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The United States that stood on the brink of war in 1941 was 
very different from the country that would emerge from World War II. 
For many people the Depression that had begun over a decade earlier 
was still a major force to contend with. Almost nine million men 
were still unemployed with 3 million more on W. P. A. jobs. Millions 
of young adults had no memory of a time when the country was prosperous. 
Paradoxically, there was plenty of food but many people 
did not have enough to eat. When Roosevelt held a National Nutrition 
Conference in the spring of 1941 to find out why army physicians were 
rejecting almost half the men called up under the new Selective Service law, the, the greatest cause was malnutrition during the 1930s. 

Despite a strong program of rural electrification 75% of the farms 
were still lit by kerosene lamps. One fourth of all homes had no 
running water and one third lacked a flush toilet. In a population 
of 132,000,000, a total that demographers expected to stay about the 
same -there was one telephone for every seven Americans and one car 
for every five. The Gross National Product was 90 billion dollars 
a year compared to 104 billion in 1929 and 41 billion in 1932. The 
Dow Jones industrial average of selected stocks had gone over 150 on 
occasion -much better than its low point of 41.22 in 1932 but well 
below its 1929 high of 381.17. 

Inflation was what most people hoped for in those days because 119 

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deflation was the curse of the Depression. Wages and salaries were very 
low but so were prices. :J Hot dogs cost a nickel, most magazines were 
a dime, and a fifth of good scotch about $1.25. Many blamed their continuing problems on "that man in the White House" and a free market economy. They were appalled at the rise of labor unions  and the protection unions got from New Deal legislation. They wanted balanced budgets and feared the consequences of Roosevelt's deficit spending. They wanted wages to be lower and prices to be higher and felt that the alphabet agencies of the New Deal were only havens for 
lazy workers. " -?! For the most part they were wrong in their analysis of 
the country's ills because they thought prosperity depended upon Wall 
Street financiers and the status of basic industries like steel They 
overlooked the real key to prosperity for the future -the consumer 
and the less expensive goods and services he needed. 2 

There were hints that the emphasis on consumer goods and consumer 
spending that would revolutionize the United States after World War 
II were having effects in the pre-war years. In late 1941 Fortune reported that one booming industry since 1930 was the manufacture of disposable goods -paper plates, cups, napkins bottles, sanitary napkins. 7 This insight was no big news to Beloit Iron Works and the paper companies. They had been quite prosperous by 1936 and in some cases even before. Demand for paper products was constantly growing and many new uses were found. But when World War II interceded and the country geared up for war  the Iron Works quickly decided  that it was no longer exclusively in the 

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papermaking machine business. Hitler's blitzkrieg, shocked Americans out of their complacency. World began in Europe with the invasion of Poland in 1939, 
By the summer of 1940, Denmark, Norway, the Low Countries and 
France had fallen to the Nazi juggernaut. Only England was left, and it was involved in their own sea war. By late 1940 the United States had dropped the restrictions of its neutrality acts and provided England with destroyers and ammunition in return for bases. Roosevelt proposed Lend-Lease and it was passed early 1941. At this time the first orders for war material were accepted by the Iron Works. These orders increased during 1941 and not long after 'the Japanese attacked U. S. Naval Bases at Pearl Harbor the company was almost wholly converted to defense work. For patriotic reasons management was extremely pleased, but economically there were  uncertainties. The major question was rather the company could adapt to different of excellent quality, on time, and without losing money? 

Fortunately, the company had moved into defense work early but with 
caution and, at first, with some governmental limitations. Mot long after the outbreak of the in Europe in September, l939, company officials traveled 
to Washington to the War Department and to Chicago to the Office of 
Production Management to notify governmental officials that the Iron 
Works had the capacity and the willingness to do war related work. 
Through the enlargement of the night shift and through overtime the 
company managed to take on subcontract work for a number of companies 

