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Aldrich had been a great leader, but his successor, Elbert H. 
Neese, Sr., was well prepared for the job through his one and one half 
decades of service to the Iron Works. The main challenge in 1932 was 
how the company would deal with the increasingly severe worldwide 
depression that was reaching its peak in the United States that year. 
After the prosperity of the 1920's people were accustomed to the idea 
that one's material progress would be constantly improving if you 
worked hard. With the "Crash" and the depression that followed, this 
maxim no longer seemed to be true. People did not know how to cope 
when their belief in the Protestant ethic was made false by the unprecedented 
severity of the Great Depression of the 1930's. People 
blamed themselves rather than outside forces like the government because 
nearly everyone had been brought up to believe in individual responsibility. 
Perhaps if the government had been blamed there would have 
been a revolution that went well beyond Roosevelt's slightly left of 
center New Deal to either an emulation of fascism on the right or 
communism on the left. 

Thus the country's state of mind when Neese took over was approaching 
panic proportions. So much had happened since the Wall Street crash in 
the fall of 1929. On the average stocks listed on the Big Board were 
worth 11% of their 1929 value. The Dow Jones industrial average bottomed 
out at 41.22 on July 8, 1932, and it would not again pass its 1929 high

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until 1954. Over 5,000 banks failed and 86,000 businesses 
ceased operations causing the country's Gross National Product to 
decline from 104 billion dollars to 41 billion. United States Steel, 
the bell weather to heavy industry, was operating at about 19% of 
capacity. 1  

For those who were working the average weekly wage was a little 
over $16, but with no minimum wages some people were paid less than 
one dollar for a 55 hour week. For those who had money, deflation 
brought great bargains -new Chevrolets were $445 F. O. B. Detroit, 
luxury goods were cheap by 1920's standards, and servants were plentiful 
and eager. Financiers and industrialists who had been national folk 
heroes in the 1920's quickly lost that reputation and many people 
were appalled when they learned that 1% of the population owned 59% 
of the wealth or that only 600 corporations owned 65% of American 
industry. Some tycoons made their situation worse by personal actions 
exposed by diligent investigators. The President of Chase sold his 
own bank's stock short so he could profit when its value went down. 
The President of the National City Bank loaned stockholders' money to 
bank officers for speculative purchases and required neither interest 
nor collateral. Many of the rich including J. P. Morgan avoided income 
taxes by selling securities to family members at a loss and then buying 
them back. Even Secretary of the Treasury Mellon, one of the most 
admired men and one of the richest, astounded the country by having 
his commissioner of internal revenue prepare an exclusive memorandum 
that showed Mellon twelve different ways to evade federal taxes. These 
tax dodges were legal, but when 15 to 17 million men were unemployed 
and many more underemployed one could to this only by flaunting public 

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opinion. As a result Time magazine coined the term "bankster" to rhyme 
with gangster and children sang: 

Mellon pulled the whistle, Hoover rang the bell, 
Wall Street gave the signal, And the country went to he11.2 

While the country had not gone to hell, the 1930's were the 
toughest and most challenging decade in American history for industrialists. 
From the outset E. H. Neese, Sr. was at the vortex of a whirlwind 
of potential success or disaster for the Iron Works. He was now almost 
solely responsible for the running of the company since, after his 
father-in-law's death, Neese and his wife had about seven-eighth's of 
the company's outstanding stock. Within the limits of the economy 
and his own abilities he could do as he pleased. Fortunately the company 
would be able to ride out the worst years of the depression, 1932 and 
1933, and emerge leaner but stronger. 

The years from the onset of the Depression to its winding down after 
World War II began were enigmatic ones. For the country as a whole 
despite some improvements due to New Deal measures, business remained 
stagnant and unemployment high for over a decade. Conversely, the paper 
industry bounced back rather rapidly so that by 1936 the company was 
selling more machinery than at any previous time. Employment was up 
and profits were good. This surge at the Iron Works mirrored and aided 
the recovery in the city of Beloit. Although individuals certainly 
suffered, the Depression in Beloit never reached the cataclysmic pro-portions 
found in the Dust Bowl, the rural South, or in most large 
cities. When the city celebrated its centennial in 1936 the mood was 
upbeat and confident. Unemployment was significantly lower than the 
national average, and Beloit's major industries were doing well. 

Page 84

By 1937 national industrial production and GNP were back to the 
1929 level and unemployment, while still too high, bad declined. At 
that point, Roosevelt, concerned about the increasing deficit, cut 
back on government spending and raised taxes. The result nearly 
balanced the budget but caused a severe recession from the summer of 
1937 to the autumn of 1938. Realizing his mistake, Roosevelt then 
increased spending and the situation was better by 1939.

 Despite this recession within the Depression the Iron Works was 
thriving. In fiscal 1937, the company recorded its highest sales 
figures of all time and 1938 sales were about 25% higher. Because of 
the 1937-38 recession's time-lag effect on its orders, and also because 
of the national over supply of linerboard, 1939's sales dropped back 
profits were satisfactory. In 1940 sales were below the 1936 level but 
up again to the second ended the Depression era highest level in history. 3 Thus the company was in the strongest position in its history. The company survived and then thrived in the 1930's but a quick overview overlooks the real difficulties that were present in the early 1930's that threatened its very existence. 

By the autumn of 1931, just months prior to Aldrich's death, the 
company had no complete paper machines on order and was totally dependent 
on the sales of spare parts and partial machines. This meant that there 
was a great deal of pressure on company engineers and salesmen to come 
up with improved products and convince paper companies to buy them 
despite the Depression. This was the key to Beloit's success in the 
early 1930's. They became nearly totally dependent on rebuilds, and 
contrary to most of their competitors, thrived by convincing their 
customers that the time to rebuild was when business was slow and downtime 

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on the machines was not so costly. It took guts to push this premise 
because customers had to have confidence that Beloit innovations would 
improve their machines so much that they would be more profitable when 
an upturn occurred. It was at this point when the economy was bottoming 
out that the company's superior reputation carried it. 

Many things were tried in order to sell machines. One unprecedented 
step was to send both G. A. Macklem and his son C. Elmer Macklem to 
Europe in 1930-1931 to get machine orders. They made three separate 
trips that kept them away from their families for ten months but they 
sold no machines. 4 Their failure was more apparent than real for they 
did bring back some orders for parts and more importantly made contacts 
that paid dividends for the company in the future. 

