1975-1979

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December 17, 1974 the Beloit Corporation's Board of Directors 
unanimously elected Harry C. Moore Chairman of the Board and Chief 
Executive Officer and Elbert H. Neese, Jr. President and Chief Operating 
Officer. Beloit had not had a Chairman of the Board since E. H. Neese, 
Sr. died in 1961. Consequently, the new arrangement required that 
Moore and Neese be able to continue their longstanding, good relation-ship 
since both of them were involved in the day-to-day operations of 
the company. Moore had final authority over financial and legal 
matters while Neese was the chief operating officer. This dual leader-ship 
lasted through the greatest profit years of the Corporation's 
history, fiscal years 1975 through 1978 -before Harry Moore resigned 
his Chairmanship on October 16, 1978, his 65th birthday. E. H. Neese, 
Jr. then became both Chairman and President and handles full day-to-day 
responsibility while Moore became Chairman of the Executive Committee 
of the Beloit Corporation. In this capacity, Moore remains a visible, 
active, and effective member of the Corporation willing to fly to 
Timbuktu practically on a moment's notice if a mill there is in the 
market for a machine

Moore's continuing career with Beloit has been long and distinguished. 
From his first experiences selling Fuller Brushes in the 
early 1930's through his rapid rise within the Beloit Corporation 
from Vice President in 1941 to President in 1952, sales has been his 
forte. In his knowledge of the paper industry and in his close 

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contacts with industry leaders, he patterned himself after his mentor 
Elbert H. Neese, Sr. Both were outstanding, vital leaders who willingly 
combined business and pleasure in their efforts to befriend and 
cultivate paper mill leaders. Moore has termed himself the "chief 
peddler" of the organization, and this has been and continues to be 
his greatest contribution to the success of the Beloit Corporation. 
Many paper company leaders still see Moore as their first point of 
contact with the Beloit Corporation when they are interested in a new 
machine because of his 43 year reputation for integrity, his knowledge 
of their problems, and his longstanding friendships. 1 

Although Moore claims he was not as good a salesman as E. H. Neese, 
Sr., he is the consummate salesman of his era and his era is much more 
complex than the earlier one. 2 Beloit went foreign in both sales and 
company expansion during this time and to be a good salesman overseas 
required more knowledge, patience, and savvy due to the necessity to 
master foreign customs and business practices often at odds with what 
was familiar in the United States. The result was a continuing success 
for the company that was in large measure due to Moore's insight and 
abilities. Beloit expanded around the world and became able to serve 
any market, The company practically achieved Moore's goal of bidding 
on every machine sold in the world

During this time Moore and other company leaders reveled in the 
close relationships they had with paper industry leaders and the 
dependence many of these leaders had upon the innovations and quality 
products of Beloit. During the 1960's, the chief executive of one 
large paper company even told Moore that it was part of Beloit's job 
to help them keep their costs down. Furthermore, Beloit was to keep 

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them out of trouble, and, if they got into trouble, Beloit was to 
be there to help them out of it. 3  Moore was especially responsive 
to challenges like this seeing them as natural outgrowths of the 
strong sales approach to success that he especially emphasized and 
symbolized as Beloit's leader. 

Although Beloit had long considered it their duty to provide 
essential support services to paper mills, they formalized this with 
the establishment of the Beloit Technical Service Group in the 1960's. 
This was and is a service organization of 10 engineers and technicians 
with reserves in the engineering and research departments. It is a 
trouble-shooting group that, for a nominal per diem charge, attempts 
to solve machine problems within the paper mill. Most requests from 
mills involve problems on older machines and newer machines that are 
out of warranty. In the process of aiding the mills by making Beloit's 
competitors' machines work better, Beloit's service group often in-directly 
leads the mills to make their own conclusion that Beloit 
machines are superior. Thus, While service is the purpose of the 
group, increased sales of Beloit machinery is often the logical outcome.

 
Moore's great success as a salesman began with the basic premise 
of his predecessor, E.H. Neese, Sr,, that the customer came first. 
Over the years Moore boiled down his sales beliefs into the 10 commandments 
of selling, and he promoted these to Beloit employees. In sum, 
they are an impressive collection of do' s and don'ts that emphasize 
professionalism, customer service, self-criticism, humbleness, opportunity, 
and integrity. 4 

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As Moore passed his 60th birthday the Board of Directors decided to make him Chairman and to name E. H. (Ebbie) Neese, Jr.6  the new President. While that that decision seems entirely logical since Beloit was a family owned corporation and Ebbie Neese was the only son of E. H. Neese, Sr. 6 then active in the corporation, it was not clear to Ebbie that he was to be the next President. Ed Lever, then Executive Vice-President, was a strong contender but Ebbie, who had been running 
Beloit's affiliate in England since 1970, was the ultimate choice in 
a decision he did not participate in. 5  He was named President in December 1974.

 Ebbie Neese worked for Beloit for the first time in between 
his junior and senior years at Exeter. He graduated from Exeter in 
1942 and because of World War II entered an accelerated engineering 
program at Purdue University, After graduating in 1944 he ultimately 
joined the navy and finished out the war as an ensign in charge of a 
construction battalion on Okinawa. He was discharged in 1946 and 
returned to begin the only career he ever considered -at his father's 
company. 6 

Like other family members since and Harry Moore before him, he 
and his brother, Alonzo, learned the business from the bottom up. 
He spent time working throughout the company before going with Harry 
Moore on the sales trip to Europe in the late 1940's. By the mid 1950's, 
both he and his brother, Alonzo, were becoming increasingly important 
in the running of the business. As a consequence he was named Treasurer 
and Alonzo, Secretary, in 1956. 

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In the meantime, he had met his wife, Peggy, appropriately 
at an International Paper Company lodge in Canada where she was vacationing 
with her family as he with his. Both families were personal 
friends of Dick Cullen, the President of International Paper. Over 
the years the close family that developed after their marriage in 1947 
has grown to 6 children and 6 grandchildren.

In December, 1960 Ebbie and his family moved from Beloit to 
Downingtown, Pennsylvania where he ran Beloit's Downingtown plant. In 
January, 1962 they moved again this time to Pittsfield, Massachusetts 
where he became President of E. D. Jones & Sons, another Beloit acquisition. 
After 5 years in Massachusetts, they moved to England where 
Ebbie ran Beloit's overseas sales office at Kingston-on-Thames. In 
December, 1970, they moved again, this time to Bolton, England, where 
Ebbie assumed an executive position in Beloit's affiliate Beloit-Walmsley. 
Perhaps the key to his choice as President of the Beloit Corporation 
in 1974 was the knowledge by Moore and the Directors that wherever 
Ebbie Neese had gone profits had improved. Jones was losing money 
until his tenure there after which it became profitable. In all the 
other positions his expertise had helped to raise profits. 7 

At the time Ebbie returned to Beloit from England in December, 1974, 
Beloit had just finished the only year since its reorganization in 
1887 that if failed to operate at a profit. However, even at that 
time, the potential for future profits was good because sales were 
strong and inflation, which in large measure had caused the deficit, 
was being overcome by escalation clauses in most of the new contracts. 
While Beloit's long range prospects were good when Neese returned, 
the immediate future was full of problems especially with the banks 

