old use for paper, but demand for newsprint 
rapidly increased after the war apparently because the public was better 
educated, had more leisure time, and was more interested in the world. 
The newsprint manufacturers had overbuilt in the 1890's, but they were 
short by 1920. As demand grew and prices rose, there was a shortage 
until 1923 when newly ordered machines and mills became available. 9 

Even though United States production of newsprint soon became 
secondary to Canadian production and control of the newsprint market, 
the rest of the paper industry grew greatly in both production and 
capacity in the decade ending in 1929. This 80% growth was impressive 
but the Iron Works sales growth during these years was an even more 
impressive 300 + %. 10 It was during the 1920's that the Iron Works really 
came of age in productivity, management, and profits.

 
This great success in the 1920's was typical of American industry 
as a whole. Americans had entered World War I with a vision to "make 
the world safe for democracy" and thought that this was "a war to end 
all wars." Wilson's vision for world peace through the auspices of the 
new League of Nations was rejected for a number of reasons but mainly 
because Americans became disillusioned with the bickering of the victorious 
Allies after the war was over. This combined with Wilsonian blunders and 

Page 51

opposition by the Senate followers of Henry Cabot Lodge caused the 
Senate to reject the Treaty of Versailles and by doing so refuse to 
join the League. 

All wars bring both external and internal turmoil, and World War 
I had more than its share. Americans were soon sick of international 
political affairs, 11 afraid of the Russian Revolution (the Red Scare 
in 1919-1920 was a direct result), and ready for a change towards conservatism 
at home. Wilson or any other Democrat was unelectable in 1920, 
and when Warren Harding coined the word "Normalcy" it was just what the 
people wanted. With Harding's election a very pro-business group came to 
power and remained in power throughout the 1920's. Calvin Coolidge, 
Harding's Vice-President and successor, honestly believed "the business 
of American is business," and he showed it through his actions as President. 
His successor, Herbert Hoover, had been a very successful businessman 
before his eight years as Secretary of Commerce under Harding and Coolidge. 
It mattered little which President was in power in the 1920's as the era 
was prosperous with business profits rising much more rapidly than wages. 
Consequently businesses had money for capital investments and expansion 
and this benefited the Iron Works. Even the Stock Market crash in 
October 1929 and the depression that got increasingly worse in 1930 and 
1931 did not affect the Iron Works' sales very much until fiscal 1932. 12 

Thus, in these prosperous fifteen years the company easily over-came 
a post World War I recession and the beginnings of the Great 
Depression of the 1930's. The heart of the Great Depression would follow 
and would lead to rapid contractions before expansion began again in the 
mid-to-late 1930's. 

Page 52

The company began to expand production in 1916 due to a large number of new orders, and the expansion continued after the United States 
entered World War I in April, 1917. The major difference was that in 
1916 all new machine orders had been from Midwestern mills. In 1917, 
while Midwestern orders remained strong, machines were ordered from 
Japan, California, and Massachusetts as well. Finally in the war year 
of 1918 only one order was received from Wisconsin but there were five . 
from Japan and one each from Hawaii and Australia. After the war, orders 
would again be received from the Midwest, but the war certainly enhanced 
the Iron Works' international reputation. 13 

Within the company the management situation was relatively tranquil 
despite the infusion of new blood with the coming of Neese and Hamilton 
Ross and the death of the long-time stockholder and director Richard J. 
Burdge. Burdge had been the attorney who acted as liquidator for Merrill 
and Houston. Afterwards he had invested in the Iron Works. He left his 
stock to his wife, and she became a director. Both Neese and Hamilton 
ROSS received some Iron Works' stock from Aldrich and Noble Ross respectively. 
This expanded the number of stockholders to nine, but more 
importantly these two men had a direct hand in running the company. 
Previously only Aldrich and Noble Ross were both stockholders and active 
company officers. 14

 
With the new people in the company Aldrich found that he had more 
time to devote to new ideas. In fact he spent most of his time planning 
for the future and working on improvements in papermaking machinery. 15 
His actions show that he had great confidence in the new men in the 
company especially Vice President Neese. Neese was a very active Vice 
President who drummed up outside business as well as aided Aldrich in 
running the company. 

Page 53

Nineteen seventeen and 1918 were times of rapid expansion. 
Business boomed, new orders required more workers, and hiring continued 
throughout World War I. The company which had contracted to well under 
200 employees in 1915 passed 300 in 1917 and was closing in on 400 in 
1918. Substantial profits followed and the stockholders expressed 
great satisfaction with the management of the company and the generous . 
regular dividends on their stock. 16 

The years of the war and the two immediately following it were 
when the Iron Works really took off. Up until this time management had 
been cautious, frugal and conservative. But with the new blood in the 
company and the economic situation in the country, a more dynamic company 
resulted. Dividends were increased from 6% to 8% of the Capital Stock 
and the President was authorized to pay a special dividend whenever he 
chose. In the past these special dividends had been substantial. 
Executive salaries increased every year, with the highest percentage 
increase going to Elbert H. Neese, Sr., whose salary tripled between 
1916 and 1919 when he was paid the same as President Aldrich. Company 
sales went up over 250% during this time. 17 Since this was his primary 
responsibility, he was amply and justly rewarded for his efforts

. 
Higher salaries for all were justified by the greater business 
and higher profits but there were other reasons as well. World War I 
inflation had been severe and with the great increase in the cost of 
living, higher salaries were needed as an offset. L? ore importantly, 
wages had gone up as the volume of business increased. As a consequence 
company leaders had a greatly increased responsibility to continue the 
progress and the expansion of the company and deserved higher pay. Since 
the pay increases to the officers and to other leading employees like 

Page 54

G. A. Macklem, the sales manager, D. C. Roberts, the superintendent, 
and Bert Larson, the chief draftsman, had been so substantial, the 
Directors hedged a bit on how long the company could afford to pay 
these higher salaries. Being self-interested since the Directors were 
also the Stockholders, they decided to keep these higher salaries unless 
the cost of living dropped materially or until the company could no 
longer afford to pay at least 50% annual dividends on its capitalization. 18 
The implication is obvious; the company in these prosperous years had 
been paying at least 50% of its $136,500 capitalization in dividends 
counting regular and special dividends. 19 This substantial amount was 
probably the major source of income to Mrs. [lesser and Mrs. Burdge, 
widows of two of the company's original backers. All the years of hard 
work and frugality were beginning to pay off by the late teen years, 
and the closely held company could now reward its backers substantially.