Another step to promote sales was an advertising campaign that 
noted Beloit's machinery improvements around a theme that "The Beloit 
Way is the Modern Way." Rubber covered suction rolls were introduced 
and promoted as eliminating the possibility of press roll marks while 
improving the quality of the paper, making it stronger, and most 
importantly making it cheaper. Advertising folders were sent to paper 
mill executives that emphasized Beloit's new developments like the 
Super-Shakes, the Hypoid Spiral Bevel Gear Drive, the Improved Suction 
Roll, and the Silent Chain Drives for dryers. 6 

While advertisements and pamphlets had some impact, probably the 
most important reasons why Beloit got rebuild orders was past reputation 
combined with personal contacts between Beloit executives and the leaders 
of various paper mills. Many examples could be cited, but the most 
important was the friendship between Dick Cullen, the President of Inter-national 
Paper, and Elbert H. Neese, Sr. Their friendship which was so 

Page 86

close that they took vacations together led to the most important re-build 
job the Iron Works got in the early 1930's. Beloit was permitted 
to rebuild and improve 30 to 35 I. P. machines. This kept the company ; & 3M ': 
busy for a long period of time at the depth of the depression? In Q 
fact rebuilds were the most important source of income for the company 
in the 1930's, and they were successful because of Beloit's leadership 
in design, engineering and new concepts. 

Long term implications were even more important. -Through rebuilds 
Beloit got its improvements on competitors' machines. Thus in the 
future, a company satisfied by a Beloit rebuild was more likely to buy 
a whole new machine from Beloit when one was needed. Since Beloit's 
competitors either were not as interested in rebuilds or could not 
compete with Beloit innovations, they were likely to lose business to 
Beloit once prosperity returned. In the meantime Beloit's reputation 
was enhanced and business rolled in when competitors of a company 
improved by a rebuild had to upgrade machines in order to compete. 
Reputation and innovations cannot be over-emphasized because 
Beloit's advantage even got down to the next level -that of suppliers. 
Paper mill suppliers often heard owners and superintendents gripe about 
problems like felts wearing out too quick or Fourdrinier wires breaking. 
Because of friendship with Beloit combined with a belief that Beloit's 
products were superior, they would recommend Beloit parts to solve the 
problems of other manufacturers' machines. The end result was that some 
of the suppliers' salesmen "were like some of [Beloit's] own people. 118 
During the Depression the company reaped the benefits of the Aldrich 
policy of getting good men and paying them well. Earl Berry, who had 
been made Vice-President for Engineering in 1930, was the key man, although 

Page 87

Lloyd Hornbostel, a young engineer that Berry had hired in 1926, was 
rising in importance. Both Hornbostel and Berry were great innovators 
who were not afraid to take chances that might result in failure. Their 
efforts and the efforts of their staff to improve Beloit's products were 
major reasons why the Iron Works continued to lead the nation's paper 
machine manufacturers during the troubled 1930's. While there were a 
large number of improvements during this time a few were outstanding 
in their impact. 

Undoubtedly the most significant, and one of the earliest was Earl 
Berry's development of rubber covered suction press rolls. This was a 
further improvement on Berry's adaptation of Millspaugh's ideas on 
suction rolls, and it significantly improved the machines. This innovation 
allowed the increased production of a better quality product and 
it reduced operating costs. 9

   According to J. E. Goodwillie, then a young engineer at the Iron 
Works and later a Vice President: There have been very few instances in the history of paper machine development where a single item of equipment has effected such a broad general improvement. 10 

Two years later in 1935 Percy Tigwell, a sales engineer at the Iron 
Works, concurred in this assessment. By that time the company had had 
over four years' experience with these press rolls in operation, and 
many tests had been made on their efficiency. Tigwell reemphasized 
the idea that a mill would get "bigger dividends" with this press roll 
than with any other piece of improved equipment. Felt life was often 
doubled or tripled, and because of anti-friction bearings, power 
requirements were 30 to 35% lower. Equally important was the fact 
that the paper sheet was delivered to the dryer section with less 

Page 88

moisture and in a better formed condition. The end result was more 
economical drying. As a consequence the mill could either cut back 
on steam pressure or increase the production of the machine. 11

 All these advantages were secondary to the main purpose of a 
rubber covered suction press roll which was to avoid "shadow markings." 
These were marks on the paper sheet that took their image from the shell 
perforations on the regular roll, and they could ruin the appearance of 
the paper. The rubber covering solved this problem and improved the 
paper quality. However in the early years of this process there was a 
major problem that defied solution for a time. The rubber coverings 
would get loose and start coming off the roll. This practically required 
mills to have a spare. "Sometimes the spare shell could barely 
get recovered and back to the mill in time to replace its running mate 
coming out because of a loose rubber cover." 12 Fortunately a chemical 
bond was developed that fastened the rubber to the shell and loose 
rubber problems rapidly diminished in importance.

 When this problem was combined with another one dealing with 
roller bearing breakdowns which were also common in the early 1930's, 
Beloit engineers and sales personnel had their hands full of customer 
complaints. The latter problem was solved by using a different type 
of roller bearing, but until it was, customer relations suffered. 
Despite these difficulties Berry and Hornbostel continued to experiment 
and theorize and ultimately improve their product. By the end of 
the decade over 350 rubber covered suction presses were in operation. 
The innovation had become a necessity that warranted the customer enthusiasm 
it received. No 1930's product increased production, reduced 
operating cost, and improved paper more than this innovation. 13 

Another innovation that paid off in the 1930's was the Beloit Dual 

Page 89

Press which was first put in operation i. n 1936, It was in line with 
Beloit's objective of simplifying papermaking machinery since it combined 
the functions of the first and second presses into a single unit.

 This breakthrough was one of the many unintended Benefits that 
the Depression brought to the Iron Works, When business slackened in 
the early 1930's Beloit engineers had a great deal of extra time which 
was used to experiment with new designs. Also the company took the 
advice it was giving to paper mills that slow times were when it was 
best to upgrade equipment in order to prepare for the expected better 
times to follow. In this case Beloit scrapped or sold its older tooling 
machines and installed new precision tool equipment and precision 
measuring devices. Once the company had trained their employees to 
think and work to a higher level of precision, papermaking ,machinery 
was substantially upgraded and real breakthroughs occurred. 14 

The Dual Press breakthrough allowed the immediate upgrading of 
old Fourdrinier machines. The first installation in early 1936 was on 
a 136 inch machine for International Paper in Niagara Falls, New York. 
The original machine's press section consisted of a suction couch, a 
plain first press, a reversing second press, a pair of smoothing rolls, 
and then the dryers. The Dual Press which replaced it consisted of three 
rolls set horizontal to each other. The first roll from the wet end was 
a Beloit rubber-covered suction press. The second was a "Stonite" 
covered roll, while the third was an ordinary rubber-covered roll. 
The end result was a machine that ran smoother and cleaner and on less 
power. Moreover the paper was at least 2% drier through the two nips of 
the Dual Press than it had been through two conventional presses. Also 
the finish was better and the felts ran longer and stayed cleaner.  