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that had loaned the corporation money to allow it to rapidly expand 
its plants in 1973-1974. Beloit had used this money as well as money 
from customer advances for a major building program and the acquisition 
of new, improved tools. When a loss occurred in fiscal 1974, the banks 
got nervous and pressured Beloit to cut back. In Harry Moore's words, 
1974 "scared the hell out of us 8 

As the new President, Ebbie's first job was to reduce costs 
drastically. His efforts, combined with those of Moore and the fine 
senior staff of executives that they surrounded themselves with, quickly 
bore fruit. Senior executives like Bill Goessel, Harry Horne, John 
Franz, Don Curtis, E. 3, Justus, and Hal Tower, as well as the managers 
of Beloit's plants around the world, cooperated together to devise 
ways to cut overhead. As a result of these joint recommendations, 
some executives were fired and successful attempts were made to con-serve 
cash instead of investing it in assets. Efficiency, which was 
down in 1973-1974 due to the rapid expansion and the need to train new 
workers, began to improve in 1975 as the new modern facilities reduced 
overhead and the workers became more skilled. By the end of fiscal 
1975, Beloit was very profitable and, more importantly, future profits 
looked even better. 

Success in 1975 and the more profitable years since was due to 
the mutual efforts of many people. Ebbie Neese turned out to have 
been an excellent choice to lead these efforts because of his personality 
and strong business practices. He and Harry Moore complemented 
each other because of their differences. 

Moore is flamboyant and outgoing, a charming man dedicated to sales 
and to a personalized approach ;in running the company. His basic thrust 

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has been to improve Beloit's share of the market by expanding around 
the world. Because of this he often found he was unable either to 
spend the time or give the emphasis he wanted to on the day-to-day 
management of the company. Ebbie by nature is soft-spoken, thoughtful, 
and unpretentious, an equally charming and especially well trained 
executive. Ruth more than Harry, he is an ardent believer in a sound 
organizational structure that allows the executives under it to make 
most of their own decisions while retaining their responsibility to 
the President. Neese follows the current rules for management as 
promoted by the American management Association. Because of his 
control techniques and because of his personal knowledge of so many 
members of the Beloit group of companies, his leadership has tended 
to be more conservative than that of Harry Moore. Neese is also extremely 
easy to work for because, unlike most executives, he is not particularly 
concerned about recognition. This relative lack of ego has helped him 
to be even-tempered and unemotional. He cares deeply about his family 
and the business but prefers to let his deeds be his calling card. 
Under his leadership Beloit's planning programs which began in the 
late 1960's under Moore, have been expanded and made more accurate. 10

 Neese seems ideally trained to do his job and the results seem 
to prove it. The years of joint control with Harry Moore -1975 to 
1978 -were all good profit years. Nineteen seventy-six was the best 
year in company history and the others were close behind, Neese became 
Chairman of the Board in October, 1978 and the 1979 fiscal year that 
followed became the second best year in corporate history. 
During the mid-to-late 1970's, major changes occurred within the 
corporate organization. One trend that remained constant for over a 

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decade reached fruition by the mid 1970's. This was to consolidate 
Beloit's foreign plants under 100% Beloit ownership instead of in 
partnership with other individuals or companies, This consolidation 
occurred in 2 steps, an intermediate one in 1971 and a final one in 
1976. In 1971 Beloit exchanged its 80% equity in Beloit Italia S. p. A, 
for additional equity in the Walmsley (Bury) Group Limited. This deal 
put the Italian company under the English company and increased Beloit's 
overall equity in the English company from 23% to 51.5%. In the same 
year Beloit increased its ownership in Beloit and Segura S. A. of 
Valladolid, Spain from 50% to 80%. In both bases the increased 
interest resulted in further Beloit investments in the millions of 
dollars for new plant and equipment at both sites, " These enthusiastic 
expansions and others in the early 1970's were a major cause 
of the financial crunch Beloit found itself in during the recession 
and inflation that followed the Arab-Israeli War in 7973.

Once Beloit was profitable again the consolidation continued, 
In early 1976 Beloit bought out the Simard family's interest in Beloit 
Sore1 (Canada), changed the company name to Beloit Canada Ltee/Ltd 
and put it under its wholly owned subsidiary Beloit-Walmsley International 
AG. In February, 1976 the corporation increased its share 
of Beloit Walmsley Limited from 51.5% to 100% This meant that Beloit 
also owned 80% of Beloit-Italia. By December, 1976 they raised this 
to 100% when they credited Cartiere Burgo, the 20% owner, for accounts 
Burgo owed Italia and for additional work over the next 3 years, In 
return Beloit owned all of Italia. For all practical purposes, Beloit 
acquired all of Beloit and Segura in 1976 although, since Mr. Segura 
had given away small amounts of his company to maids, cooks, and friends 

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over the years, a few shares have never been tracked down. Nevertheless, 
Beloit and Segura became Beloit Iberia in 1976. Thus, by the 
end of 1976 all of Beloit's overseas plants were 100% owned by the 
corporation. 12

This simplified the accounting but more importantly the accountability 
of the managers of these subsidiaries, However, no sooner had 
Beloit gotten total control over its overseas entities than it got 
involved in the partial control of another overseas company. This one 
was and is filled with danger and opportunity, and so far it has 
required Beloit's leaders to be patient and to persevere through a 
maze of politics that would test anyone's resolve. 

Beloit has been interested in building a plant in Brazil since 
1962. While Beloit can serve the Latin American market particularly 
from Spain or Italy, Brazilian tariffs have almost precluded sales in 
Brazil. If Beloit could build a manufacturing plant in Brazil and 
particularly if it could get Brazilian government incentives, it not 
only could compete in the Brazilian market but export lower-cost, 
Brazilian-built machines to the rest of Latin America. Moreover, one 
of Beloit's most capable competitors, Voith of West Germany, has had 
a plant in Brazil for a decade and has used it to sell to the United 
States domestic market where it is increasingly competitive with 
Beloit. 13 

Beloit's experiences in Brazil in the last 17 years would make 
a good novel complete with good and bad guys, idealism versus realism, 
and political and economic pressures both on and from Beloit. The 
essence of the story is that Beloit purchased a manufacturing site in 
Campinas in the State of Sao Paulo in southeast Brazil in 1962 and 

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sought government permission to build a factory. Shortly after the 
request was turned down, the civilian government of President Goulart 
fell to the military. Due to these internal problems Beloit did not 
appeal its request. By 1968 the situation was calmer, and Beloit 
entered the Brazilian market through a licensing agreement with a small 
company in Sao Paulo. The license covered only about 10% of Beloit's 
product line, and it lasted 5 years, after which the small company 
proceeded alone but continued to use the technology learned from Beloit 
to compete with Beloit. This was more of an irritation than a threat, 
but it was a portent of things to come.