 
Other profits were plowed back into the company in improvements 
or kept as a surplus as a hedge against future problems. In 1918 and 
1919 the company built a new smokestack for the boiler house, built on 
to the foundry, extended the machine shop, and erected a wood and gold 
leaf sign. 20 These were minor compared to the rapid expansion in 1920 
when the company built a new foundry, new cranes, a large storage building, 
and a new roof on the machine shop. In addition they purchased over 32 
acres of what had been fairgrounds in South Beloit. This was all 
necessary due to the increased business and the prospect that business 
would continue to increase in the future. The company had lost some 
business in 1919 to companies that could promise faster deliveries, and 
Aldrich wanted to insure that he could satisfy old customers and new ones 
as well. 21

 Page 55 

Also in 1920, the long awaited re-capitalization of the company 
occurred. This had been discussed among the directors for over five 
years and with sales and profits so good it was obvious that the company 
was undercapitalized. The decision to change was made at a Special 
Meeting of the Directors and Stockholders held on April 6, 1920. At 
that meeting the then current capitalization of $136,500 was quintupled ' 
to $682,500 of Preferred Stock (6,825 shares at $100 par value), and 
also 10,000 shares of common stock having no par value were authorized. 
Of the 10,000 shares authorized 6,825 were issued to the stockholders 
in proportion to their holdings and the rest remained un-issued. This 
meant that the stockholders now had a combination of preferred and common 
stock. The preferred stock was to have a 7% dividend and while no 
dividends were guaranteed on the common, they were anticipated. By 
this method, the company was able to keep most of its large surplus 
within its treasury, and at the same time reward the loyalty of its 
stockholders by likely increased dividends. Should any of them decide 
to sell either of their kinds of stock its 1920 value was much higher 
than its 1919 value. 22 

By the end of 1920 new construction was completed and the company 
was humming along with a large work force and orders enough to keep 
them busy for at least a year. Profits were down a bit almost entirely 
due to the $350,000 in improvements made during the year. It was at 
this point that Noble Ross, one of the four original founders, decided 
to retire from his jobs as Treasurer and Director of the company, 
although he still acted as a salesman until 1925. 23 

Ross had had a long and successful career in business beginning 
as a machinist's apprentice at Merrill & Houston in 1873. As one of 

Page 56

the four founders of the Beloit Iron Works he had done everything he 
could to make the venture a success. By 1920 he could look back with 
satisfaction at the result. In the remaining two decades of his life 
he concentrated on the non-business loves of his life -Y. M. C. A. and 
Beloit College. He had been a director of the Y. M. C. A. since 1905 
and its President in 1907 -a post he held for thirty years. He was  
named a trustee of Beloit College in 1923 and in 1939, the year before 
his death, he was made Vice President of the college. 24 He brought 
to both the Y. M. C. A. and Beloit College the same qualities of leadership 
and drive that had made him so important at the Iron Works. Even after 
he sold his remaining shares in the company to Elbert Neese, Sr., in 
the late 1920's, he retained an active interest in the company's 
operation. Because he knew so many people and because he was so well-liked, 
his occasional tours of the plant in the 1930's tended to disrupt 
the regular flow of work. However, nobody minded, and Ross was welcomed 
-by management and workers whenever he chose to visit. 

E. H. Neese, Sr. took Ross's place as Treasurer but also retained 
his Vice-Presidency. Clearly Neese had the energy and the ambition to 
succeed in both jobs. He was becoming indispensable to the company.

 
Another rising star was George A. Macklem, the sales manager, 
who was made a director and also permitted to buy up to 1,000 shares of 
the common stock. Ownership of the common stock was the key to con-trolling 
the company as normally the preferred stock had no voting 
power. Through a program of sales to certain designated employees the 
Iron Works rewarded the best and the brightest by giving them a stake 
in the company. Dividends were not begun on the common stock until the 
middle of 1921, but when they began they were substantial. 

Page 57

G. A. Macklem was allowed to purchase his stock at $15 a share and, once 
they began, dividends were $1 per month. 25 

Another program aimed at materially rewarding certain selected 
employees was the directors' plan to allow the president to distribute 
a bonus of 25% of the total dividends on the common stock to "the 
leading men in the company." This was prorated to the employee's 
salary and was a real inducement to good management and vigorous sales. 26

 
The late teens and early 1920's were very innovative years for 
the Iron Works. Undoubtedly the most important invention was Bert 
Larson's design for the first removable Fourdrinier. This breakthrough 
in the paper machine trade was formulated during 1918 and 1919. Construction 
began in 1920, and the first machine was installed and running 
on July 1, 1921 at the Consolidated Water Power and Paper Company in 
Wisconsin Rapids, Wisconsin. 27

 
The Paper Trade Journal described this 1,200 feet per minute 
newsprint machine as the "wonder of the age." Previously an 800 feet 
per minute machine was considered fast and few ran at 1,000 feet. For 
a short time, this one was probably the fastest in the world. 28 
The greatest innovation was not its speed but the design of its 
Fourdrinier section. This entire section was designed to be lifted from 
its bed and moved by electric motor away from the rest of the machine 
whenever wires broke or were worn out. Since the machine was designed 
to operate 24 hours a day, long downtimes for repairs would be very 
costly. With the removable Fourdrinier, downtime was reduced from three 
hours to 40 minutes. 29 Plant managers and company executives loved it 
because it meant easier changes and higher profits. Labor was reduced, 
and there was no chance of accidentally tearing the expensive wire. 