Page 90

Most important however was the breakthrough in space. The Dual Press required 
much less space than the conventional press section, thus allowing a mill cramped for space to add dryers in the space saved. The end result increased and improved production, saved power and reduced costs. 15 

The Dual Press was installed on a number of old machines in 1936, 
and on its first completely new machines in 1937. This installation 
on both a lightweight and a heavyweight Beloit Fourdrinier machine in 
the Georgetown, South Carolina Mill of the Southern Kraft Corporation ,was 
one of a number of improvements that went on those machines. 16 This 
Dual Press was similar to those installed as rebuilds but all three 
rolls were mounted in extra heavy duty SKF roller bearings. These 
bearings which were also installed in the dryer section and elsewhere 
in the machine improved its reliability and speed and lowered operating 
costs. 

In general these machines incorporated many new features for the 
first time. For example, the Fourdrinier section of the lightweight 
machine had a novel wire changing arrangement., The wire loop could 
be strung in the machine room aisle before the machine was shut down. 
Thus the machine could continue making paper while the new wire was 
being prepared for a quick change. 17 This considerably cut down the 
time needed for changing the wire and thus allowed the machine to run 
longer.

The calendar stacks were also of a new design bearing practically 
no resemblance to conventional stacks. 18 The stacks were open sided 
thus removal of one or more rolls was facilitated. Only one hitch from 
an overhead crane was necessary to remove the roll from the stack. This 

Page 91

contrasted with the ordinary calendar stack which required several 
hitches and much more time. 

The Beloit reel was also completely redesigned incorporating some 
newly patented features that greatly improved its operation. The main 
innovation was the use of hydraulic air pressure, With it a roll could 
be wound as hard or as soft as desired; the spool could be prevented 
from bouncing and slipping on the drum; and when the sheet was broken 
and another spool started, a full roll of paper could be quickly moved 
away from the drum simply by operating a valve. 19

The winder itself was a new Beloit heavy duty double drum winder 
provided with an exclusive Beloit feature called an automatic shaft 
puller. When the finished roll was wound and a valve opened, the roll 
was automatically pushed from the drums onto a chain conveyor. As the 
paper roll was removed from the shaft, arms fell into position automatically 
and removed the winder shaft to the spare shaft position. All 
this took place while the next roll of paper was being wound. Thus the 
winder was convenient in operation and required no heavy lifting from 
the operators. 20 

The machine also included dryers driven by Earl Berry's latest 
design of enclosed duplex silent chain drive. Berry, the resident 
engineering genius at Beloit in the 1930's, usually had good ideas on 
how to improve machines. The enclosed silent chain drive was one of 
his improvements that worked better than the cast iron gear system that 
it superceded. However, it too had its problems which caused it to be 
retired once Lloyd Hornbostel invented something better just after World 
War II.

Nevertheless, it was an important innovation in the Depression years. 

Page 92

In older machines gears were in the open and not well protected. As 
machine speed increased they became objectionable because of noise and 
vibration. When paper breaks occurred, wads of paper often got into 
the nips between gears and caused gear breakage. Berry's idea was to 
use a special chain made by the Link Belt Company that had drive teeth 
on both sides of the chain. All of the chain drive elements were completely 
enclosed in casings lubricated by oil that was constantly circulating. 
The oil was continually in the process of being washed, dewatered, 
filtered and purified so that the only oil that had to be added to the 
system was to compensate for evaporation. 21 

It was a major improvement that was installed on a large number of 
machines in the 1930's. "Some gave good service, but there were some 
wrecks. In spite of maintaining good lubrication and proper chain 
tension, chain wear did occur, and when a chain traveling at quite high 
speed broke, there was occasionally a monumental jam-up." 22 Only a few 
paper mills that operated high speed machines converted to silent chain 
drive. Some replaced their cast iron gears with special micarta tooth 
gears. These ran quieter and with less vibration. Nevertheless, they 
were just as vulnerable to breakage as the cast iron gears if wads of 
paper got into their nips. 23

Thus while drives were improved during the 1930's, no solution was 
found for the problem of breakage. After the Iron Works was released 
from war work in 1945 Lloyd Hornbostel gave the problem his full attention. 
He came up with enclosed helical dryer gearing in which an enclosed 
casing had special expansion provisions that served to keep out paper 
wads and to catch lubricating oil for filtering and reticulation. This 
innovation practically eliminated the earlier difficulties surrounding dryer gearing. 24

Page 93
 
Another major issue of the 1930's dealt with the main drive elements 
of the machine. Machines are divided into 10 or more sections each of 
which must be driven at varying speeds in order to provide for changes 
in paper sheet condition. Unless this is accurately done the sheet 
could break or the paper could be damaged in other ways. Beloit's 
solution to this problem was to promote its own mechanical drive against 
a number of companies like General Electric, Westinghouse, and Reliance 
Electric who were promoting their own sectional electric drives. Beloit's 
papermaking competitors all had mechanical drives, but they stayed out 
of the controversy and let mill people decide which kind to use. Beloit 
engineers argued that sectional electric drives tended to drift off the 
required speed setting and that Beloit hypoid right angle gear units 
were superior. Taper pulleys provided the adjustability and speed 
that was required and the line shaft was driven by a variable speed 
steam turbine or an electric motor. 25

 From the standpoint of power usage, Beloit's mechanical drive was 
more efficient than the multiple motors needed for the electric drive. 
Many customers agreed and the company sold a lot of hypoid gear units. 
Since some customers and potential customers thought it was rather 
unsightly to have a long line shaft in the mill basement, Beloit experimented 
with other options like putting the line shaft upstairs. Eventually 
Lloyd Hornbostel invented a differential drive unit. With the 
differential drive each machine section had its enclosed gear unit but 
all were connected by shafts and machine couplings. An adjustable speed 
steam turbine unit or an adjustable speed motor would be located about 
in the middle. It would power the whole machine and start or stop each 
section. With this innovation the Beloit mechanical drive retained its 

Page 94

efficient use of power but achieved a neat and compact form pleasing 
to customers. 26 

Pleasing customers has always been a prime consideration, and in 
the 1930's Beloit's reputation for engineering superiority helped it 
get involved in the development of an important innovation in paper-making 
-the on-the-machine coater.