In 1973 Beloit began to investigate various approaches to enter 
Brazil. Beloit's own problems delayed action until February, 1976 
when Beloit sent a letter of application to the Industrial Development 
Council (CDI) of Brazil. The CD1 is the Brazilian governmental agency 
that can aid new industry by giving incentives such as duty and sales 
tax concessions on imported equipment and tax privileges for purchases 
of locally-made equipment. CD1 incentives would reduce Beloit's total 
investment and be a great benefit to the company in its competition 
with Voith and a number of small Brazilian paper machine manufacturers. 
Needless to say the companies already in Brazil vehemently opposed 
any further competition, and CD1 was pressured from all sides. At this 
point the small manufacturer that had had the licensing agreement with 
Beloit from 1968 to 1973 reentered the picture. They offered to be 
Beloit's partner and to lead Beloit "into Brazil like Moses leading 
the Israelites into the Promised Land. l4 The cost was about a 600% 
premium on the value of this manufacturer's property. Not surprisingly 
Beloit turned this opportunity down. 14 

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other  liberal doses of Brazilian politics combined with 
indecision by CDI, Beloit decided that the best way to get into Brazil 
was not to go it alone but to seek a politically astute Brazilian 
partner. This was done by late 1977 and Beloit Rauma Industrial Ltd. 
was established with Beloit owning 35% but in charge of operating the 
plant on which construction had begun. Beloit's Brazilian partner, 
Monteiro Aranha, nominally controlled the ownership which also included 
a minority interest by Rauma Repola of Finland. 

By late 1979 the plant was nearly completed and orders were on 
the book& However, no incentives have yet been received from CDI 
although they still are possible. Beloit's interest in Brazil has 
become a multimillion dollar investment that, if successful, will be 
mutually beneficial to Brazil and to Beloit. In the meantime, the 
maze of Byzantine politics continues with no end definitely in sight. 
In mid-December, 1979 Beloit awaits the confirmation that the Brazilians 
have done away with export incentives. If true, Beloit would be treated 
like all other companies, and this is likely to be advantageous due to 
Beloit's technological leadership and competitiveness. 15 

Undoubtedly Brazil is the most complex and most interesting of 
Beloit's recent adventures, but the 1975-1979 period is full of new 
ideas and new projects primarily due to the company's prosperity and 
to the need to invest the results of that prosperity. 

One consistently good source of income for Beloit since the 1950's 
was the Beloit International Corporation C. A. (BICCA) which was a 
Venezuela Corporation that received nearly all its income from commissions, 
royalties, and interest. After Beloit affiliated with Walmsley in the 
early 1960's, BICCA became the Beloit Walmsley International C. A. 

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(BWICA). This name was retained until the mid 1970's, when due to 
Venezuelan government activities that hinted at taxes on offshore 
income or even possible expropriation, Beloit effected a tax free 
reorganization that moved this company to Switzerland and changed 
its name to the Beloit Walmsley International A. G. (BWIAG). BWIAG 
like its predecessors gets its income from commissions #or taking 
orders for Beloit's plants, from royalties, and from the interest it 
gets for financing customers who have ordered Beloit-built machinery. 
It also issues financial guarantees to customers. Switzerland is a 
good geographic location for its activities because both the political 
and economic atmospheres are stable and pro-business. 16 

BWIAG is a 100% owned direct shareholding entity of the Beloit 
Corporation which has under its jurisdiction 4 other Beloit companies. 
The first is Beloit Canada Ltd/ Ltee which until 1976 was Beloit Sore1 
and now is totally owned by Beloit. The second is Beloit do Brazil 
Ltda which is really a shell company that owns the land on which the 
new Beloit Rauma Industrial Ltda manufacturing facility in Campinas 
is being built. The third is Beloit Paper machines SARL in France 
which is another shell company that includes a small sales office and 
apartment. The fourth is Beloit Nippon Ltd of Japan. This is a 
technical service company that supports Mitsubishi in its licensing 
arrangements with Beloit. Because of Japanese exchange control laws, 
Beloit is allowed to own only 50% of this tiny company. 17 
In another process now going on and scheduled to be completed 
within 2 years, the Walmsley (Bury) Group Limited, a 100% Beloit owned 
holding company located in the United Kingdom, will be eliminated. At 
that time the 3 companies it owns will be directly owned by the Beloit 

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Corporation. These 3 are the Beloit Walmsley Limited, the company 
that owns the manufacturing facilities in England; Beloit Walmsley 
Pty. Ltd which runs a sales office and. an application engineering 
group in Australia; and Beloit Italia S. p. A., the paper machinery 
company located at Pinerola, Italy. 

In a move that is finally yielding some financial benefits in the 
late 1970's, the corporation set up the Beloit Export Corporation in 
1972.18 This Delaware corporation which has offices at the Beloit 
Foundry in South Beloit, Illinois was established to take advantage 
of Congress's generosity in passing tax deferral legislation allowing 
the founding of Domestic International Sales Corporations (DISC's). 
Under this plan, 50% of DISC income can be deferred. This means that 
a portion of Beloit's international sales can be sheltered temporarily 
from the United States income tax. This has not been of great significance 
to the company because the vast majority of its foreign business 
is handled directly by its subsidiaries. 19 

In another late 1970's small scale venture Beloit purchased a 9% 
interest in the Wrenford Insurance Company Ltd of Bermuda. This company 
is owned by a number of other companies including Rexnord, Dana, 
Head, and Beloit, and its purpose is self-insurance for its member 
companies. Beloit has all its casualty and product liability insurance 
with Wrenford and has found this is a money saver compared to placing 
the insurance with more conventional insurance companies. Product 
liability cases can be a real drain on time and effort since it is 
possible for Beloit still to be liable for a machine made in the 1920's 
that has passed through 2 or 3 owners if someone should get injured 
by it. This seemingly ridiculous situation has cost the company money 

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in the past even when the machines have been altered from the original 
Beloit design by various machine owners. 20 

After the Wrenford investment, Beloit set up Paperchine Insurance 
Ltd also in Bermuda. This is a 100% owned subsidiary that invests in 
reinsurance. It buys participation in risk pools and makes money on 
the premiums paid. It can also use its capital just to draw interest. 
Beloit's investment has been small so far but the returns are good. 21 

The last of Beloit's small investments in the late 1970's was 
the establishment of the 100% owned Beloit International Ltd in England. 
This organization has a sales office in London, and its purpose is to 
coordinate Beloit's overall marketing so one Beloit subsidiary, through 
ignorance, does not bid on a paper machine in competition with another 
subsidiary. 22 Beloit seeks to pick its most competitive international 
company to make its bid, and the decision on which one to choose is 
based on where the potential machine is located. 

Beloit was disillusioned by the failure of its diversification 
programs of the 1960's. By 1974 it had eliminated all of the money-losing, 
non-paper related divisions and joint ventures except for 
plastics. While the company suffered that year, the turnaround came 
so quickly that the urge and the necessity for further investments 
coincided in 1975. This time Moore, Neese, and other company leaders 
were determined to make good investments. Consequently, they decided 
to invest only in already profitable companies that made products 
related to the paper machine industry. Beloit had failed earlier by 
not understanding non-related products or their markets, and they were 
determined not to repeat that mistake again.