Page 58

 For its time it was a huge machine -375 feet long with a maximum 
height of 16 feet. It weighed 1,200 tons and with all its accessory 
equipment, furnished by other companies, cost $600,000. During one 
day's operation water weighing more than 100,000 tons went on the 
machine, and it required 100 cords of wood for pulp and 110 tons of 
coal to generate steam for its dryers. For all this, 110 tons of news-. 
print was the daily result. 30 

The design was quickly patented but further refinements ensured 
that this machine Bgrry, and others was one of kind. Larson, the newly employed Earl 
soon improved upon this non-shaking machine by designing a removable, adjustable and shaking Fourdrinier. These were set up and working by 1922 and were a great success. 31

 
Beloit was well ahead of its competition in these years and their 
confidence showed in advertisements in the Paper Trade Journal. The 
competition's ads were straightforward and stodgy -really nothing more 
than a compendium of what they made. In contrast the Iron Works rather 
cockily and with tongue-in-cheek once used a poem for its entire advertisement. 
It made a point and did it with humor: 

 
"And they asked me how I did it, and I gave 'em the Scripture test, 
'You keep your light so shining a little in fron to' the next! ' 
They copied all they could follow, But they couldn't copy my mind, 
And I left 'em sweating and stealing A year and a half behind." 32 

This bit of frivolity was probably true at the time and certainly true 
in the long run. 

Another example of frivolity that also had a larger purpose was 
the foundation of Messer Lodge in the summer of 1921. Messer Lodge was a 

Page 59 

cottage in Yost Park built on a do-it-yourself basis by a number of the 
company's department heads. Its purpose was social but also "to create 
a better feeling of friendship and cooperation among its members." 
Aldrich was a firm believer in pulling together, and Messer Lodge was 
a perfect way to bring company leaders together in informal sessions 
involving fun and games. The larger purpose was well served without . 
detriment to the immediate social purpose of eating, smoking and playing 
cards or baseball. 33 

Messer Lodge was reserved for company leaders, but the Iron Works 
also sponsored activities for its regular employees including bowling 
teams, a baseball team and a basketball team. These went on for years, 
but it is unlikely that the camaraderie. in these activities approached 
that of the fellows of Messer Lodge. 

The company set a new sales record in 1921 of over,$ 800,000 land 
profits were good. 34 This was accomplished mainly because of previous 
orders because the country was then suffering from a recession. Because 
of the lead time needed in making paper machinery it usually took the 
company an extra year or two to be severely affected by a recession or 
depression. This was a huge advantage for planning because the leader-ship 
could assume from the bad times that demand in the next year would 
be lower and accordingly they could cut down on their work force. In 
this way, even light years could be extremely profitable ones for the 
Iron Works. 

A good example was 1922. Sales had reached an all time high in 
1921, but profits were only average because the work force was expanding. 
When the recession hit some workers were laid off, and in 1922, when 
sales were less than 60% of the 1921 record, profits were superior. 

Page 60

1922 the general prosperity of the 1920's helped increase 
paper mill expansion. New machine sales went up and so did partial 
rebuilds. In the paper trade idle machine time stayed between 17% and 
22% of capacity between 1922 and 1926. However total capacity rose 
from 8.6 million tons per year in 1921 to 12 million tons per year in 
1926.36 Consequently many machines were sold in those years, and the . 
Iron Works managed to get an increasing share of the market. 

This increased share was evident as sales rose every year from 1923 
through 1931. The record year of 1921 was broken in 1925 and each 
succeeding year surpassed the previous year's record until sales reached 
4 million dollars in 1930. Profits also remained strong during these 
years and were usually well above average. 37 

With the papermaking machine business becoming more complex every 
year, company leaders determined early in the decade that they would 
need to develop new ideas to retain their competitive edge. For this 
reason Earl Berry was hired in 1921. He was the first engineering 
graduate to join the company, and over the next two decades before his 
premature death in 1943, he made "major contributions to the advancement 
of papermaking engineering and in the invention and development of 
machine improvements. "38 

Berry began with the Iron Works at the same time that the company 
was feeling the effects of the post World War I recession. Sales had 
zoomed from 1917 to 1921 but then had turned sharply downward. This 
downturn was particularly tough on papermaking machine companies because 
their potential and usual customers cut back production and were not 
interested in investing much money in new machines or rebuilds. Although 
the Iron Works' leaders found it difficult to get enough new contracts to

Page 61

keep the plant going they managed to do so. In contrast, Beloit's 
competition had all been "shut down to a greater or lesser extent." 
Thus the company weathered this short lived downturn with more than 
their normal share of new business. President Alrdich attributed this 
good fortune to their product and its "excellent standing" in the trade. 
Furthermore he stated that "it is conservative to state that Beloit 
machines are considered equal to the best, if not actually the best
machines built today. 39 
This reputation served the company well. In fact Beloit's superiority 
in design and in performance enabled the company to avoid being drawn 
into a great controversy then going on among papermaking machine companies. 
The issue was which kind of machine was better -a wider or 
a faster one? It was a fact at that time that you could not have both 
width and speed. In the early 1920's numerous articles were published 
on the issue, and Pusey & Jones even sponsored a contest and gave out 
prizes to engineers who wrote articles promoting one or the other points 
of view. 

Aldrich, Neese, Berry, Macklem and others at the Iron Works agreed 
that width versus speed was not an issue since both width and speed were 
rapidly increasing and with better machines and research it would be 
possible to have both in the same machine. Thus it was the goal of 
the Iron Works to adapt its shops so they could make wider machines 
and spend money on research so they could make faster machines. They 
succeeded in doing both. 