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like Fairbanks, Morse & Company, and the Allis Chalmers Manufacturing 
Company and still maintain full production on its paper machine orders. 
The government soon realized that due to the defense program,  
paper mills then in operation would not be able to keep up with defense 
related needs. 3  Mill expansion programs were necessary so Beloit spent 
most of its time in 1941 with the business it knew best. This paid off  
most spectacularly with the paper machine the company built for International 
Paper's new mill in Georgetown, South Carolina. Ninety six 
freight cars of equipment left Beloit between September 1941 and 
February 1942, carrying the finished products to construct this machine. It began operation on February 17, 1942, producing over 500 tons of paperboard daily -of for essential war needs. During this same period Beloit built machines for 
Kalamazoo Vegetable Parchment, Riegel, Thilmany and Gaylord to 
eliminate shortages in other kinds of paper products used in defense 
work. In addition smaller rebuilds aimed at increasing the capacity of 
existing machines were given high governmental priorities. By Pearl 
Harbor 80% of Beloit's work had been directly authorized by Washington. 4 

By early 1942 paper mill capacity was considered sufficient for 
defense needs so the government requested that the Iron Works help 
out other industries that had shortages and backlogs. The industry 
needing the most help was the machine tool industry and as the 
company had experience with the large tools needed to make paper 
machinery it was a logical choice to take jobs in this area. The company began building lathes, grinders and mills, and within a short time defense work made up 99% of the business.

 
The war emergency also disrupted the lives of some of the company 
executives. W. S. (Bill) Wood, who had been elected Vice-President in 

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1940, was a former army officer who had remained in the reserves. He 
was called up by the army in October, 1940, and served as Colonel in 
command of the 126th Field Artillery at Camp Beauregard, Louisiana. 
Later, he was promoted to Brigadier General in command of the 57th 
Field Artillery Brigade. 

Earl Berry's contribution was even greater. Berry, Beloit's 
Vice-President for Engineering since 1930, was one of the company's 
resident geniuses and had made many contributions to increasing the 
speed of paper machines and the quality of paper that they made. 
After returning from a sales and pleasure trip to Chile shortly after 
Pearl Harbor, he was given a leave of absence from the Iron Works to 
become a "dollar-a-year" man in Washington. His job title was Deputy 
Director for the Facilities Division of the War Production Board, and 
he was in charge of supervising the equipping of new war industrial 
plants. He did a superior job, but in the process his health broke 
down and he was given a leave of absence in 1943 to recuperate at 
home. Unfortunately his health worsened and he died suddenly on November 
9, 1943. 

His death was a severe blow to the company for he had a 
large part in helping the Iron Works retain its leadership in the 
papermaking machinery field. He loved mechanical things and was one of 
a tiny minority of people who had the vision to see and understand the 
whole process of making paper machines from engineering, through production, 
to sales. As a consequence he was interested in every part 
of the machine from the original design, through adaptations to make 
it work, down to the size of the nuts and bolts that held it together. 
He was so confident in his abilities that he once told a paper mill 1

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owner that if the bearings on a Berry designed dryer leaked oil he 
would personally come to the plant and lick the oil off the floor. 
The other executive whose life was disrupted unduly by the war 
was Harry Moore, newly elected as Vice-President in 1941. Seemingly 
he spent most of the war in transit on the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad 
between Chicago and Washington. In reality, he spent about a week 
each month from 1942 to the end of the war in Washington sitting on 
the Paper Industry Committee of the War Production Board and also 
serving as a member of the Office of Price Administration. 
Since all production was based on priorities, Moore spent much 
of his time in league with other industry executives and governmental 
officials deciding how to make the most efficient use of industrial 
capacity to build war related machines and material. He also was 
directly involved in decisions that determined what the Iron Works would 
do to help win the war. In these activities he often was aided by 
Elmer Macklem who also spent a great deal of time in Washington. 
In the critical early months of 1942, the Iron Works was finishing 
up its last two paper machine orders at the same time it was building 
"Mall" lathes for turning crank pins. Fairbanks Morse and the Erie 
Forge Company of Erie, Pennsylvania needed these improved lathes to 
make diesel engines for submarines. Erie began operating the first of 
these in July, 1942 and found it to work more accurately than their 
other equipment. Later, after Lloyd Hornbostel improved the machine's 
design, the company received orders for larger and more powerful 
lathes. While this lathe program was underway, they were also building 
deck machinery, propeller shafts and flywheels for the United States 
Maritime Commission as well as four suction rolls for machines designed 

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to make synthetic rubber by a new, secret process. Just at this point, when MacArthur left the Philippines and the fall of Corregidor was imminent, the company received a large order through the War Production Board for 50 large vertical boring mills. These machine tools were designed to be used by other plants to build army tanks and they were of the highest priority. The contract was 
for nearly $2 million but the government set the price based on what 
it would cost a machine tool builder who made these as a regular line 
of business. Thus, the Iron Works was operating at a distinct disadvantage 
in that it had no experience in building boring mills. 9 