Consequently, in 1975 Beloit bought a 30% interest in the Lenox 

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Machine Company of Lenox, Massachusetts. Lenox was a profitable 
company that made small winders, roll handling equipment and extrusion 
coating machinery. Beloit had made these products for some time but 
always found it difficult to be competitive. With the investment and 
the combined expertise, the late 1970's results were promising enough 
so that Beloit accelerated the final step to complete ownership and 
bought the remaining 70% in 1978.23 

Beloit was so prosperous in 1976 and 1977 that it had a large amount 
of surplus cash available for investment and diversification. Consequently, 
Beloit sought the advice of acquisition experts. One result of this was the complete asset acquisition of the Roll covering Division of Raybestos-Manhattan, the sale of which was closed on September 30, 1977. This multimillion dollar investment enabled Beloit to 
expand the sales of their newly developed roll covers, heretofore manufactured 
only in Beloit, to 3 other locations in Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, 
and Mississippi. Beloit-Manhattan, Inc. was the result, and it was 
immediately expanded with the building of a new installation in Aiken, 
South Carolina. Besides making rubber covered rolls, each of these 4 plants 
was to be utilized to increase Beloit's maintenance and repair capabilities 
for its paper machinery clients. The plants were ideally located to pro-vide 
quick turnaround service on repairs. So far the investment has been 
a good one that, like Lenox, has aided Beloit in the sale of paper 
machinery. 24 

While the negotiations with Raybestos-Manhattan were going on in 1977, 
Beloit was also negotiating to buy a majority interest in Rader Companies, 
Inc. Rader was involved in the pulping, wood, and coal 
conveying business, and it was operating profitably. Rader, with sales 
of 35 million a year, was the biggest company Beloit had ever tried to 

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acquire. Negotiations continued into 1978 with Beloit becoming increasingly 
interested in the company and especially its coal processing 
technology. After a Beloit commissioned report declared that the 
Radmark Coal Handling technology was feasible, Beloit purchased 57% 
of Rader in early 1978. According to the agreement made at the time, 
in a few years Beloit will own 100% of Rader. 25

While Rader is somewhat related to Beloit's expertise, this 
acquisition led away from Beloit's strength and the tacit lessons 
learned in the early 1970's. Yet Rader came to Beloit highly recommended, 
and it appeared to be a relatively conservative diversification. 
During 1979, at least one of Beloit's Directors expressed his concerns 
about Rader's management and operations, and it is clear that Beloit 
is "closely monitoring" Rader's projections and activities. Rader's 
plans remain enthusiastic, and if the words turn into deeds, Beloit 
will find Rader to be a bargain. 26 

While Rader was a diversification, Beloit also made two unrelated 
investments during 1978 in areas far afield from the paper industry. 
Yet each seems to have the potential for both short and long range 
advantages for the company providing Beloit quickly picks up the needed 
expertise to insure their profitability. 

The first of these was Beloit's acquisition of Jo-Su-Li Farms, 
Inc. - a 5600 acre farm in Georgia acquired for a multimillion dollar 
price. Beloit's new entity, Beloit Farms, Inc., is a wholly owned 
subsidiary of the corporation. One of Beloit's Directors warned that 
the agr-business was essentially illiquid and that running it required 
an expertise probably not available within the company. Nevertheless, 
he deferred to stockholders' desires to own and work this property. 

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Since the purchase was finalized in August, 1978, a professional 
manager under the jurisdiction of Hal Tower runs the farm. So far 
Beloit's management team is happy with this hedge against inflation -so 
happy that a nearby 805 acre farm has also been purchased. 27 Whether 
or not ownership of this farm remains attractive will depend on its 
ability to make money from cattle, hogs, and crops as well as how 
quickly agricultural land continues to inflate in price.

Beloit's other major investment in 1978 was even more expensive 
than Beloit Farms, Inc. and very different from anything the company 
had done before. Negotiations began in late 1978 and were finalized 
in 1979 for the purchase of the Pittsburgh and Lake Erie Railroad, a 
wholly owned subsidiary of the bankrupt Penn Central system. Eventually 
Beloit and some Pennsylvania investors purchased this railroad 
with Beloit holding a 51% share. This coal hauling railroad also owns 
unencumbered rolling stock, real estate, coal royalties, and coal 
reserves. Since the railroad has traditionally been a money maker, 
Beloit sees its equity interest as a passive investment that should 
earn more for Beloit than if Beloit put its money in a bank. Again 
this is a very different kind of involvement for the company but the 
acquisition experts recommended it highly and consider it a safe, 
profitable investment. 28 There is a potential tie between Rader's 
interest in coal technology and the railroad's ownership of coal 
reserves. Given the precarious nature of the nation's energy situation, 
the railroad and Rader could turn out to be bonanzas

Beloit's other acquisition during this time was much more conventional. 
During late 1978 and early 1979, the corporation purchased 
100% of the shares of the Beloit Foundry Company, a family owned, modern 

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foundry located in South Beloit, Illinois. Four years before, Beloit 
had set up a separate Castings Division since about 50% of its casting 
work was being done for other companies. By 1978 it could not keep 
up with its orders, and it needed additional capacity. 2g Thus, the 
acquisition of the Beloit Foundry and its placement into the Castings 
Division was a logical and potentially very profitable expansion within 
Beloit's area of greatest expertise. 

The separate Castings Division has been a consistent money maker 
for Beloit as have Beloit's two other older interests in the paper-making 
machine business. Wheeler Roll of Kalamazoo, Michigan acquired 
in the 1960's and designated as the Wheeler Division has always been 
small but profitable. Beloit celebrated 50 years of partial ownership 
of the Sandusky Machine and Foundry Company of Sandusky, Ohio in the 
late 1970's. Sandusky continues to be the main United States manufacturer 
of centrifugally cast shells for the paper industry. Beloit, 
which has a one third interest, receives a good return on its investment 
every year. 

The Paper Machinery Division (PMD) in Beloit continues as the 
company's bread and butter and efforts were made to strengthen it in 
the late 1970's. The company spent millions of dollars in the early 
1970's to expand capacity in Beloit, Wisconsin, and despite good 
orders in 1974, inflation and inefficiency due to the rearranging and 
expansion of facilities caused a loss for the year. For Corporation 
leaders it was one thing to lose money in the Plastics Machinery 
Division, but they never expected to lose money in the area of their 
greatest strength -one which was literally under their noses. 
By early 1975 PMD operations were becoming profitable although 

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about 25% of their backlog of almost 200 million in sales was without 
escalation. This meant that some Beloit contracts were still vulnerable 
to inflation, but the majority had escalation clauses that would enable 
machine prices to keep pace with inflation. By this time Beloit's 
work force was stabilized, and the shop expansion program completed. 
Cost reduction programs were also being implemented. Consequently, 
company leaders were cautious but optimistic that 1975 would be a good 
year for the PMD. 30 

Beloit's formal budget plan for fiscal 1975 turned out to be much 
too pessimistic. Probably because of the loss in fiscal 1974, company 
planners underestimated the resilience of the PMD. By mid 1975, projections 
were revised and higher profits were projected. When the 
results were in in late 1975, the profit was even better than what had 
been projected at midyear. 31

In 1975 Beloit was in the midst of a profit improvement program, 
an inventory reduction program, and a cash conservation program. Each 
helped the Paper Machinery Division and the corporation as a whole to 
have the best year in its history in fiscal 1975.