Until the early 1920's Beloit's facilities did not allow the company 
to build machines wider than 160 inches. Yet their competitors were 
building machines as wide as 234 inches. In order to become competitive 

Page 62

for wider machine orders, the machine shop was remodeled, an extension 
was built on it, and a number of the larger tools were lengthened. 40 
Other tools were purchased and some obsolescent ones sold. Finally 
an addition to the erecting shop and the remodeling of other buildings 
allowed a more efficient operation. All these improvements were com-pleted 
before the end of 1923. Consequently, the company could compete . 
for the wider machines by that time.

 
The issue of speed was attacked by a new research campaign. President 
Aldrich was concerned that "some very radical ideas" were being proposed 
that "if successful would render" some of Beloit's latest products 
obsolete. Therefore he proposed that the company spend up to $50,000 
on research that aimed at developing new types of machines and studying 
new principles of making paper. 41 The Directors agreed and Earl Berry 
spent a great deal of time and effort in developing improvements to 
Beloit's products.

 
Aldrich was determined that Beloit's machines would remain competi-tive 
throughout the 1920's, and as its machines were built wider and 
went faster, the company remained in the forefront. Customers were 
told that Beloit could manufacture to their specifications and for their 
particular needs and do it on a faster and wider machine. They argued 
that "width was determined by proportion and had nothing to do with 
speed." If a machine was proportioned correctly, ,the 160" to 180" 
machine would run just as fast and do as good work from an engineering 
standpoint as a 100" to 120" wide machine. Thus, the company never 
believed that there was very much to the great controversy that was 
continually debated in the trade papers early in the 1920's. 42 
On the other hand President Alrdich was very much worried that the 

Page 63

political situation in Wisconsin would adversely affect the company. 
Progressivism had been on the wane in most of the country since World 
War I, but remnants of it were still very important in Wisconsin where 
Robert LaFollette had represented the state in the Senate since 1906. 
Aldrich feared that progressive and Non-Partisan League strength con-trolled 
the Wisconsin legislature and that social legislation would be 
passed that would greatly raise the cost of doing business. 43

 
While some legislation was passed that many businessmen found 
objectionable the company was not adversely affected. In fact events 
in Wisconsin soon took a back seat to the Harding scandals in Washington. 
Harding had tried hard to be ,a good President but the job and his cronies 
of the so-called "Ohio Gang" had overwhelmed him. They had used their 
positions to enrich themselves and their friends, and Harding, whose 
only qualification for the Presidency was that he looked like a President 
ought to look, began to find them out shortly before he died of a cerebral 
embolism on August 2, 1923. Most of the scandals including the gigantic 
Teapot Dome Swindle broke after his death. This scandal, the worst since 
the Grant Administration, would remain the worst until it was topped 
by Watergate in the early 1970's, and the public's attention was riveted 
on the unfolding facts for years to come.

 
Harding's successor, Calvin Coolidge, was surprisingly personally 
untouched by these events. He had the public's confidence from the 
start and easily won election in 1924 over the disunited Democrats and 
the last of the Progressives headed by Robert LaFollette. With Coolidge 
in the White House business values were even more in vogue, Coolidge 
did everything he could to promote its success. 

Page 64 

The Coolidge terms from 1923 to 1929 in retrospect are usually viewed as a "period of extreme conservatism," but for the time employers did quite a lot for their employees. Welfare capitalism was in vogue in part just for the sake of making the workers' lot a happier one and in part because employers feared unionization would occur if workers were disgruntled. Welfare capitalism took many forms, some of which the Iron Works had been doing for years such as company athletic teams 
and improvements in the factory environment. Natural outgrowths of 
these, as the company prospered in the mid-1920's, were an employees' 
Mutual Aid Association, additions to Messer Lodge, safety programs, a 
first aid room, pre-employment physical exams, and a profit-sharing 
bonus, based on length of service and earnings, paid at Christmas. 45 
The bonus was substantial and a real inducement to continue working 
for the Iron Works. As Coolidge prosperity continued at the national 
level, Iron Works prosperity mirrored it.

 
With the Harding scandals off the front page people got involved 
in other things including a Florida land boom that busted in 1926 when 
Florida was wracked by two hurricanes. 46 The mid 1920's provided 
something for everyone. For the bigots, the Ku Klux Klan had been 
on the rise since World War I. For the fundamentalists and their 
detractors the Scopes Monkey Trial of 1925 provided fear or amusement. 
For hero worshippers "Lucky Lindy" soloed the Atlantic in 1927 the same 
year that Babe Ruth hit 60 home runs and Dempsey fought Tunney. For 
those who feared foreigners and radicals in this nation of immigrants 
there was the racially discriminatory National Origins Act of 1924 and 
the execution of Sacco and Vanzetti in 1927. For the feminists there 
was the vote, but not an Equal Rights Amendment even though one was 
introduced in 1923. For nearly everyone there were flappers, Prohibition, 

Page 65

with its speakeasies and bathtub gin, jazz, Sigmund Freud, the Charleston, 
the cult of youth, and a revolution in morals. Businessmen guided this 
society and basked in Coolidge's praise, adulation, and laissez-faire 
economics.

 
Growing companies like the Iron Works took full advantage of the 
spirit of the times. They made good profits every year. They paid . 
increasingly higher salaries to key executives, generous dividends on 
the common stock, bonuses to employees, and still managed to put most 
of their profits right back into the company in a surplus fund to be 
used for expansion or for whatever purpose management wished. In the 
late 1920's this increasing surplus was used to transform the closely 
held corporation into a family owned corporation.

 
Elbert Neese, Sr., had a long-standing goal of making the Iron 
Works a family owned company. Ever since his years at Pusey & Jones 
when he found himself effectively shut out from any chance at participation 
in ownership, he hoped and planned to have his own 'company. 
Not long after his association with the Iron Works began in 1916, he 
began with his wife Laura Aldrich Neese to purchase stock from the 
original stockholders or their successors. The re-capitalization of 
the company in 1920, the ageing or death of some stockholders, and the 
prosperity of Neese and his wife all facilitated their stock purchases. 
The first big step was taken in 1925 after the death of one of the 
original founders, W. H. Grinnell.