President Neese was confident that Beloit could do these jobs and 
more, and he was correct. In those very scary early months of the war 
the company like the country took the war more 'and more seriously. 
The United States had lost much of its Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor, 
and it was in the process of a general retreat that would take it all 
the way to Australia before offensive actions were taken again. In 
this climate of fear and increased patriotism, plant protection was 
doubled and all employees photographed and fingerprinted, and provided 
with an identification badge. Within the plant, a "Help Win the War" 
committee was established to help channel suggestions for increasing 
efficiency and combating waste. Bond sales were promoted, and a 
large number of employees were enrolled in civilian defense first aid, 
safety engineering, auxiliary firemen, and advanced plant police 
courses. 10 Through all this Neese acted as cheerleader and father-confessor 
as well as company leader. He had always been close to the 
production employees and with the war he redoubled his efforts to make 
his employees feel that they were essential cogs in a machine that would 

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help defeat the Axis. If this required overtime, Sunday, and holiday 
work so-be-it. He was willing to work whatever hours were necessary 
to get the jobs done when they were promised, and he expected all the 
employees to feel the same way. For the most part they did, for 
many of them saw him as their "Skipper" and were proud to work with 
and for him. 11 

Beloit advertisements continued to emphasize the 1930's slogan 
that "when you buy Beloit. . .you buy more than a machine" but this 
was subordinated to the idea that Beloit was "serving Uncle Sam first 
for the duration" and that Beloit was "fighting" on the factory front! 
Nevertheless, they promised every effort to provide essential repair 
and maintenance parts for paper machinery. Within the company slogans 
abounded with the foundry leading the way with "Lick the Axis with 
Tank Mills." 12  The Tank Mills referred to were part of the order of 
50 received in early 1942. By August the first was completed and 
management announced that they had received an order for 50 Powder 
Mills. 

These Powder Mills were part of Lend-Lease shipments to the Soviet 
Union. They were used to process the smokeless gun powder that the 
Russians had developed. This drying process turned out to be very 
dangerous for the Russian machine operators because explosions would 
occasionally occur. Soviet munitions plants did not have the elaborate 
safety precautions such as cement walls that protected the operator 
like United States plants did. 13 Nevertheless they needed the gun 
powder mills fast as a major confrontation with the Germans was shaping 
up in the autumn of 1942. 

When the confrontation which occurred at Stalingrad turned out to 

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be a devastating defeat for Germany, the overall war situation looked 
much brighter. The western Allies had landed in North Africa at about 
the same time and these actions, combined with United States offensive 
actions in the Pacific, put the Axis on the defensive where they would 
remain for the rest of the war. 

During these crucial months the Iron Works received its biggest  
order and greatest challenge of the war. The order was for 20 seventy-eight 
ton Corvette steam engines. The challenge was threefold -to 
get the order, to keep it once it was received, and to actually do a 
job which stretched Beloit's facilities and ingenuity. The effort had 
a happy ending for all concerned, but the struggle was complicated and 
time consuming. 

It began in early November, 1942 when, after a number of conferences 
in Washington between Iron Works leaders and the United States Maritime 
Commission, the company received the initial order for 20 engines. 
These engines were of English design and had been used in English 
Frigates involved in convoy service. For the United States built 
Corvettes, they were to be installed side by side two to a ship. They 
were supposed to be redesigned so they operated at a higher horsepower 
(2,750 per engine) and a higher speed (185 RPM at maximum speed). When 
Beloit engineers looked at the drawings it was evident that English 
drawing practices were so different that the plans had to be redrawn 
completely. This held up work on the engines not only for Beloit but 
for four other United States companies that had similar contracts. 14 
During this hiatus, the Maritime Commission called Beloit to tell 
them the whole deal was off and that they had a better plan to use 
Beloit's facilities. This "Christmas message" was not one that was 