Chairman Moore was elated at the results and gave Bill Goessel 
the credit for having the leadership ability that effected economies 
within the division's operation which made a "great contribution" to 
the profit improvement. Goessel, a company employee since 1950, and 
Director since 1969, had been named Vice-President of the Paper Machinery 
Division after Ed Lever resigned in 1975. Ebbie Neese and his management 
team were also praised as was John Franz and his financial organization. 32 

After the breakthrough to renewed profitability in fiscal 1975, 

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the PMD regained and has retained its starring role throughout the 
remainder of the 1970's. P% D profits for 1976 were double what was 
forecast, and even though shipments declined in 1977, profits remained 
high. New orders poured in during 1977 and 1978 partly due to an 
upward turn in the paper cycle that pointed to the need for new 
capacity. Equally as important were the effects that Beloit's innovations 
were having on the market by the late 1970's. Despite strong 
competition, Beloit's leadership in design and manufacturing was recognized 
worldwide. As a result, PRD deliveries increased again in 1978 
and 1979, and profits remained very satisfactory even in 1979 when PMD 
was struck by the Machinists' Union. 33 

This quick return to profitability in the PMD between 1974 and 
1975 was mirrored at the Jones Division of Dalton, Massachusetts. 
The Jones Division, the former E. D. Jones & Sons 1950's acquisition 
of the Iron Works, had been a steady, if non spectacular,  profit maker 
during the 1960's and early 1970's. It was a worthwhile investment 
that had enabled Beloit to expand into stock preparation equipment, 
a product line vital to the complete paper machine builder. Jones, 
like PMD, was caught in 1974 by price controls, inflation, and the 
necessity to hire and train new manpower. Consequently, it operated 
at a small loss in fiscal 1974.34

As in PHD, escalation was introduced during 1974 and began to take 
effect by 1975. By the end of the 1975 fiscal year Jones was firmly 
in the black after the largest sales year in their history. Also, 
their research facility had begun to experiment with Thermo-mechanical 
Pulping. They were also involved in research on de-inking of newsprint 
for recycling, and with Walmsley in the general area of research on the 

Page 251

reuse of other grades of paper. TMP and recycling research continued 
throughout the rest of the 1970's and profits remained very satisfactory. 
35 

While Jones has prospered, the Plastics Machinery Division, also 
located in Dalton, has been a major disappointment for almost 2 decades. 
Since Beloit's introduction into plastics in the early 1960's, this 
division has remained unprofitable and constantly in flux. The 
Division has been moved a number of times before locating in Dalton, 
and relocation costs have been significant. Moreover, while potentially 
high profits have continually been forecast for a successful plastics 
operation, the Division has practically drowned in red ink. In fiscal 
year 1974, the only year the Corporation lost money in its modem 
history, plastics was the major case. Without its losses overall 
company operations would have been comfortably in the black. 
Company leaders have long been deeply concerned about this Division 
and its losses which have ranged from "tremendous" in 1974 and 
"disastrous" in 1975, to losses less than expected in 1976. Through-out 
this time Beloit pruned its operations to get rid of unprofitable 
lines in plastics. In 1977 billings increased substantially but the 
Division remained unprofitable. Since then plastics has remained 
under continuous monitoring and outside experts have advised Beloit 
to retain it. Thus, as Beloit begins the 1980's its weakest company 
still continues to struggle. Yet, expert advisers believe that it 
can be made to work profitably. 36 Perhaps E. 3. Justus' tongue-in-cheek 
account of the evolution of a paper machine order can be applied 
to the Plastics Machinery Division as a whole especially if projections 
of profitability are finally reached. According to this the logical 

Page 252

sequence of events would be: 

1. Unbridled enthusiasm 
2. Emergence of doubt 
3. Search for the guilty 
4. Punishment of the innocent 
5. Credit to the uninvolved. 37 

Despite continued problems of the Plastics Division, the Beloit 
Corporation remains strong in all its other operations. Even Beloit-Iberica 
which has problems due to disarray within the Spanish paper 
industry, can be kept busy subcontracting for other Beloit plants. 
It remains Beloit's lowest cost facility and it is under new management. 
However, its original purpose of serving the Spanish paper industry now 
seems out-of-date. 38 Since Latin America will be served by Beloit's 
new plant in Brazil, Spanish ties to Latin America are also lessening 
in importance. 

Beloit-Walmsley also had its problems in the late 1970's although 
Walmsley's future success is very likely. Small profits in fiscal 
1976 declined to a slight loss in 1977. In 1978 Walmsley was still 
a problem, but 1979 sales were up 14% and the company was profitable. 
Better sales, operating efficiencies, and new management combined with 
a multimillion dollar plant modernization all have pointed the way to 
future success. 39 

Beloit-Italia remains one of the Corporation's star performers 
during the late 1970's. Profits were good in 1975 even though Europe's 
paper industry was tremendously depressed. In 1976 profits were well 
above plan even though billings were less than plan. This situation 
continued in 1977 when net income was almost six times what Beloit 

Page 253

expected. In the past 2 years Italia has continued its strong showing 
and seems to be picking up even more strength especially from rebuilds. 40 
Beloit-Canada had a number of poor years in the early 1970's when 
the Canadian paper industry was depressed. They righted themselves 
in 1975 and enjoyed the best year in their history. The success 
continued in 1976 as profits improved again. They remained profitable 
in 1977 although sales were not as good. However, by the late 1970's, 
the paper industry in Canada not only had revived but was exploding. 
Sales into the Canadian market plus the sales of 3 very profitable 
machines to Poland insured Beloit-Canada's success. Secondary products, 
such as Gould's pumps, have also become profitable. The paper cycle 
in Canada is on an upward swing and Beloit-Canada's immediate future 
is very promising. 41

Combined with Beloit's overseas affiliates and its investments 
and subsidiaries in the United States are three foreign licensees. 
The Mitsubishi license in Japan has been a consistent source of good 
income for Beloit since its inception in the 1950's. It remains very 
important because through Mitsubishi the Beloit name and product line 
have become well known throughout the Far East. With the likelihood 
that the Peoples Republic of China will need new paper machines in the 
near future, Beloit probably will expand even more in this part of the 
world. 