 Coated paper had been made for a long time but it had always been 
done on a machine separate from the main paper machine. In these 
installations only one side of the paper was coated at a time and then 
this comparatively slow and expensive operation had to be repeated on 
the reverse side. When Henry Lute of the Time-Life Company began promoting 
the circulation of his new Life Magazine in the early 1930's, 
papermaking innovators began looking for a cheaper way to make good 
quality coated paper. 

Peter Massey, a former printer, came up with a new process based 
on his knowledge of printing machines that he thought would work on 
papermaking machines. He had been working with paper mills in Kalamazoo, 
Michigan and through experiments he had concluded that an on-the-machine 
coater could be made that could coat paper on both sides as an original 
process and at a speed as fast as the machine could form and dry the 
sheet. This was a real breakthrough if it worked because it meant that 
a separate coating machine and its crew could be eliminated. Also base 
stock would be protected better because no second handling was necessary. 
In 1934 Massey convinced George Mead, the President of Consolidated 
Water Power and Paper Company in Wisconsin Rapids, Wisconsin, that he 
could adapt one of Consolidated's newsprint machines to on-the-machine 
coating. United States newsprint machines were particularly vulnerable 

Page 95

to Canadian competition at that time, and that particular machine at 
Consolidated was being phased out because it was not fast enough or 
big enough to compete. Since Beloit had built all of the Consolidated 
machines and had maintained a close working relationship with management 
there for generations, it was natural for Mead to invite a Beloit 
delegation to Wisconsin Rapids to see a trial run of the coater. 
Both Earl Berry and J. E. (Bill) Goodwillie were members of this 
delegation. They arrived at the mill to find everyone there most concerned 
that the "obviously mechanically inadequate" experimental installation 
would fail and turn mill owners away from a process that would work 
if given a fair trial. Things were not going well as Berry and Goodwillie 
arrived. They were rather flabbergasted to meet Massey just as he 
crawled out from under his machine. He was covered with coating material 
and had a long bloody scratch across his bald head. As constructed, it 
was obvious that the machine did not work properly.

Fortunately Berry, after examining the process, saw ways to make 
the machine work. Massey because of his printing background had used 
a multiplicity of small diameter rolls like in a printing press. Paper 
machines were two or four times wider than printing presses, but Massey 
had not taken this into account. Some of the small diameter rolls 
were in rocking mountings in order to transfer the coating to the 
pick-up to the point where the coating was printed on the paper. But 
this was inadequate and Berry suggested that 16-inch diameter rolls be 
used instead of the 5-inch ones then on the machine. He also suggested 
the elimination of the rocking mountings. The new design worked in 
every respect. Berry had adapted Massey's ideas and the result brought 
about a great advance in paper technology. 

Page 96

With the Nassey on-the-machine coater, economical mineral coated 
paper with a high finish was produced. The surface allowed a near 
perfect reproduction of fine half-tone engravings and the process was 
in great demand for magazines and mail order catalogues. Printers 
could now produce mono-and multi-color illustrations on rotary presses. 28

 This breakthrough turned out to be a great benefit to the Iron 
Works because of their close relationship with Consolidated. Consolidated 
had an arrangement with Peter Massey to give them complete control over 
the use and licensing to others of this process. Within a short time 
two English mills who were Beloit customers arranged licenses and Beloit 
built the machines. Quite naturally, Consolidated wanted the details 
of the process to be kept secret as long as possible: so the Iron 
Works cooperated and sent mechanics who normally worked on b% ck yard 
machinery to install the first machine in England. On December 1, 1936, 
the machine in England made coated paper for the first time. 29

 Within a short time after Consolidated's success both Kimberly 
Clark and Mead worked separately and then jointly on a competitive 
coater. They succeeded and used their initials to name the KCM coater. 
Even though Beloit was building all the Consolidated coaters, the KCM 
coater was entrusted to the Iron Works as well. This indicates the 
dominant position Beloit held in papermaking machinery manufacturing 
at that time in the late 1930's. Consolidated and KCM quarreled over 
their patents and ultimately reached an out-of-court settlement, but 
Beloit's manufacturing of both companies' coaters continued, unaffected 
by all the turmoil. 30

By the late 1930's all these successful innovations encouraged 
Earl Berry to try for a technological breakthrough in headbox design. 

Page 97

The open headbox had been used for years, but even with improvements 
few people in the industry were satisfied. Many people saw the open 
headbox as a "necessary evil" and hoped that some invention could 
eliminate it entirely. 31 The headbox with its slice was probably the 
most important part of the machine in that it was most responsible 
for the character of the resulting paper. Thus a breakthrough in 
that part of the machine might lead to breakthroughs in the other 
sections. 
In the 1930's a consistent problem was how to get a proper stock 
flow through all the compartments of the headbox. Stock tended to 
accumulate in corners and pockets and ruin the even flow, and it also 
lumped up and clogged the headbox and slice. To counteract this 
Beloit's headbox vats were manufactured so there were no corners or 
pockets where stock might collect. They also had quick acting dump 
valves, adjustable partitions, and a set of perforated rolls just before 
the slice to break up lumps. 32 

The Beloit slice was called the Double Adjustable Slice, and it 
had a plain inner slice and an adjustable outer one. This worked 
rather well at slow speeds, but both the headbox and slice remained 
open to the atmosphere at the top. Consequently, at the higher speeds 
then possible, the box had to be quite high to keep sufficient pressure 
behind the slice so the stock flow would enter the wire at the correct 
speed. As speeds increased the Double Adjustable Slice became less 
and less suitable even though minor alterations were made on it to make 
it similar to the Voith slice then being made by Valley Iron Works, one 
of Beloit's competitors. All headboxes were difficult to keep clean 
at higher speeds and both the stock and the paper suffered as a result. 

Page 98

After some experimentation using small scale models, Berry came 
up with the Flow Evener or King Midas Box which turned out to be a 
"real dog. 1134 This device eliminated the open headbox and consisted 
of a distributor and an enclosed slice. The distributor employed the 
principal of counter flow by putting the stock and water mixture into 
two parallel tubes. One of the tubes received its flow at the back 
of the machine and moved it to the front, while the other tube was fed 
at the front and flowed toward the back. Through re-circulation fittings 
each tube kept the entire volume of the stock and water mixture in 
continuous circulation. Orifice plates were mounted on the top of 
each tube, and the stock went through these before discharging through 
the slice to the Fourdrinier wire. 35