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welcomed very heartily by Neese, Moore, and other company executives. 
What the Navy wanted was for the Iron Works to come to the aid of 
Fairbanks Morse which had a large contract to build diesel engines 
for submarines. Fairbanks Morse was not making fast enough progress 
on this commitment so the Navy reasoned that Beloit, being in the same 
city, would make a good auxiliary to Fairbanks and in the process speed 
up work on the diesels. Beloit immediately sent Harry Moore and others 
off to Washington to plead their case for the original contract. They 
argued that they would be more efficient and productive if they handled 
a contract from start to finish and that these capabilities would be 
lost if they waited around for Fairbanks to give them odds and ends. 
Eventually the Navy and the Maritime Commission agreed, and the original 
contract was restored in February, 1943.15 

This was cause for celebration within the plant, but it required 
another conversion -this time away from machine tools. The new order 
was especially exciting because Beloit's effort would be more visible 
once these engines were installed in specific Corvettes. In the 
meantime the new order required a great deal of precision workmanship 
on an unfamiliar product. 

By March 1943 the first base casting was poured, but before long 
problems began to slow down the work. Promises to have the first 
engine shipped by mid-summer could not be kept. Neese and Moore spent 
a great deal of time in Washington negotiating schedules for engine 
completions. Unfortunately, mostly due to circumstances beyond their 
control, they fell further behind. By September they still had not 
delivered an engine and were approximately one month late on their 
final promise. Neese was chagrined, embarrassed, and under great 

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pressure from the Navy and the United States Maritime Commission because 
ships were already constructed and waiting for their engines. Consequently, 
he resorted to an all-out appeal to company personnel to give 
their best efforts to get the orders back on time. This meant shipping 
them at the rate of four a month. He especially appealed to his workers' 
pride by noting that five other companies were making Corvette engines  
from the same drawings and all were ahead of Beloit. He then held out 
a stick and a carrot. The stick was the potential humiliation of losing 
the contract combined with the lack of work that would result. The 
carrot was the announcement that he knew that the company was being 
considered for the coveted Army-Navy "E" for excellence pennant. He 
wanted it and felt that the company deserved it on its past record but 
noted that a failure in the engine program might prevent their getting 
it. Or even worse, they-might get the "E" and then have it taken away 
if they failed. That would be a "terrible blow" to the company's 
self-respect. Neese was at his paternalistic best in this appeal and 
got results! 16 

Within about six weeks, they shipped seven engines. From then on 
Moore promised the Maritime Commission that the company would finish 
and ship an engine each week. This rate was even faster than their 
previous promise of 4 a month but in doing so they would make up in 
part for the previous delays. This promise was kept, and by the end 
of the war, company production approached 100 engines. Occasionally 
they heard stories about some of the ships they supplied. Those assigned 
to the United States Navy got little publicity but a few consigned to the 
British Navy were, in one case, involved in an attack on the German 
battleship Von Tirpitz and in another in the sinking of two German 

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submarines at the cost of a Corvette. 17 

While the Corvette engine order was the most important war work 
the company did, a close relationship with the Nordberg Manufacturing 
Company of Milwaukee brought them a miscellaneous collection of sub-contracts 
for castings and machine work, and major jobs erecting some 
huge extrusion presses and manufacturing pistons and cylinders. This . 
latter job was for the Nordberg-built Skinner Uniflow poppet valve 
steam engines used to power escort aircraft carriers. The reason 
Beloit erected the extrusion presses was because Nordberg's own erecting 
floor was full of steam engines ready to be sent to the Kaiser ship-yards 
for the "baby flattops." By these actions which allowed both 
companies to get the most out of their plants and work forces, Beloit 
and Nordberg had a near perfect symbiotic relationship. 18 

Overall the Kaiser shipyard built more than 50 escort carriers 
nearly all equipped with Nordberg engines with Beloit pistons and 
cylinders. By December 1944 the Iron Works had furnished over 600 
pistons and 400 cylinders including a set of piston assemblies manufactured 
in record time to repair an escort carrier damaged in a naval 
battle near the Philippines in the autumn of 1944. l9 

Company efforts were both appreciated and recognized by the armed 
forces through the Army-Navy "E" awards. They won four of these awards 
which rewarded outstanding achievement in the production of essential 
war materials. The first was perhaps the most significant and surrounded 
by the most publicity because it came in November 1943 just as the 
company had come to grips with their Corvette engine problem. The other 
three awards, which allowed the company to add white stars to their 
Army-Navy Production Award flag came at six month intervals through 