Beloit's other licensees are with Polimex-Cekop in Poland and 
Jessops in India. Both are becoming increasingly important and have 
aided sales from Beloit-Italia, BeloibCanada, and Beloit-Walmsley 
during the late 1970's. The Polish agreement is especially advan-tageous 
in that it permits Beloit to supply some papermaking equipment 

Page 254

for soft currency to Iron Curtain countries. Jessop's value to Beloit 
will improve as India's paper needs increase, but in the meantime the 
licensing arrangement has been instrumental in the placing of a few 
orders. 42 

In order to get the most out of this increasingly complex organization, 
Ebbie Neese and the Board of Directors had to decide whether or 
not they wanted to increase Beloit's paper machine handling capacity.
Demand was strong in the late 1970's and Beloit certainly had the money 
to expand if they chose to. However, since the paper industry has 
traditionally been so cyclical in its demands, expansion when demand 
was up would undoubtedly lead to contraction and disarray when demand 
inevitably declined. After a number of discussions among company 
executives, Bill Goessel formalized their joint thoughts in-a report 
to the Board of Directors. Under the plan Beloit decided to use its 
existing plants to handle market requirements. New tools and equipment 
were to be purchased and new scheduling methods and systems developed 
to improve Beloit's deliveries and response time. The key to the plan 
was in making better use of existing facilities. Over the previous 
12 years, plant utilization had been only 64.3% of capacity. If this 
could be raised worldwide to an average of 80%, Beloit could adequately 
meet its customers' demands while maintaining a stable work force. 
Since PMD was already overloaded some of' its work was subcontracted 
to other Beloit Group companies as well as Beloit's Japanese licensee, 
Mitsubishi. 43 

This is a "hotly debated" idea whose success depends on whether 
Beloit's customers are satisfied. So far "the jury is still out" but 
initial results are favorable in that the work has been spread thus 

Page 255

benefiting some underutilized Beloit Group plants. However, some 
deliveries have been unavoidably delayed and the future consequences 
of this are unknown. Good performance is the main requirement if 
this strategy is to work. 44 Fortunately for Beloit, they have a 
tradition of good workmanship and a longstanding policy of guaranteeing 
that their products will be virtually the same whether made in the 
United States, Canada, Europe, or Japan

If Beloit is to retain its world leadership, research and development 
must continue to provide new and better products. On the eve. of 
the 1980's, research and development was centralized for the whole 
Beloit Group under E. J. Justus, Corporate Vice-President, Research 
and Development. This change strengthened Beloit's product leadership 
advantage by insuring that research was better coordinated and duplication 
among the divisional research groups avoided. As a consequence 
of this decision, high speed Bel-Bond research and development moved 
to Beloit while board grade development was left at Walmsley. 
The Beloit Research Center added a third experimental paper 
machine to develop the concept of horizontal twin-wire formers. This 
expands Beloit's research capabilities especially in the market area 
of rebuilding Fourdriniers into horizontal twin-wire farmers. The new 
machine also is equipped with the next generation of the commercially 
successful Converflo headbox which Beloit hopes will bring the simultaneous 
formation of mutli-layered sheets on the Fourdrinier closer 
to reality. 45 

The Beloit Research Center has also developed the Extended Nip 
Press, and it is being installed by Weyerhaueser on a linerboard 
machine. The Extended !jip Press has been in the process of development 

Page 256

for a decade and, if successful, tremendous energy reductions will 
result. In full operation it will be less expensive, and it will 
produce energy savings of approximately 25% on the amount of steam 
needed to dry paper. Beloit is also involved in other projects aimed 
at energy reduction. 46 

The Jones Research Center is continuing to work on Thermo mechanical 
Pulping. The first complete Jones TMP system has now started up at 
Southeast Paper in Dublin, Georgia. This development was begun in the 
early 1970's, and Beloit's improvements over competitive systems are 
designed to save about 25% of the power used. Such a technological 
edge over Beloit's competition would undoubtedly allow Beloit to gain 
a larger share of the market. Since the overall market for TMP systems 
is projected at 200 million per year in the 1980's, advantages to 
Beloit are obvious. 47

In the meantime, the Bolton research facility, in conjunction 
with Italy and Jones, continues work on the recycling of waste papers. 
Their counter-current washing and pressing method to de-ink newsprint 
has good potential particularly in saving chemicals and power. High 
quality fibers have been produced and the company is confident that 
its processes are better than others previously on the market. 48 

With the completion of the Brazil facility, Beloit plants are 
strategically located throughout the world and ready to serve any 
market. While foreign competition remains significant, paper mills 
both in the United States and abroad have made Beloit the preferred 
supplier for many parts of a paper machine. According to a domestic 
survey published in Pulp & Paper Magazine, Beloit is number one in 
twin-wire machines, multiple-ply machines, headboxes, coaters, calendars, 

Page 257

winders, and refiners. A similar foreign survey in Pulp and Paper 
International listed Beloit as the first choice in paper machine 
rebuilds, press rebuilds, and twin-wire machines. Beloit is also 
considered the most innovative supplier. 49 

The outstanding performance and design superiority of Beloit 
equipment is well known and much envied. As the 1970's decade ends, 
over 70 of the world's newsprint tonnage is being produced on Beloit 
machines. The world's widest machine, a 10 meter Strata-F10 liner-board 
machine, made by Beloit-Walmsley, is in operation at Obbola, 
Sweden, and Beloit machines hold world speed records in many grades including 
newsprint, lightweight coating raw stock, one time carbonizing, 
and facial tissue. 50

After the 5 best years in its history Beloit's management looks 
at the 1980's with optimism and confidence. Continued expansion 
is likely particularly in those areas that are related to innovations 
in paper machines. Beloit may also get involved in unrelated areas 
that provide investment opportunities.

Good executive leadership both within and without the family has 
been a hallmark of the corporation throughout the 20th century. Between 
the 1930's and the 1950's, Elbert H. Neese, Sr. was fortunate to have 
had dedicated non-family executives such as C. Elmer Macklem,, Bill 
Wood, Wiley Smith, H. F. Tower, Earl Berry, Charles T. Ramsden, G. A. 
Xacklem, and Lloyd Hornbostel. Some of these men carried over into 
the early expansion period of the late 1950's and early 1960's, but others 
such as J. E. (Bill) Goodwillie, Ed Beachler, Arthur Laage, Donald 
Simonds, W. E. Watson, Hal Tower, John Franz, Don Curtis, John Walsh, 
3. W. Spence and E. C. Lever reached high levels within the corporation 
at that time. After the turmoil of expansion and contraction in the 
1960's and early 1970's, the Beloit Group has become so large and 

Page 258

complex as expansion has continued that a list of important executives 
has become too long to be meaningful. The major Beloit Corporation 
officers in 1979 are: 51 

Chairman & President. .  . . .................................................. . . .E. H. Neese, Jr. 
Vice-President. . . . . . . ...................................................... . . . .A. A. Neese, Sr.
Executive Vice-President, Administration, and General Counsel . .J. H. Franz
Executive Vice-President, Operations. . . . . . . . . . ................... .W. W. Goessel
Executive Vice-President, Corporate Marketing . . . . . ........... . .H. K. Horne
Vice-President, Corporate Planning and Public Relations . ........ .D. W. Curtis
Vice-President, Corporate Research & Development..................E. J. Justus
Vice-President, Research. . . . ....................................................J.I. Bergstrom
Secretary . . . . . . . . . ......................................................... . . . .K.L. Salzberg
Treasurer . . . . . . . . .                                                         . . . . .H. E. Tower

Beloit's success in the past 5 years has only underlined a spirit 
of mostly anonymous generosity that goes back even earlier than World 
War II. Through the Beloit Foundation, various trusts, and personal 
giving the Beloit Corporation has helped make the community of Beloit 
a better place to live. Beloit College, the local academically 
superior private institution, has been closely tied to the Beloit 
Corporation and its predecessors since the 1850's. Both the Neese 
family and Harry Moore have taken a particular interest in the college. 
Primarily because of their help, the college is now able to look forward 
with confidence to the challenges of the 1980's. 