Beloit promoted the Flow Evener as a real breakthrough and rather 
quickly received three orders for its manufacture and installation. 
The first to be installed was for the Spring Hill Number 2 machine of 
International Paper, and it was to replace the original headbox and 
slice. Because the production of that machine was particularly 
important to I. P., Beloit promised that the downtime needed to make 
the change would be kept at an absolute minimum. Russell Goodwillie 
superintended the changeover and it was done in 24 hours. As it was 
 being completed by Southern Kraft paper experts began to arrive from
all over the South to view the machine in operation. The machine 
started up and ran for about three hours with disappointing results. 
At that point IA and Beloit officials decided the experiment was a 
failure and the machine was turned off. The Flow Evener was taken 
out and the original headbox and slice returned to the machine. A 
very disappointed Beloit crew then returned the Flow Evener to Beloit where it became very expensive scrap metal. 36

Page 99

Berry and the other engineers were worried but not defeated. 
They made some changes in the orifice plates arrangement and pronounced 
the machine as ready to go. In December, 1940, the second Flow Evener 
was installed as part of a completely new machine made for the Longview 
Fibre Company of Longview, Washington. The installation was a success 
and the machine worked. Company officials were ecstatic and appreciative 
of the favorable publicity received in the Pacific Pulp and Paper, March, 
1941, issue which described the new machine in detail and noted that the 
Flow Evener was "the most interesting feature." 37

Unfortunately this was the high point for the Flow Evener. One 
more was built for the Hammermill Paper Mill in Erie, Pennsylvania. 
It worked but after an extended period of time company officials decided 
they wanted their previous unit reinstalled, and they returned the Flow 
Evener to Beloit. By this time the Flow Evener in the new machine 
in Longview was not performing up to specifications. It ran moderately 
well but not as they hoped or Beloit expected. They wanted it replaced 
with a more conventional headbox and slice. Since Beloit had guaranteed 
that its machines would work or be replaced, they had to swallow their 
pride and their losses. Unfortunately for Longview, by the time they 
decided they wanted the Flow Evener replaced the United States was in 
World War II, and the Iron Works was practically out of the papermaking 
machine business for the duration. Thus, Longview had to wait for the 
end of the war for Beloit to make good on its promise to give them a 
brand new headbox and slice. 38 

The Flow Evener experience was a sobering and costly failure for 
the company. Yet the company's good reputation remained intact due to its

Page 100
 
willingness to satisfy the three customers who had tried the Flow 
Evener. In time Lloyd Hornbostel, who replaced Earl Berry after 
Berry's premature death in 1943, invented an air loaded headbox which 
retained but improved the cross flow elements that had been developed 
for the Flow Evener. The resulting headbox and slice combination was 
used quite successfully for a number of years after World War II. 39 
Although the Flow Evener turned out to be a fiasco, the Iron Works 
had much better luck with tissue machines in the 1930's. In subsequent 
decades Beloit machines dominated the market.

 Tissue and towels had long been made on paper machines but their 
major problem was that they lacked absorbency. Even after William 
Lysle patented creped paper in 1889, tissue formation was still crude 
and machines ran very slowly. But by the end of World War I, Ernst 
Mahler of Kimberly Clark had invented a dry creping process that helped 
revolutionize the industry. The end result was Kleenex, a name now 
SO familiar that it has become generic for tissues of all brands. 40 

Because of Beloit's longstanding close relationship with Kimberly 
Clark, E. H. Neese, Sr., and Earl Berry worked closely with Ernst 
Mahler and other company officials in the 1920's and 1930's and the 
Iron Works did all of Kimberly's work on the dry crepe machine. 
While this was a substantial amount of business, Beloit also had good 
relations and good orders from other tissue companies. 41

One of these, the Hoberg Mill in Green Bay, Wisconsin, had a unique 
problem that the Iron Works helped solve. They were trying to achieve 
a breakthrough in softness on toilet paper by a double creping process 
involving two Yankee dryers. Unfortunatl y She process did not work 
very well because the sheet from the first dryer would not adhere 

Page 101

on the second dryer. As a result Beloit rebuilt part of the 
machine and replaced the second Yankee dryer with a bank of six conventional 
dryers. Then the first Yankee was improved and equipped 
for higher steam pressures. This insured that the sheet of paper 
would be about 50% dry before the creping process began. With this 
process the heavier toilet paper sheet could be finished with a substantial 
degree of crepe and softness although not as much as a facial tissue. 42 

This was the start of a new grade of toilet paper called semi-creped. 
Within a short time toilet paper machines from all over the 
country were being converted to Yankee drying followed by conventional 
dryers. As a result Beloit got a substantial amount of new business. 43

 Paper toweling developments were similar to those in toilet tissue. 
Toweling machines were rebuilt so the sheet could be creped on a Yankee 
dryer, and the softness and absorbency of the finished product was 
significantly improved. As the result of these developments in the 
1930's, the Yankee dryer business greatly increased in importance and 
Beloit furnished all of them. 44 

Through these and other developments the Iron Works and the 
papermaking machine industry as a whole made rapid strides during 
the years up to World War II. Then the necessities of war and the 
industry's conversion to war-related production slowed down innovations 
until the late 1940's. 

In retrospect, it is easy to see that the papermaking machine 
industry was not too adversely affected by the Depression. Yet of 
all the companies Beloit emerged the strongest from this period. 
Perhaps the lack of business in the early 1930's had scared them so 

Page 102

much that they had tried harder. More likely their quality product, 
innovations on that product, and the good standing that Beloit personnel 
had within the industry were more important. They were also fortunate 
that the Depression that hit the paper industry was relatively short. 
1932 and 1933 were by far the worst years, but by 1933 
the New Deal was resurrecting the paper industry at a rapid pace. The 
National Recovery Administration made useful strides in rationalizing 
the industry by bringing about cooperation through its code practices. 45

 Attitudes in the industry quickly changed from despair in 1932 to 
great hopes for the future in 1933 as is evidenced by the opinion of 
S. L. Willson, President of the American Pulp and Paper Association: 

Regeneration has replaced disintegration--order has replaced chaos--businesslike principles have replaced jungle laws. Cooperation and confidence have replaced distrust and fear... there is today a changed attitude toward the future.
Most people are now willing to admit that business is not only better, but will continue to get better. 46 

Willson was correct. By 1935 total production of paperboard in 
the United States had passed the previous high set in mostly prosperous 
1929. By 1936 almost every paper company source reported that "marked 
recovery" had occurred. Demand for new machines was up and 29 were 
delivered before the papermaking machine companies converted to war 
work. Business slumped temporarily again in the recession of 1938, 
which adversely affected the Iron Works in 1939, but with that exception 
the Depression was over for the paper industry and its suppliers by 
1936. Beloit's sales topped $4 million that year. This was only 
$24,000 short of their all time high in 1930 and profits were substantial. 
In 1937 sales were over $5 million and in 1938, $6.5 million. Even in 
1939 when sales dropped back to less than $4 million, profits were adequate

Page 103

Thus on the eve of World War II the company was a thriving 
concern averaging well over $5 million a year in sales, and the management 
was stable and innovative. 47

 The major reason for this was that a number of the good men who 
had joined the company in the 192O's'or before were reaching the peak 
of their productivity and influence. Equally important, the company 
was being continually reinvigorated by new men -a number of whom would 
reach the highest executive levels within the company. In the older 
group Elbert Neese, Sr. stands out because his influence within the 
paper industry was constantly expanding and bringing direct benefits 
to the company. Others in this group included Wiley Smith, Secretary 
since 1927, and company purchasing agent; Harry Tower, Assistant 
Treasurer since 1927; Earl Berry, Vice-President of Engineering since 
1930; G. A. Macklem, Vice-President for Sales since 1927; and Charles 
Ramsden, a longtime all around employee who made his mark in sales 
where he rose to Vice-President just before his death in 1941. 