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June 1945. When Neese heard of the first award he expressed his pride and 
pleasure in his employees' accomplishment. He noted their willingness 
to work at various inconvenient times including Sundays and holidays, 
their team work, their minimum absenteeism, and, perhaps most significant, 
their efforts that insured that production continued without any . 
interruptions. 20 The war had brought out the best in Iron Works 
employees and justified Neese's long held views on proper employer employee 
relations at least for the personalistic small company that 
he headed. He was both cheerleader and boss, and he believed that his 
own example of friendship and hard work would be emulated by his 
employees. He was correct and the result was high production, excellent 
quality of product, good pay, and no major labor problems. 
The last was in pleasant contrast to what was typical for the 
country as a whole. Labor disputes abounded and, despite the war, 
strikes continued at about the same level as the years just prior to 
Pearl Harbor. In fact, President Roosevelt was forced to get Congress 
to pass special legislation that strengthened his power to deal with 
strikes that interfered with the war effort. Both the eastern coal 
mines and all railroads were temporarily seized by the national 
government to avert strikes. There were also a number of scandals 
involving shoddy work that resulted in the death of Allied servicemen. 
Likewise, unfair profiteering enabled some companies and their leaders 
to get rich off the misery of war. None of this occurred at the Iron 
Works. Quality control, despite the new products, was high throughout 
the war, and profits were fair but even lower than the averages prior 
to the war. 

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The company received a great deal of favorable publicity from 
the media in southeastern Wisconsin and northern Illinois as the due 
date for the "E" award approached in late November 1943. What seemed 
most impressive was the variety of jobs that the company had done 
without government money, and without needing extra employees or 
extra plant space. Company employment ranged between 810 and 890 only  
slightly above the prewar level, and although they had lost about 21% 
of their personnel to the armed forces, this was considered fairly 
light. Most who remained were long service employees who were older 
than the 18 to 38 year olds then subject to the draft. 22 

The "E" award was presented by Colonel William H. McCarty on 
November 26, 1943, the day after Thanksgiving. Bert Larson, the firm's 
oldest employee in term of service, received the pennant before a large 
crowd of employees and visiting dignitaries. Of all the rhetorical 
praise for the company and its employees perhaps the most pertinent 
was Colonel McCarty's emphasis on the necessary partnership, especially 
during wartime, of civilians and the military and in Beloit's case the 
extra effort that enabled the company's production record to keep ahead 
of schedule. The employees had done something significant, and they 
were rewarded with the highest award that the Army and Navy could 
give for civilian production. 23 

The war was far from being won in late November 1943. But a 
great deal of progress had been made, and the Allies were on the offense 
from Russia, through the Mediterranean, to the South Pacific. German 
troops were slowly being pushed out of Russia and into Poland. North 
Africa had been liberated, Sicily conquered, Italy invaded, and Mussolini 
overthrown. In the Pacific, New Guinea was in the process of being 

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captured and the Japanese on the Island of Tarawa had just been conquered. 
Just two days after the "E" award the conference among 
Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin began at Teheran, Iran. The result 
was an agreement to coordinate what would become the D-Day operation 
of June 6, 1944 with a Russian drive from the east. Nineteen forty-four 
would be the toughest and bloodiest year of the war. 

At the Iron Works, 1944 was similar to 1943 in kind and quality 
of product although their ability to supply parts for paper machines 
got increasingly important. Production continued on the Corvette 
engines, on winches, windlasses, steering gears, propeller shafts, 
powder mills, rubber mills, cylinders and pistons. They remained 
ahead of target dates and as a result received two more "E" awards. 
They also received orders for repairs of papermaking machinery that 
was directly involved in defense work. In fact production of certain 
kinds of paper products used for the military and in short supply 
were given priorities. Beloit, still tooled and equipped for quick 
production in its original field, served as an emergency supplier of 
paper machinery used strictly for war work. Kraft products (like container 
board, corrugated cartons, paperboard boxes, and multiwall 
bags) had long been designated as an essential war industry and placed 
under wartime controls. These products were essential in saving weight 
and space as well as waterproofing military shipments. Whenever one 
of these machines needed parts Beloit supplied them. 24 

Internally two changes occurred both having long term significance. 
Earl Berry's untimely death late in 1943 allowed Neese in January 1944 
to promote Lloyd Hornbostel to the position of Vice-President in charge 
of engineering. This was an excellent choice for Hornbostel had been 