The company enters the 1980's as a family corporation, actively 
run by a family member, Ebbie Neese. Three generations of the Aldrich-Neese 
extended family have run the Corporation so far, and members of 
the fourth generation are presently employed in responsible positions. 
Whether another Neese will become President in the future depends on 
whether his qualifications match him for the job because the success 

Page 259

of the company is more important than having a family member run it. 52 
Beloit's success in the past has been achieved by making the company 
a partner in papermaking with thousands of other companies throughout 
the world. It is the company's goal to continue to expand this 
partnership.

Page 260

1 Moore speech to International Sales Conference, November 1, 1971; E. H. Neese, Jr. interview, October 30, 1979.

2 The combination of Moore and Lloyd Hornbostel could sell almost any-thing. One East Coast mill bought a Beloit Air Loaded Headbox after a Hornbostel presentation and then called Don Curtis in to explain  to them what they bought. Curtis interview, October 29, 1979. 

3 Harry Moore speech to P. I. R. A., 1978 Beloit Corporation Archives. 

4 Harry Moore speech at Orono, Maine, August 5, 1960, Beloit Corporation Archives. The 10 commandments have also been printed separately on a number of occasions. 

5 E. E.. Neese, Jr. interview, November 30, 1979. Alonzo Neese, Sr., Ebbie's brother, was a Vice-President but not involved in the day-to-day activity of the corporation after he moved to Florida in the late 1960's. 

6 Peggy Neese interview, November 29, 1979. 

71bid. Phone interview, December 3, 1979. 

8 Harry Moore interview, September 6, 1979. 

9 E. H. Neese, Jr. interview, November 30, 1979; Don Curtis interview, October 29, 1979; Harry Moore interview, September 6, 1979.

10 Peggy Neese interview, November 29, 1979; Harry Moore interview, August 2,1979; Ebbie Neese interview, November 30, 1979. 

11 Harry Moore letter to stockholders, February 8, 1972. 

12 Karl Salzberg phone interview, November 27, 1979; Harry Moore letter to 
stockholders, February 11, 1977. 

13 Bill Goessel interview, July 11, 1979. 

14 Don Curtis speech, "Problems Encountered in Entering Brazil Today," I& y22-24, 1978, Beloit Corporation Archives. 

15 Don Curtis' speech, previously cited, is an entertaining, ironic, and full account of Beloit's attempts to enter Brazil. It can be supplemented by practically all the Directors' meetings minutes from 1976 through 1979; for the latest events a phone interview with Hal Tower 
on December 10, 1979 was rmost helpful. 

16 Karl Salzberg phone interview, November 27, 1979; Minute Book, May 21, 1975; Harry Moore letter to stockholders, January 2, 1976. 

17 Karl Salzberg phone interview, November 27, 1979. 

18 This company is different from the long defunct Beloit Export Corporation of the 1950's. 

Page 261

19 Harry Moore letter to shareholders, January 17, 1973; Karl Salzberg telephone interview, November 27, 1979. 

20 Salzberg phone interview, November 27, 1979; John Franz interview, 
October 25, 1979. 

21 Karl Salzberg phone interview, November 27, 1979. 

22 Ibid. 

23 Harry Moore letter to shareholders, January 2, 1976; Elbert Neese, Jr. letter to stockholders, January 13, 1979; Minute Book, December 7, 1978. 

24 Harry Moore letter to shareholders, January 25, 1978; Minute Book, 
August 17, 1977. 

25 Minute Book, August 17, 1977, October 2, 1977, December 2, 1977, February 

21, 1978, May 17, 1978; E. H. Neese, Jr. interview, November 30, 1979. 

26 Minute Book, June 13, 1979, August 15, 1979; E. H. Neese, Jr. interview, November 30, 1979. 

27 Minute Book, May 17, 1978, August 17, 1978; Karl Salzberg phone interview, November 27, 1979. 

28 Bill Goessel interview, July 27, 1979; Minute Book, October 16, 1978, January 23, 1979, June 13, 1979, August 15, 1979. 

29 Bill Goessel interview, July 26, 1979; Minute Book, October 16, 1978, December 7, 1978. 

30 Harry Moore letter to shareholders, January 15, 1975. 

31 Harry Moore letter to shareholders, May 9, 1975, January 2, 1976. 

32 Harry Moore letter to shareholders, January 2, 1976. 

33 Harry Moore letter to shareholders, February 11, 1977, January 25, 1978; E. H. Neese, Jr. letter to shareholders, January 13, 1979. 

34 Harry Moore letter to shareholders, January 15, 1975. 

35 1bid., January 2, 1976, February 11, 1977, January 28, 1978, January 13, 1979. 

36 1bid,; E. H. Neese, Jr. interview, November 30, 1979. 

37 Quoted by Harry Moore in the Beloit Group International Marketing Bulletin, Vol. 2, No. 3, February, 1974, p. 2. 

38 E. H. Neese, Jr. interview, November 30, 1979. 

39 Hal Tower phone interview, December 10, 1979. 

40 Harry Moore letter to shareholders, January 2, 1976, February 11, 1977, January 25, 1978; E. H. Neese letter to shareholders, January 13, 1979. 

Page 262

41 Ibid., Hal Tower phone interview, December 10, 1979.

42 Harry Moore letter to shareholders, January 25, 1978. 

43 E. H. Neese, Jr. interview, November 30, 1979; Minute Book, December 7, 1978; February 17, 1979. 

44 E. H. Neese, Jr. interview, November 30, 1979. 

45 E. H. Neese, Jr. speech to Board of Directors meeting, Rader Companies, 
Inc., July 17, 1979; E. H. Neese, Jr. speech for 1979 Controllers' Conference, undated, 1979. 

48 E. H. Neese, Jr. speech to Rader, July 17, 1979. 

49 Surveys reprinted in the Beloit Group International Marketing Survey, 
Vol. 4, No. 3, October, 1976, pp. 50-52. 

50 Harry Moore speech in the Peoples Republic of China, June 1, 1979. 

51 Minute Book, February 17, 1979. 

52 Harry Moore interview, August 2, 1979. 

Page 263

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Beloit Corporation Archives 

Of all the scattered sources located within the Corporation, the following were most useful: 

Minute Books, 1887 -1979. Elbert H. Neese, Sr. and Walter Dundore, "Pioneers Paper Machines," a loose-leaf compilation of machines sold and company events, 

1858-1958. Additions for the years 1958-1968 by Carole Sheldon. Speech files located in the company Research Library, South Beloit, Illinois. Many of these are cited in the end notes. 