In the newer group, Lloyd Hornbostel, an engineering graduate  
from Lehigh University, had been weaned away from Westinghouse in 1927 
by Earl Berry and by the 1930's was acting as Berry's assistant. He 
was a brilliant individual - so bright that he was an unsettling 
influence on those around him who were not as quick to see things. 
His influence was felt in the 1930's, but his decades of greatest im-portance 
would be the 1940's and 1950's. Others in the group whose 
influence would be felt in the 1930's but whose most productive years 
were later included C. Elmer Macklem (G. A. Macklem's son); Bill Wood; 
J. E. (Bill) Goodwillie; Francis Ramsden (Charles Ramsden's son); and 
Harry Moore (Elbert H. Neese, Sr. 's son-in-law). 

Page 104

All of this latter group except Bill Wood had their greatest 
impact in sales which at Beloit was never wholly divided from engineering. 
In fact Beloit salesmen were expected to master enough engineering to 
help diagnose customers' machine problems and needs. Conversely, 
engineers like Berry and Hornbostel spent a good share of their time 
carrying out important sales assignments. 

Each member of this latter group rose to the level of Vice-President 
at some time in his career. Harry Moore, a journalism graduate from 
Northwestern University, later became President and Chairman of the 
Board. He got his start at the Iron Works in 1936 in all probability 
because he was married to Mr. Neese's daughter. After doing tours in 
the foundry, machine shop and order department, he settled into sales 
where in 1939 he was put in charge of advertising. Neese quickly 
discovered that Moore was a real asset to the Iron Works, and his rise 
was based on ability more than anything else. He learned a lot very 
quickly about customer relations and was very successful before World 
War II intervened~ 'in relieving Mr. Neese of this "pleasant but increasingly burdensome task. "48 

The Iron Works' executives, engineers and sales staff were a very 
intimate group in those days. They had a great deal of day-to-day 
contact with each other and much mutual rapport. Every morning at 
8: 00, Hornbostel and Berry from engineering, Mr. Neese, G. A. Macklem, 
Bill Wood and sales people like Charles and Francis Ramsden, Cash 
Whipple, Percy Tigwell, Ted Roberts, C. Elmer Macklem, and Bill 
Goodwillie would gather at what was called the morning mail table. 
As a group they would read the incoming inquiries and letters and the 
outgoing "yellow copy" letters sent the previous day to paper mills 

Page 105

and suppliers. In this way they educated each other on the inner 
workings of the company and most importantly they discussed day-to-day 
problems of sales and design. Each individual learned from the others 
in this informal seminar with the least experienced profiting most. 49

A number of the men who made up the morning mail group also were 
members of the Beloit City Club -a luncheon organization for local 
executives. The Club was a great place to bring visiting executives 
and customers, and it was one place where everyone could let his hair 
down by playing the one-armed bandit, bridge, or the famous "lulu" 
of the Lilla Edets paper mill in Sweden came as a guest and told of 
his experience with "lulu." He was involved in a poker game with a 
group of strangers while traveling by train in the United States. He 
was dealt four of a kind and bet substantially only to be told by the 
man who stayed with him that the man's hand of three queens including 
the spade queen was a "lulu" and that in United States style draw poker 
a "lulu" defeated every other hand. Haeger was chagrined but out-numbered 
so he acquiesced and remained in the game. A few hands later 
he drew three queens including the queen of spades, bet heavily, and 
triumphantly announced "lulu." His opponent then showed a mediocre 
hand, took all the money, and announced that the "lulu" hand only 
came-once in each poker game. Haeger told this story with so much 
self-deprecating charm that the City Club immediately adopted the "lulu" 
game in place of bridge

Neese and the Iron Works people became aficionados of the game 
which they played with a few adaptations for the next 25 years. In 
that time all the rare card combinations were held at one time or 

Page 106

another, and in one case a royal straight flush was defeated by a 
Hornbostel-held "lulu." His opponent was ready to commit murder! 
One customer even presented the club with a "lulu" cow with three 
teats. If a person got a "lulu" he was permitted to autograph the 
cow for posterity's sake. "Lulu" was so popular that it was not 
unusual for salesmen visiting foreign paper mills first to be quizzed 
about how the "lulu" game was going before talking about the business 
at hand. 50 

This attitude of comradeship found among Iron Works executives 
and between Iron Works leaders and other company leaders extended to 
the feelings that management had towards employees. Neese was a true 
paternalist force and a man who prided himself on his fairness. He 
was also strong-willed and relatively conservative in his social views. 
He believed that he knew how to run his business and how to be fair 
with his employees without any outside interference. Interference 
in this case meant unions and also the federal government which was 
sworn to uphold the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 and 
its successor, the National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) of 1935.

Among the provisions of the N. I. R. A. was Section 7A which 
guaranteed labor's right "to organize and bargain collectively 
through representatives of their own choosing." Shortly after the 
N. I. R. A. was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 1935 
Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act which reiterated 
labor's right to bargain collectively and defined unfair labor practices 
on their employer's part. The new act also created a new National 
Labor Relations Board with power to supervise elections for or against 
unionism, to certify the duly chosen labor union, to take testimony 

Page 107

about unfair employer practices, and to issue cease and desist orders. 
As a result of these laws labor unions became increasingly powerful 
during the 1930's. 

There was resistance on the part of many employers and counter 
hostility by the newly organized union members. Nationally the 
greatest conflicts occurred in the automobile and steel industries. 
Autoworkers reacted to their lack of union recognition or a contract 
by staging a 44. day sit down strike at the General Motors plant in 
Flint, Michigan. This early 1937 action encouraged other sit down 
strikes among rubber, steel, textile, oil refining, and shipbuilding 
workers. Violence was common, and it culminated in the May 30, 1937 
Memorial Day Massacre outside Republic Steel in South Chicago when a 
peaceful union demonstration was fired on by company guards and police-men. 
A number of people were killed. 