 
W. H. Grinnell had served the company in a variety of capacities, 
including Secretary, Vice-President, and Director, but he had retired 
a decade and one-half before his death at age 83 in February 1925. During 
his retirement especially, he had profited from his ownership of more 

Page 66

than 20% of the outstanding shares of the company's stock. After his 
death his entire share was purchased by E. H. Neese, 9. and Laura 
Aldrich Neese. 47 

This meant that for practical purposes the only non-Aldrich-Neese 
shares were owned by Noble Ross and his family, Mary Messer and her 
daughter, and George Macklem, the sole outsider ever allowed to purchase . 
a substantial number of common shares. Even though Macklem had been 
allowed to purchase common stock in 1920, E. H. Neese, Sr., had a 
binding agreement with him for the first right of purchase. 48 In 
effect this meant Macklem could keep the stock for his lifetime or 
sell it to Neese. If Neese outlived him he had the right to purchase 
it from Macklem's heirs. Consequently although Macklem held stock, 
these limitations practically insured that the stock would sooner or 
later revert to Neese.

 
This meant that Neese could concentrate on acquiring the stock of 
the Ross and Messer families. By September, 1927, the time was ripe, 
in part due to a disagreement with Hamilton Ross which led to his 
leaving the company. He resigned both as Secretary and as a Director. 
His place on the five member Board of Directors was taken by Laura 
Aldrich Neese, giving the Aldrich-Neese family three of the five 
Directors. The others were G. A. Macklem, their close friend and 
ally, and the aged Mary Messer, wife of Fred Messer, the original 
founder who had died in 1889. 49

 
Macklem was both competent and loyal and had been regularly rewarded 
since had had moved from Pusey & Jones to the Iron Works in 1907. He 
had been a superior erecting engineer and sales engineer at Pusey & 
Jones, and had beaten Noble Ross out of a paper machine contract in 1907. 

Page 67

ROSS was impressed with him and wanted to hire him. When Ross returned 
to Beloit to tell President Aldrich of his find, he found that Aldrich 
had independently made Macklem's acquaintance and he too wanted to 
hire him. The wooing began and Aldrich weaned him away from Pusey & 
Jones by emphasizing that "there are too many ahead of you there of 
[the] same age or older, also relatives." In contrast Aldrich expected ' 
Macklem "to be rapidly forced into a prominent position" at the Iron 
Works. Indeed he was in the years after he started as a sales engineer. 50

 
Aldrich had hired him because he wanted to crack the east coast 
market and with Macklem's help this was accomplished. After Elbert Neese, 
Sr., joined the firm and was allowed to buy in, the same privilege was 
extended to G. A. Macklem. He became a stockholder and company director 
in 1920, and Vice-President for Sales in 1927. Aldrich and Neese were 
always sure of his loyalty and friendship, and he cooperated fully in 
Neese's practical takeover of the company. 

The takeover efforts continued in 1928 when E. H. Neese and his 
wife purchased 700 more shares of stock -400 from the Rosses and 300 
from the Messers. 51 This meant that with Alonzo Aldrich they had more 
than 50% of the outstanding common shares and effective control of the 
company. Also that year Mary Messer did not seek re-election to the 
Board of Directors and Wiley Smith, the Secretary of the company, took 
her place as Director. 52 The Aldrich-Neese family was then firmly in 
control and required only agreements to purchase the rest of the out-standing 
common stock to take full control.

 
The procedure for full takeover was quickly decided upon and the 
rest of the shares were soon acquired. The plan was simple, fair and 
effective. The Directors decided early in 1929 to use a portion of the 

Page 68

large surplus accumulated in the 1920's to buy all of the Messer and 
Ross common shares for $300 each. 53 The price was very lucrative since 
only nine years before George Macklem had been allowed to purchase 
his shares for $15 each

. 
By 1930 the deal was complete and except for Macklem and his 1,000 
shares and Wiley Smith with his single share, the Iron Works common . 
stock was owned by Alonzo Aldrich, E. H. Neese, and Laura Aldrich Neese. 
This left only the usually non-voting $100 7% Preferred Stock outstanding 
and by August the common owners, who were also the Directors, decided to 
retire it on November 1, 1930, at 105% of the par value plus accrued 
dividends. This was entirely proper and permitted by the company by-laws. 
54 

Through these actions the original stockholders and their families 
received substantial profits from their association with the Iron Works. 
Others who had been allowed to purchase or had been given the preferred 
stock as rewards for good service profited as well. Combining both the 
Common and Preferred transactions, almost $2 million changed hands. 
These nearly completed the evolution of the Iron Works to a family owned 
corporation. 55 

While these internal financial dealings were going on from 1925 to 
1930, other economic events and personnel changes more important to the 
long term growth of the company were also occurring. Mr. Aldrich had 
long been a believer in and a promoter of the idea that the company 
should get the best men possible and pay them well. As the company 
expanded in the 1920's this long standing policy began to pay increased 
dividends. Earl Berry had come to Beloit as an engineer in 1921, and 
by the mid 1920's he invented what became known as the Beloit Cantilever 

Page 69

Suction Couch Roll. This invention which was an improvement of W. H. 
Millspaugh's 1909 invention of the suction couch roll became very 
important to Beloit by the late 1920's. It fit right in with Beloit's 
attempts to build wider and faster paper machines because through the --
use of roller bearings higher speeds were attainable. 56 

Millspaugh had been the pioneer in suction rolls, and he practically. 
had a patent monopoly on them in the early 1920's. However his patents 
began to run out just at the time Berry's invention superceded them. 
The major consequence of this was Beloit's domination of the suction 
roll market by the late 1920's. Beloit built suction rolls on an 
original equipment manufacturing basis for its competitors. This 
domination lasted over two decades and was extremely lucrative for the 
company. 57

 
This important episode is perhaps the best example of the management 
encouraged intellectual and practical fermentation that went on 
among Iron Works personnel. In the 1920's both Earl Berry and E. H. 
Neese, Sr., had recognized the importance of suction rolls and Berry 
had significantly improved them. Berry received wide latitude to 
experiment and in this case he succeeded, although he would not always 
succeed in the future. One reason why Beloit came to dominate the 
papermaking machine market was management's willingness to take chances 
and gamble on the advice of technical people. 58  Thus the company did 
not just make good machines; they made superior machines that incorporated 
the latest innovations, and they made them to their customers' 
specifications. 