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doing significant engineering for the company for nearly two decades 
and would continue to do so until his premature death almost two 
decades later. Hornbostel was widely known as an idea man who could 
quickly translate his ideas on paper and then try them out. However, 
he was never committed to an idea thus allowing him to be constantly 
on the lookout for something better. Not only did he have more ideas 
than anyone else, he had more good ideas. Yet, when something failed 
he was never afraid to take responsibility or say he was wrong. Be-cause 
he was so creative he could correct the mistakes. 25 

Most important for the Iron Works, he was excellent at customer 
relations. He worked closely with paper mill executives and engineers 
and was flexible enough to use their good ideas to help them build 
what they wanted. Moreover, he was usually able to prevent them from 
going astray because he had such a glowing reputation as an innovative 
genius. Because he was so bright, open, and straightforward, he had 
the ability that few people possess -to argue a position without 
having the customer get mad or feel that he had been pushed around. 
This camaraderie with customers resulted in more business for Beloit 
just as it helped to hold back Beloit's competition from following 
too closely. 26 

The other internal change was something that Neese had long 
resisted as unnecessary -the unionization of many of the employees 
by the International Association of Machinists. The Machinists had 
failed to unionize the company in 1937 but were anxious to try again 
in 1944. Early that year the union petitioned the National Labor 
Relations Board to order an election to determine whether a majority 
of Iron Works employees in certain departments wanted the union to 

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represent them as their sole bargaining agent. The request was granted 
and the election was set for May 4, 1944. President Neese agonized 
over how he should respond to this intrusion upon his benevolently 
paternalistic company. He continued to believe that a union was un-necessary 
at the Iron Works because he could and did do more for the 
workers than a union could. Nevertheless he had to comply with the ' 
NLRB, hold an election, and not indulge in unfair statements or put 
undue pressure on his employees in the meantime. 

He finally responded in an open letter to all employees just two 
days before the election. After explaining the details of what they 
were voting on, he called on all those eligible to vote. He continued: 
I have always felt a deep sense of pride in the good, friendly, cooperative relationship that has existed between the company and all of its employees, and the good team work which has made the name of this company and its products stand so high throughout the paper industry of the world, and which has made it possible for us to enjoy a higher volume of business in hard times and an unusually steady employment and actiity at all times. It will interest you to know that we
have right now the assurance from many of our old customers of sufficient business to insure the operation of our plant at full capacity for some years after the war. I do not think I can say much more except that in the final analysis you are voting on the question of who shall be your leader. 

We have to ask ourselves the question whether any outsider can do more for us than we have been able to do for ourselves working in close harmony in a common cause for our common good 27 . 

Neese wanted the fine relations between workers and management 
to continue so that the company could keep its reputation as being a 
"good place to work." It is clear that he did not think a unionized 
company could do that. The vote was held, and he suffered one of 
the great disappointments of his life when the union won. He took 
the decision as a personal affront to his leadership. Perhaps in the short run unionization had little effect. A con-tract was signed but the war work continued without interruption. 

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However, in the long run, unionization combined with the rapid expansion 
of the work force after World War II both would lead to more management-employee confrontations and to a slow breakdown of the intimacy and camaraderie common to the company since its founding. Perhaps this 
was inevitable, for the world and the company were both changing, but 
unionization remained a sore spot to Neese for the rest of his life. 28 .

Throughout the rest of 1944 and into 1945 the employees continued 
their high production levels and everyone watched the giant war finally 
begin to wind down. Germany was caught in a pincers movement between 
the western Allies and the Soviet Union, and after one last attempt to 
burst out failed in the Battle of the Bulge in late December 1944, 
they were in general retreat in the west. Shortly thereafter Russia 
began a general offensive in Poland and within weeks most of the 
fighting was going on within Germany. With Hitler's suicide in late 
April, Germany was finished and surrendered unconditionally. Japan 
was left to fight on alone but was also in general retreat. The 
Philippines were invaded by Macarthur's forces in October 1944 and by 
1945 the main Japanese islands were under constant attack by air. 
By summer Japan was defeated with the atomic bombs serving only as 
a brutal coup de grace. 

Shortly after Germany surrendered the Iron Works resumed manufacturing 
papermaking machinery. While order backlogs were large, 
the return to making paper machines was only done on an idle capacity 
basis until Japan was defeated and the last of the war contracts were 
completed in October. 