It was in this climate of feeling that the Iron Works got into its 
first major labor dispute in 1937 which culminated in hearings before 
the National Labor Relations Board. The issue was over company recognition 
of the International Association of Machinists who wished to 
represent the Iron Works' machinists. The company subtlety resisted 
the efforts of the union by promoting and aiding a company union -the 
Beloit Iron Works Employees Association. Company unions were common 
in industry and were usually considered by management to be easier to 
control and much less militant. This likely attitude fit in well with 
the professed philosophy that Elbert H. Neese, Sr. had about unions. 
In his testimony at the NLRB hearing in November 1937, he professed 
sympathy for the "poorer classes of people" having come from them 
himself. To Neese, unions were necessary on some occasions and in some 

Page 108

industries where worker exploitation occurred. However, he did not 
believe that the situation at the Iron Works necessitated a union.

After coming to the Iron Works in 1916 Neese was determined to 
make working at the company as pleasant and profitable an experience 
as possible SO that the workers would not want to join a union. And I may have done a poor job of it; I hope not. I feel we have done pretty well, and I feel that labor unions in the Beloit Iron Works are unnecessary, and probably won't do them any good; not because we may want to fight them, or run counter to the spirit of the law, but we pay them more than they are paid any place in town, more than any other communities, as well as our competitors, or better; and then if we make some money that is worthwhile, to share it. That is my attitude toward labor . 

Neese simply could not see how an outside labor union could aid 
his employees any better than he could. When the union attempted to 
organize, management had resisted by promoting its own union and 
firing four employees who were machinist union organizers. The company 
alleged that the four men were discharged for inefficiency, 
intimidation of other employees and/ or neglect of duty. The machinists 
argued that company action amounted to unfair labor practices and demanded 
an NLRB hearing. 52 

An extensive 10 day hearing followed and a great deal of testimony 
was given on both sides. Finally the Trial Examiner came to his 
conclusions and made recommendations in early 1938. In them, the 
company was determined to have engaged in unfair labor practices and 
was required to rehire and compensate the four employees who were 
fired. Furthermore the Beloit Iron Works Employees Association was 
to be disestablished and the company was required to "cease and desist 
from interfering with, restraining, or coercing" its employees "to 

Page 109

form, join, or assist labor organizations." Finally the company was 
required to post notices in conspicuous places in the plant and in 
all departments telling all employees it would comply with the 
decision. 53 

The decision undoubtedly was a real blow to Neese's ego and to 
his philosophy of labor-management re$ ions. Yet the short term 
results of the case had little effect on the company. It did everything 
the decision required, but the International Association of 
Machinists was not successful in getting a majority of workers to 
join its union. Thus, the company ended the pre-World War II period 
without a machinists' union. 54 

Perhaps one of the reasons why the company remained non-unionized 
during this period was due-+ o the composition of its labor force. The 
majority of workers had worked for the company a number of years and 
tended to be very loyal. They had reaped the benefits of loyalty 
even during the Depression because the company had continued its 
practice of year-end bonuses and the incentives of a premium system. 
The premium system was a piece work system that rewarded extra ability. 
If a man did a job faster than what the predetermined rate for that 
job was he would get half of the profit over and above his daily rate. 
Older and more efficient workers liked the system because they profited 
by it. Consequently, it was difficult for union organizers to convince 
a majority of Iron Works employees that it could do better for 
them than the company was doing especially when the company surprised 
all of the workers in late 1939 by providing a very low cost Employees' 
Group Insurance Plan underwritten by Metropolitan Life. The employee 
contributed 25 cents per week and was covered by life insurance, 1

Page 110
hospitalization benefits and fees, and surgical benefits. The company 
paid the balance of the net cost. 55 

Besides the insurance plan, the company also began its policy 
of annual employee family picnics in 1939. These were popular family 
outings that encouraged mixing among all the employees. The company 
paid all the expenses. Thus on the eve of the great conflagration 
seen-to hit Europe and much of the rest of the world, the company 
remained a popular and profitable place to work. The benevolent  
paternalism compatible to Neese's views remained intact. & within 
a short time the company would begin to get defense jobs and ultimately, 
after Pearl Harbor, convert almost entirely to war work. In the years just before United States entrance into World War II, Beloit could look at its products and its position among paper machine manufacturers with a great deal of satisfaction. Paper use 
was expanding rapidly -one Beloit engineer claimed that Three hundred and fifty kinds of paper are used in the United States today. One special kind is used to wrap 
babies after birth. Another special kind is used to wrap corpses before burial. The other 348 kinds are used for intermediate purposes. 56 

Iron Works' personnel were experts on these "intermediate purposes" 
and on the machines that made them. Every paper machine then made in 
the world had within it features patented by the Iron Works -part of 
over 150 patents and trademarks that the company possessed by 1941.

A Beloit Cylinder machine had established new speed records: tissue 
machines were designed for 2,000 feet per minute; and the world's 
largest high speed 216 inch Fourdrinier Kraft Liner Board machine made 
for International Paper, weighed 5 million pounds and was capable of producing the equivalent of its own weight every four days. 

Page 111
 
machines also made paper for Life, Time, Ladies Home Journal, --the 
Saturday Evening Post, and other magazines. Practically every 
kind of paper found in the world was being made somewhere on a Beloit 
machine. 57 

All this activity was topped off just prior to Pearl Harbor 
when Rhinelander Paper's "Big Swede" went into operation. This glassine 
machine was named after Folke Becker, the President of Rhinelander, 
and was the largest in the state of Wisconsin. This was an impressive 
looking machine with small diameter 36 inch dryers and a different 
arrangement for framing. For its type, it was also a step forward 
in speed. To Rhinelander it was important because it increased company 
production 35%. To the Iron Works, it symbolized their importance 
in the market. The contract had been signed without competition and 
the resulting machine was very profitable. Consequently, they voluntarily 
gave Rhinelander back 5% of the total price. 58 This was wonderful for customer relations, but more importantly it shows that Beloit was building the Cadillac of the papermaking machine industry -the kind most prized and most profitable. 

Page 112

1 William Manchester, The Glory and the Dream (Bantam: New York, 1974), p. 33

2 Ibid., pp. 33, 38, 43-45, 67.

3 Statistics from E. N. Neese, Jr. letter, May 15, 1979; Harry Moore interview, September 6, 1979. 

41nterview with Mrs. C. Elmer Macklem and Jim Macklem, July 21, 1929.