Beloit's competitors often made a number of standard machines 
similar if not identical in design and tried to sell-them to more than one cusomer.

Page 70

 It was less expensive to do it this way, but Beloit chose to customize machines for each order. This required that Beloit salesmen have a great deal of industrial know-how so they could under-stand each customer's particular needs

. 
Beloit was fortunate that it had both George A. Macklem and Charles 
T. Ramsden concentrating on sales during the 1920's. Both were 
superior sales representatives and both became Vice-Presidents for Sales.

 
When Macklem came from Pusey & Jones in 1907 he was the only sales-man. 
Ramsden, who had joined the Iron Works prior to 1900, had worked 
as a machinist, erecting foreman, and as head of the order and service 
department before joining Macklem as a salesman during World War I. 
While they were the official salesmen other company officers as well 
as engineers were involved in sales. In fact there was no sharp line 
drawn between engineering and sales, and this remained true for many 
 years. 59

By the 1920's Beloit was a formidable concern when it came to 
sales expertise. Salesmen were called sales engineers because they 
prided themselves on their technical know-how. While Beloit was a 
technological leader in the 1920's, the way salesmen carried that 
technology to potential customers may have been the company's biggest 
economic advantage over their competitors. Aldrich and Ross had been 
great salesmen in the earlier years. Neese, George Macklem, and Charles 
Ramsden had learned from them and had even improved upon their methods. 
Earl Berry and Lloyd Hornbostel, after he came to Beloit in 1926, added 
their efforts to sales whenever called upon. 

The key to success was to make sure that sales personnel knew the 
details of papermaking. These details then were applied to learning 

Page 71

the exact requirements that a particular paper mill had in order that 
a specialized machine or portion of a machine could be built to fulfill 
those needs. Macklem especially emphasized the possibility of 
doing a substantial amount of business in rebuilding and modernizing 
paper machines. The Iron Works did this more effectively than any of 
their competitors. 60 

Earl Berry, a perfectionist who was unusually critical of the 
occasional mistakes and waste in the engineering and manufacturing 
side of the business where most of his own responsibility was, lauded 
the sales efforts. He believed that we may be better than most or all of our competitors but... our ability to make a satisfactory profit has not been due to any outstanding efficiency of our engineering or manufacturing organization, but due to a greater extent to methods of sales and ability to get good prices. 61

 
Beloit sales techniques in the 1920's, beyond technological knowledge, 
emphasized keeping in close contact with paper mill operations. Salesmen
and company officers got to know all the important men in a company's 
operation so that they naturally thought of Beloit for repairing, 
improving, rebuilding, or installing a brand new machine. This technique 
would work only if the Beloit men had the kind of personalities 
that encouraged rapport and confidence. They did then and this remained 
a strong point in the future. 

Beloit's advertisements in trade journals emphasized company 
innovations, and the advantages that customers would have if they used 
Beloit machines to modernize their plants. The Beloit Removable 
Fourdrinier was described in 1924 as the "papermaker's dream come 
true" because it cut down lost production and reduced labor costs. 62 
In 1925 the new Beloit Shake was described as an advancement that 

Page 72

increased production 75%. In addition the company could not resist 
getting into the then current controversy over wider versus faster 
machines by sarcastically comparing two machines in the same mill -one 
from Beloit and the other from a competitor. The Beloit machine 
"with the disadvantage of higher speed" produced a better formed and 
higher test sheet than the competitor's machine. 63 As the company 
explained it the old shake was obsolete on a fast running machine but 
that innovations in the Beloit Shake eliminated weight and sped up
vibration so the shake could be as effective on wider and faster machines 
as it was on narrower and slower ones. 64 

By 1926 advertisements emphasized the importance of mills using 
their reserve funds to invest in new Beloit equipment. The Iron Works 
tried to encourage paper mills to replace any and all equipment as soon 
as it was found that it would pay to replace it. This meant that even 
though some piece of equipment worked all right it should be replaced 
if new equipment would result in substantially greater production or 
less downtime. 65 Beloit was confident its products could improve any 
mill. Their slogans, "The Beloit Way is the Modern Way" and "It Pays 
to Modernize" emphasized this. 66 

Company leaders were in such close contact with mill owners that 
a great deal of unsolicited praise was received about Beloit machines. 
Sometimes this was used in advertisements. Some typical comments from 
the 1920's included the following. It is generally conceded by all the best paper mill men on the coast here that our No. 4 machine is by far superior 
to any paper machine on the Coast. 67 

We are very proud to own the paper machine which you built for us and if we can serve you with any information in regard to the operation of same we shall be only too glad to do so, as we are anxious to reciprocate the many courtesies which 

Page 73

you have extended us and to show our appreciation of the unusually fine service which you have given us. 68 

AS I told you on our last conversation in New York City, my aim was to obtain the best machine that 1 could get in this world, and in his respect I think that Beloit outweighs all others. 69 

These comments and many others like them confirmed that Alonzo 
Aldrich's early hopes and intentions had come true certainly by the 
last decade of his life if not before. The Iron Works was number one!