Harry Moore, Letters to Shareholders, 1969-1978. 

Interviews 
Francis Ramsden J. E. (Bill) Goodwillie 
Yrs . C. Elmer (Grace) Zacklem James Macklem 
Harry Moore E. H. Neese, Jr. 
John Franz Bill Goessel 
E. J. Justus H. E. (Hal) Tower 

Newspapers 
Beloit Weekly Free Press Beloit Daily News 

Ed Beachler Karl Salzberg 
Don Ely Jan Bergstrom 
Mrs. E. H. (Peggy) Neese, Jr. Carl Brehm 
Harold Bayer Tom Jones 
Rodger Dopp Don Curtis 

Beloit Daily Free Press Milwaukee Journal 
Unpublished Materials 
Goodwillie, J. E. (Bill). "The City Club." 
Kobylka, Richard. "The Beloit Labor Movement and the Beloit Labor Journal , unpublished manuscript, February 4, 1979. 

Whalen, Henry. Interview, July 20, 1951. Wisconsin State Historical Society. 

Page 264

Books 
Armstrong, G. M. S. Pulp, Paper Power. Philadelphia, 1909. 
Bettendorf, Harry J. Paperboard and Paperboard Containers-A History. Board Products Publishing Company,
1946. 

Boorstin, Daniel. The Americans -The Democratic Experience. Vintage: New York, 1974. 
Faulkner, Harold U. Politics Reform and Expansion, 1890-1900. Harper & Row: New York, 1959. 
Garraty, John. The New Commonwealth. Harper and Row: New York, 1967. 
The Golden Book of American Industry. The Industrial Publishing Com-pany: Palisades Park, New Jersey, 1945. 

A History of the Wisconsin Paper Industry, 1848-1948. Howard Publishing Company, 1949. 

Hunter, Dard; Papermaking.

Jones, Dwight E. The Jones Story, 1845-1958. Pittsfield, Massachusetts, 1966. 

Leuchtenburg, William. The Perils of Prosperity. University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1959. 
Manchester, William. The Glory and the Dream. Bantam: New York, 1974. 
Progress of Paper. Lockwood Publishing Company: New York, 1947. 
Smith, David C. History of Papermaking in the United States of America. Lockwood Publishing Company: New York, 1970. 

Articles 

"A Salute to Beloit Italia," Partners Magazine, Winter, 1978. 
Beckes, William. "The First 145 Years of the Paper Flachine in the U. S. ,'I Paper Trade Journal, May 27, 1972. 

"Be1 Bond Former Is Said to Cut Costs, Improve Output and Quality of Board," Paper Trade Journal, July 15, 1977. 

"Beloit Engineering Progress," Paper Mill News, September 15, 1951. 
Berry, Earl E. "Anticipating Maintenance Expense by Proper Inspection," Paper Trade Journal, June 22, 1933. 

Page 265

Eurnham, L. A. "Mechanical Water Removal," Paper Industry, March, 1965. 
Carlson, Robert and Garde, Gerald. "New Pilot Coating Line Offers Wide Flexibility For Research," Pulp and Paper, May, 1977. 

Curtis, Don. "Recent Developments in Fourdrinier Paper Machines," Tappi, December 1956. 
Dennison, V. S. "The Beloit Suction Dual Press Section," The Paper Mill and Wood Pulp News, May 8, 1937. 

Diltz, Jack. "Flooded Nip Coaters and Their Operation," Paper Trade Journal, November 12, 1962. 

Evans, John C. W. and Machine Design and "Five New Beloit Machine Waelde, Charles G. "Significant Trends in Paper Operation-II ,  Paper Trade Journal, August 16, 1971. 

Five New Beloit Machines," Paper Mill News, July 18, 1953. 

"Georgia-Pacific Starts Up New Tissue Former at Crossett Mill," Pulp and Paper, August, 1977. 

Goodwillie, J. E. (Bill). "Developments in Design of Modern Fourdrinier Paper Machines, Paper Trade Journal, June 8, 1933. 

"Developments in the Papermaking Machine 1930-1940," Pacific Pulp and Paper Industry, December, 1939. 

 "Machine Possibilities," Pulp and Paper, February, 1950. 

Gustafson, David R. "Twinverform: High Points of Design and Development," Pulp and Paper, February 28, 1966.

Heys, Ralph C. "Pioneering with Millspaugh," The Paper Maker, February, 1966.

"Inverform Wet End Shows Promise," Paperboard Packaging, February, 1960. 

Johnston, Gary W. "New Approaches to Multi-ply Board Forming Now Coming Out of England," Pulp and Paper, September 1977. 

Justus, E. J. "Static-element Headbox Developed to Handle Increasing Width and Speed," Pulp and Paper, October, 1978. 

Cronin, Dennis. "The Vented-Nip Press," Tappi, August, 1964. 

"Longview Fibre's New Paper and Board Machine," Pacific Pulp and Paper, March, 1941.

Massey, Peter J. "Machine Coated Paper," Paper Trade Journal, May 24, 1945. 

Moore, Harry. "Trends in Paper Machine Design," Paper Trade Journal, May 31, 1945. 

Page 266

"Papermaking Developments and Trends Since the War," Paper Mill News, July 15, 1970. 

"Multi-ply and Stratified Web Forming Systems," Paper, May 23, 1977. 

Mustro, Robert J. "Twin-wire Formers Seen Expanding into Heavy Paper Board," Paper Trade Journal, October 15, 1975. 

"Our Partners in Sorel," Partners Magazine, Autumn, 1967. 

Parker, Joe and Hergert, Dick. "Simultaneous Convergence -A New Concept in Headbox Design," Tappi, October 1968. 

Petrie, Robert. "Contribution of War Industries to the Paper Machinery Industry," Paper Mill News, February 9, 1946. 

Rampel, C. Neil. "Factors Influencing Venta-Nip Press Water Removal Efficiency," Paper Trade Journal, December 27, 1971. 

Roberts. T. C. "Modern Paper Machines at Georgetown," Paper Mill and Wood Pulp News, September 11, 1937.

Spencer, George. "The Postwar Fourdrinier," Paper Mill News, December 26, 1942. 

"Successful Bel-Baie Former Now Further Improved," Paper Trade Journal, February 15, 1971. 

Tigwell, Percy. "The 1935 Fourdrinier Machine, '* The Paper Mill and Wood Pulp News, June 1, 1935. 

"Walmsley's Report on a Year of 'Great Activity'," The World's Paper Trade Review, December 13, 1962. 

Weisshuhn, F. E. "Tissue Machines: Their History and Development," Paper Technology, May, 1965.

Wicks, Laurie. "Press Section Rebuilds Can Give Existing Machines New Vitality," Pulp and Paper, November, 1977. 

Wolfe, Dexter. "The Twinverform Makes Its Debut," Pulp and Paper, February 28, 1966. 

END

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