Despite some problems, the management and employees of the Iron 
Works had performed with distinction in their efforts to help win 
the war. This success was due primarily to their adaptability and 1

Page 134

"know how" because their greatest contribution was their policy of 
"seeking only those orders most urgently needed for the war effort 
and of utilizing to the fullest extent their plant capacity, supplementing 
it where possible by additional tools and subcontracting." 
Another achievement was their flexibility and ability to complete 
one order and then make a rapid changeover to an entirely different 
product. To do this promptly and efficiently required careful 
coordination throughout the company. It also required a high level 
of intelligence, cooperation, and enthusiasm from the shop men who 
were frequently shifted from one department to another and often required 
to learn new jobs. 29 

With victory certain and war orders receding in importance 
company leaders focused their attention on the re-conversion to paper-making 
machines. They knew that there would be a tremendous market 
for their product due to the freeze on new machines during the war 
and the pent up demand for all types of consumer goods. 30 In order 
to prepare for this the company needed more space and tools. Consequently, 
the tail raceway separating the Island property from the rest 
of the company was filled in, yielding an additional 1.3 acres of space. 
An addition was built to the engineering and office building and a 
number of modern tools were purchased. This expansion was completed 
by the late autumn of 1945, and men were then being hired in order 
to keep the tools going at full capacity. Even then, it was necessary 
to subcontract some of the work because capacity was still short of 
demand. 31 This situation would require even more expansion in the 
immediate postwar years. 

As former workers were discharged from the armed forces they 
were offered their old jobs back. In fact manpower was so critical 

Page 135

that President Neese, in one of his periodic letters to all former 
employees then in the armed forces, went one step further and offered 
to do anything he could to speed their release. This was followed 
by a Christmas letter that reiterated the job offer and also included 
a small cash gift as a goodwill gesture. 32 These actions were Neese 
at his paternalistic best -the company was still looking out for 
its men even though they were thousands of miles away. 
This paternalistic attitude also got its first major test in 
1945 as a result of the contract the company had signed the previous 
year, recognizing the machinists' union. The dispute was over an 
interpretation of the part of the contract that dealt with base wage 
rates for those workers who were under the premium system. The union 
claimed that the company had not put into effect those rates previously 
agreed to in the 1944 contract. The company disagreed and as in 
accordance with the contract the matter was referred to arbitration. 
A majority of the Board of Arbitrators agreed with the company and 
according to the contract this was binding on both parties. Nevertheless, 
the union appealed to the Department of Labor in Washington 
for a strike vote. In reply, the Department sent a Commissioner of 
Conciliation on a special trip to Beloit. He listened to both sides, 
agreed with the company position, and asked that the union withdraw 
its request for a strike vote. They refused. Then a Field Examiner 
from the National Labor Relations Board came to Beloit and consulted 
with both the company and the union. He also asked the union to 
drop its request for a strike vote. They refused again. 33 

Neese was incensed at the union's attitude and took their complaint as 
a personal insult calling it an "unwarranted attack on the 

Page 136

integrity and good faith of this Company and its officers." He further 
claimed that the "Company has conscientiously lived up to the pro-visions 
of its contract with the Union and does not intend to be 
swayed from this position by any strike or threat of strike." Finally 
he called upon all eligible employees to vote, and, without telling 
them how to vote, he made it quite clear that the strike threat was 
a "serious matter" to all employees and customers and to the whole 
community. 34 The workers then voted against striking.

Although he and his company had won this test, he must have felt 
that the victory was hollow. There had not been confrontations like 
this in his first two decades with the company. The world he knew 
was rapidly changing, and unions had greatly increased in power since 
the Iron Works-Machinists confrontation of 1937. The company would 
never be the same again. New and younger workers were replacing the 
hardy veterans of "The Old Folk's Home," and the new workers were 
more militant and demanded an increased slice of the economic pie. 
Wages would surely go up in the inflation that followed World War II, 
but old fashioned niceties like year end bonuses and the premium 
system would ultimately fall by the wayside. With the work force 
rapidly increasing it would soon be impossible for the boss to know 
each employee by name when he made his periodic visits to the plant. 