 
Aldrich retained his Presidency throughout the 1920's, but by the 
late 1920's he relinquished day to day authority to Elbert H. Neese, 
Sr. This was necessary because at age 69 in 1927 he was diagnosed 
as having a heart ailment. From then on he was required to conserve 
his strength and work less. Nevertheless he was consulted on all major 
decisions and remained active in the company.

 
By the mid 1920's he took vacations at his winter home in Fort 
Lauderdale, Florida. It was there in 1927 that his wife died. 70 After 
this traumatic event he continued to vacation in warmer climates but 
preferred the Edgewater Gulf Hotel in Biloxi, Mississippi.

 Even when he was away on his winter vacations he carried on a 
regular correspondence with a number of company leaders and received 
and gave advice. He remained plain spoken, shrewd, and farsighted. 
At the height of company prosperity and national prosperity just after 
the election of Herbert Hoover in 1928, he warned Neese about a likely 
"slowing up time. . .in the near future." 71

 
The company had been accumulating a large surplus for expansion 
and retooling. Aldrich advised that the capacity they had was all right 
for the present good times and the future slow down. However, he 

Page 74

requested that Neese plan right then for the "next good-times period" 
so the company would achieve more "satisfaction and profit" then. 72

 
This was good advice based on his past knowledge of the cyclical 
nature of papermaking machine business. Perhaps he also foresaw that 
the general prosperity of the 1920's could not last forever given the 
nature of the speculation then occurring on Wall Street and the imbalance 
between high industrial profits and the relatively low purchasing 
power of workers and farmers. Installment buying was rampant 
among consumers in general while those better off often borrowed money 
to invest in the seemingly endless Bull Market. When Bulls turned to 
Bears in the autumn of 1929 the market crashed.

 
This market crash helped precipitate the Great Depression. Business 
confidence was shattered and many investors bankrupted. Holding companies 
and investment trusts were destroyed, thus eliminating a major 
source of long term capital. Consumer demand also quickly receded, 
and when banks began to fail in large numbers business and public 
morale plummeted. 73 

When all this occurred the Iron Works was not immediately affected. 
Orders were strong in 1928 and even more so in 1929 when eight complete 
machines were made. Because machines were sold before they were manufactured 
and because the length of time needed to manufacture a paper 
machine was so long, the company had a major advantage over most other 
manufacturers. It could cut back in employment and cut overall expenses 
whenever future contracts declined and still stay profitable at a reduced 
level. All this required good management planning, and the 
company was blessed with this in both Aldrich and Neese.

Page 75

This ability combined with a backlog of orders for complete
machines and increased orders of Spiral Drives and Berry's Cantilevered 
Suction Rolls enabled the company to remain prosperous even after the 
Great Depression began. In fact 1930 was the best sales year in 
company history and 1931 was second best. In both years profits 
were well above average. 74 

Because of the long lead time and the good business in 1930 the 
company added 100 employees making the total 550. By 1931, with good 
present business but no machine orders for 1932, employment was slowly 
cut back as orders were finished until the number of employees stood 
at approximately 300.75 Early in the year, before it was apparent that 
the company's good times were coming to a temporary end, the Beloit 
Daily News had described the company as "a rock defying all the swirls 
and eddies of the depression period, with a fulltime working schedule 
and its products sold out 6 months ahead." 76 

When the six months passed with only a few replacement orders on 
the books, the company had only a bleak immediate future to look forward 
to. This gloom in the late autumn of 1931 was immeasurably added to 
when Alonzo Aldrich unexpectedly died in his sleep on December 20, 1931. 
While this was a very sad day for his family and co-workers who loved 
and respected him, he left the company in its best financial condition 
of all time with a surplus of over $5 million, over 2  l/ 2 million of 
which was in bonds and investments or cash. 77 He had a remarkable 
life and his vision and hard work had helped to make the Iron Works the 
leading company in the papermaking machine field. 

Shortly after his death tributes from friends and customers poured 
in, but no comment was more true than the one unanimously adopted by 
the Board of Directors.  

Page 76

It stated in part that at this time [the] Beloit Iron Works is recognized as the leader in the industry. This has been the result in a large measure of Mr. Aldrich's untiring efforts, his genius and his devotion to the highest business principles. 
No man has contributed more to the advancement of thepapermaking industry. 78    

Page 77

1 Goodwillie tape, April 19, 1979; Letter, Alonzo Aldrich to A. C. Company, July 14, 1912; Letter, Alonzo Aldrich to E. H. Neese, Sr., February 23, 1931, in Beloit Corporation Archives. 

2 Interview with Carl Brehm, May 25, 1979; Harold Bayer, May 24, 1979; assorted interviews with retired Beloit Iron Works employees, May, 1979.

 
3 Aldrich interoffice memo, January 17, 1912, Beloit Corporation Archives. 

4 Minute Book, July 11, 1916. In reality, even though his salary was officially lowered, he received the same pay and the Directors ratified this retroactively.

 
5 Statistics from a letter from E. H. Neese, Jr., May 15, 1979. 

6 Ibid. 

7 Smith, History of Papermaking, p. 329. 

8 Ibid., p. 341.

9 Ibid., p. 344. 

10 Ibid., p. 359; Neese letter, May 15, 1979.

 
11 This was not true of international economic affairs as the 1920's was 
a time of rapidly increasing investment and trade

. 
12 This was primarily due to the lead time needed to construct paper 
machines. Orders made in 1928 and 1929 would be completed and final payments made in 1930 and 1931. 

13 Neese and Dundore, pp. 64-67. 

14Minute Book, June 14, 1917. 

15 Ibid. 

16 Ibid. 

17 Minute Book, November 6, 1918 and August 27, 1919.

18 Minute Book, August 27, 1918

19 In reality the dividends for the five years before 1920 were approximately 
100% per annum; Farrow and Dutton folder, Beloit Corporation Archives, April, 1920. 