5 PTJ,,, October 29, 1931; The Paper Industry, February, 1932, p. 1279. 

6 1932 advertising folder titled, "What Has Beloit Been Doing?". The Silent Chain Drive tended to break and was quickly phased out by improvements. 

7 Francis Ramsden interview, April 27, 1979; other sources as well. Neese and Cullen had met back in the early 1920's. Cullen had called the Iron Works about an order, and Neese rushed to meet Cullin in Knoxville on July 4. Cullen was impressed and a
long friendship began. Harry Moore interview, August 2, 1979. 

8 Ibid. 

9 Charles Ramsden, "Late Improvements in Papermaking Machinery," speech 
dated April 9, 1936 from Francis Ramsden collection. 

10 J. E. Goodwillie, "Developments in Design of Modern Fourdrinier Paper 
Machines," PTJ, June 8, 1933, p. 283. 

11 Percy H. Tigwell, "The 1935 Fourdrinier Machine," The Paper Mill and Wood Pulp News, June 1, 1935, p. 16. 

12 J. E. "Bill" Goodwillie interview tape, April 19, 1979. 

13 J. E. "Bill" Goodwillie, "Developments in the Papevmaking Machine 1930-1940," Pacific Pulp and Paper Industry, December, 1939, p. 39; Ramsden, 
"Late Improvements in Paper Making Machinery," speech, April 9, 1936, p. 3. 

14 E. E. Berry, "Anticipating Maintenance Expense by Proper Inspection," 
PTJ, June 22, 1933, pp. 306-08. 

15 V. S. Dennison, "The Beloit Suction Dual Press Section," The Paper 
Mill and Wood Pulp News, May 8, 1937, pp. 13, 15, 17. In this as in many other innovations, Beloit agreed to remove the Dual Press and reinstall the old one if it did not work satisfactorily. The Dual Press was such a success that by 1939 one million tons of paper per year were being made on them. With the Dual Press the sales department received orders from mills that had never done business with Beloit Corporation before. In fact, without these new orders, many of which included other paper machine parts, Beloit would probably have gone through periods when there was no work in the shop. See Paperchine, October, 1939. 

Page 113

16 T. C. Roberts, "Modern Paper Machines at Georgetown," Paper Mill and 
Wood Pulp News, September 11, 1937, p. 39. 

17 Ibid., p. 34. 

18 Ibid., p. 39. 

19 Ibid., p. 40. 

20 Ibid., -. p. 43. 

21 Ibid., p. 39; Goodwillie interview tape, April 19, 1979. 

22Goodwillie interview tape, April 19, 1979.

23 Ibid 

24 Ibid

25 Ibid

26 Ibid. Decades later the company came to the conclusion that electric drives had finally superceded mechanical
drives. 

27 Ibid., for the preceding five paragraphs. A Vice-President of Consolidated later told Berry and Francis Ramsden that they probably would not have gone ahead with the Massey process if Berry had not assured them it would work. Francis Ramsden
interview, April 27, 1929. 

28 Peter J. Massey, "Machine Coated Paper," PTJ. Flay 24, 1945, p. .39. 
It is interesting that Massey never mentioned Berry in his article. 

29 Goodwillie interview tape, May 30, 1979. The major event then going on in England was Edward VIII's love affair with the American divorcee Wallace Warfield Simpson which forced his abdication. 

30 Ibid. 

31 Goodwillie, "Developments in the Paper Making Machine 1930-1940," p. 39. 

32 Percy Tigwell, "The 1935 Fourdrinier Paper Machine," The Paper Mill and Wood-Pulp News, June 1, 1935, p. 14.

33 Goodwillie interview tape, April 19, 1979.

34 Interview with Harry Moore, August 2, 1979. 

35 "Longview Fibre's New Paper and Board Machine," March, 1941, pp. 19-27. 

36 Goodwillie interview tape, April 19, 1979. 

37 "Longview Fibre's New Paper and Board Machine," March, 1941, pp. 19-27. 
Pacific Pulp and Paper, Pacific Pulp and Paper, 116 116 Page 117 

Page 114

38 Goodwillie interview tape, April 19, 1979; Harry Moore interview, 
August 2, 1979. 

39 Goodwillie interview tape, April, 19, 1979. 

40 F. E. Weisshuhn, "Tissue Machines: Their History and Development," 
Paper Technology, May, 1965, p. 447; Goodwillie interview tape, May 30, 1979. 

41 Goodwillie interview tape, May 30, 1979. 

42 Ibid. 

43 Ibid. Travelers in Europe in the 1930's and in many places yet today can appreciate the difference. Toilet paper there was made on a light weight sheet, dried on a Yankee dryer -no crepe and no softness! 

4 Ibid. By the 1950's, Beloit would be involved in new breakthroughs in tissue machines -the Suction Breast Roll and the Steven's Former. 

45 David C. Smith, History of Paper-making in the U. S. A (Lockwood Publishing 
Company: New York, 1970), p. 463. 

46 Ibid., p. 448. 

47 Ibid., pp. 454, 463; Elbert H. Neese, Jr. letter, May 15, 1979.

48 Bill Goodwillie interview tape, April 19, 1979. 

49 Francis Ramsden interview, April 27, 1979. This practice went on for years until the company got so large that it was too unwieldy and complex to hold a single mail conference for all the company leaders. 

50 Unpublished manuscript by Bill Goodwillie on "The City Club"; Harry Moore interview, September 6, 1979. 

51 Neese, testimony in NLRB Hearing, Beloit Iron Works and International 
Association of Machinists, Case No. X11-C-144, Beloit Corporation Archives. 

52 Ibid 

53 Ibid

54 The machinists union finally became organized in 1944. There was a small Patternmakers Union that had been established in 1933. It struck in 1937 because of a misunderstanding and sympathy for an outside patternmakers' strike. The strike only lasted a few days and it ended when union leaders realized they had made a mistake. The Iron Works took them back "without discrimination and without hard feelings." 
Neese memo, August 23, 1937, Beloit Corporation Archives. 

55 Paperchine, December, 1939. 

Page 115

56 J. H. Salisbury, speaking before the Rock River Valley section of The American Society of Mechanical Engineers, BDN, January 18, 1935.

57 Program for Beloit Iron Works Open House, December 31, 1938; Companypamphlet, 1946; both in Beloit Corporation Archives.

58 Paperchine, October 1940; A History of the Wisconsin Paper Industry 1848-1948, Howard Publishing Company, 1949; Harry Moore interview, September 6, 1979. Rebates occurred in other cases when Neese felt profits were too high. In later years this was done by prior agreement. 

Advance to: THE ELBERT H. NEESE, SR. ERA Conversion to Continuity 1941 - 1952

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