20 Neese and Dundore, pp. 66-67; BDN, May 15, 1918.

21 BDN, July 1, 1920; Neese and Dundore, p. 68; Minute Book, February 13,1920 and December 3, 1920.

 Page 78

22 Minute Book, April 6, 1920.

23 Minute Book, December 3, 1920

24  BDN, October 11, 1940.

25 Minute Book, December 3, 1920, July 28, 1921. 

26 Minute Book, December 3, 1920. This bonus was continued through the 1920's. 

27 Neese and Dundore, pp. 66 and 68; PTJ, July 21, 1921, p. 30.

28 July 21, 1921; BDN, April 20, 1921, p. 30; Woodpulp News, June 4, July 21, 1921; BDN, April 20, 1921, p. 30; Woodpulp News, June 4, 1921. 1921. It was probably one of the most meticulously made as well, as It was probably one of the most meticulously made as well, as Mr. Aldrich kept it running on the erecting floor for weeks until he was satisfied that it met his measure of perfection. Aldrich kept it running on the erecting floor for weeks until he was satisfied that it met his measure of perfection.

29 PTJ, July 21, 1921, p. 30.

30 Ibid. 

31 Neese and Dundore, pp. 66, 68, 69; List of Alonzo Aldrich patents, 
Beloit Corporation Archives. 

32 PTJ, November 10, 1920, pp. 3-5, 161, 194, 197, 228-229. 

33 Neese and Dundore, p. 69; Constitution of Messer Lodge, June 28, 1922, 
in Beloit Corporation Archives. The lodge was named after Fred Lesser, first President of the Iron Works, who had died in 1889. 

34 Neese, Jr. letter, May 15, 1979. 

35 Ibid. 

36 PTJ, February 24, 1927, pp. 75-76.

37 Neese, Jr. letter, May 15, 1979

38 Bill Goodwillie letter, April 19, 1979

39 President's Report--Minute Book, January 2, 1923. 

40 Ibid. 

41 Ibid. 

42 No author, typed manuscript dated April 6, 1938; in Macklem family collection (probably written by C. Elmer Macklem). 

43 President's Report--Minute Book, January 2, 1923. The company scared 
the hell out of the city of Beloit on January 27, 1925 when the BDN headlined the "Iron Works Buys South Beloit Site" and would sometime  move there because of the unfavorable business climate in Wisconsin. While this was not an idle threat, cooler heads prevailed. The company expanded in Beloit and did not use a South Beloit site until it expanded there in 1960.

Page 79

44 Leuchtenburg, The Perils of Prosperity, p. 201.

45 Neese and Dundore, pp. 70-78; Plinute Book, November 9, 1927, November 14, 1928; BDN, December 24, 1925.

46 President Aldrich bought property in Florida and his wife unexpectedly died there in 1927.

47 Minute Book, September 24, 1927.

48 Minute Book, September 24, 1927. Wiley Smith, the Secretary, was allowed to purchase one share so he could become a Director. Macklem had 1,000 shares--slightly over 12% of the common stock, Yrs. C. E. Macklem and James Macklem interview, July 21, 1979. In 1935 Earl Berry bought 50 shares from G. A. Macklem. Neese bought these in 1943 after Berry's death.

49 Minute Book, September 10, 1927.

50 Interview, Mrs. C. E. Macklem and James Macklem, July 21, 1979; Phone interview with Rodger Dopp, August 7, 1979; Letter from A. Aldrich to G. A. Macklem, March 25, 1907 from Macklem family collection.

51 Minute Book, November 8, 1927 and December 29, 1928.

52 Minute Book, December 29, 1929.

53 Minute Book, January 8, 1929.

54 Minute Book, August 23, 1930.

55 The final steps occurred in 1941 when G. A. Macklem died and E. H.Neese, Sr. purchased his shares, and in 1943 when Earl Berry died and Neese bought his 50 shares.

56 Ralph C. Heys, "Pioneering with Millspaugh," The Paper Maker, February, 1966; Beloit ad in Paper Trade Journal, 1929. Bill Goodwillie, unpublished manuscript sent to Hodge-Ely, May, 1979.

57 Millspaugh got into financial difficulties in the late 1920's and sold his Sandusky Foundry and Machine Company to a group of United States papermaking machine manufacturers including the Iron Works. In 1979 Beloit still retains a l/3 ownership of this company.

58 E. J. Justus interview, July 20, 1979, confirmed by many other people.

59 Bill Goodwillie interview tape, April 19, 1979.

60 Ibid.

Page 80

61 Letter Berry to Neese, November 24, 1928, Beloit Corporation Archives.

62 PTJ, January 17, 1924, p. 31.

63 PTJ, January 22, 1925, p. 39.

64 H.N.Ross letter to paper industry, January 17, 1925, Beloit Corporation Archives.

65 PTJ, January 14, 1926, p. 27; January 28, 1926, p. 33.

66 Undated advertisement with testimonials to Beloit suction rolls, c. 1930.

67 Hawley Pulp and Paper Company, Oregon City, Oregon, to Iron Works, January 20, 1922, Beloit Corporation Archives.

68 Filer Fiber Company, Filer City, Michigan, to Iron Works, March 28, 1925, Beloit Corporation Archives.

69 Companie de las Fabricas de Papel de San Rafael y Anexas (Mexico) to Pusey and Jones, January 19, 1929 (copy found in Beloit Corporation Archives).

70 BDN, December 17, 1927.

71 Aldrich to Neese, January 9, 1929, Beloit Corporation Archives.

72 Ibid.

73 Leuchtenburg, The Perils of Prosperity, pp. 246-247.

74 Neese and Dundore, pp. 77-80; E. H. Neese, Jr. letter, May 15, 1979, on financial data.

75 Neese and Dundore, pp. 79-80.

76 BDN, January 17, 1931.

77 Minute Book, January 23, 1932.

78 Ibid.

Advance to: ELBERT H. NEESE SR. ERA The Depression Years 1932 - 1941

Quit