These changes notwithstanding the Iron Works was still a good 
place to work and a profitable business as it emerged from World War 
II. The war had totally disrupted the normal business of the company, 
but they were able to adapt to every new challenge. Sales of slightly 
over $7.2 million set a new record in fiscal 1942, but this figure 
was helped by the paper machines that the company was permitted to finish 

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before totally converting to war work. In 1943 and 1944 sales averaged 
over $6.4 million per year but profits were below the peacetime average. 
In fiscal 1945, the war and government contracts ended, and the company 
was faced with a difficult re-conversion job. Orders were coming 
in for paper machines and paper machine parts, but the company was 
faced with the hiring and training of a large number of new employees. 
This staff buildup occurred without appreciable increases in production 
or cash payments from new sales. Thus, while the future was bright, 
the company profits were very unsatisfactory in 1945.35 

Practically all forecasters including the Commerce Department, 
the Paper Trade Journal, and various paper machine manufacturers were 
unanimous that the paper industry would boom after World War II. When 
it did, it led to a bonanza in sales for the Iron Works. The paper 
industry expanded rapidly from 1946 to 1949. Then there was a slight 
slump while expansion was consolidated and the Korean War was con-fronted. 
By 1951 a second wave of expansion began, and it continued 
throughout the 1950's. 36 

Sales at the Iron Works mirrored this general expansion. Fiscal 
1946 sales of slightly over $7 million were only $100,000 less than 
the company's previous high made in 1942. Sales doubled in 1947 and, 
compared to 1946, more than tripled in 1948 to almost $23 million. 
After 1948, sales remained high but did not surpass the 1948 figures 
until 1952 when they topped $25.5 million. During this period profits 
lagged for a time but were particularly healthy from late 1948 through 
1950. Then they declined again due primarily to Korean War inflation. 37 
These years, the last seven of Neese's Presidency before he became 
Chairman of the Board in 1952, were also innovative ones for the 

Page 138

corporation. Many of the experts involved in paper machine design 
thought that in the immediate postwar years paper machine improvements 
would be evolutionary not revolutionary. Paper mills had been doing 
many unaccustomed jobs and their machinery was in need of replacement 
parts. In the meantime the Iron Works and other machine builders 
had been manufacturing war related equipment and had spent little 
time on research. Thus it was unrealistic to expect that innovations 
would revolutionize the industry. 38

The paper industry emerged from the war as the 7th largest industry 
in sales volume in a country that was by far the world's largest user 
of paper products. The future seemed limitless. The society was increasingly 
consumer-oriented and consumer demands had been fueled by 
four years of government imposed wartime restrictions. Expansion 
occurred as rapidly as machine builders could deliver new machines 
or improve old ones. Industry capacity rose from 20.4 million tons 
in 1946 to 23.2 million tons in 1948, and most of the growth was 
badly needed. 3g Beloit cashed in on this growth because much of it 
was done by companies like International Paper, Crown Zellerbach, and 
Kimberly Clark, all traditional customers of the Iron Works. 

This expansion in the paper industry included all the prewar 
products as well as some that attained commercial use because of 
wartime innovations. Two areas that grew very rapidly were those 
of dissolving pulps (rayon, cellophane, etc.) and containers. The 
first had particularly benefited from wartime uses (rayon cord for 
automobile tires) while container innovations were occurring at 
regular intervals. After the war the consumption of paper cups, 
plates, milk bottles, and other products rapidly increased. Also 

Page 139

Kraft, tissue, toweling, wrapping, and machine coated papers all 
found new and increased uses. 40 

The machines themselves were more complex and as a result more 
specialized. 41 This required even closer relations among paper mill 
engineers and Beloit's engineering and sales personnel. Sometimes 
paper company engineers would invent something that improved a machine, 
and Beloit would build it to their specifications. Often, Hornbostel 
and his engineering team would figure out a breakthrough, and the 
Iron Works would sell it to anyone who desired to purchase it. Yost 
likely, innovations would come from discussions between Iron Works' 
engineers and their customer counterparts. There would be much give 
and take, some experimentation, and finally a new process or invention. 
Beloit's management believed that it was their job to work out these 
detailed machine requirements both at the mill and in their own 
engineering department to the customers' satisfaction. This might 
mean educating the customer to advantages of specialization like 
improvements in quality and efficiency. Specialization was particularly 
advantageous after World War II because by that time grades of 
paper had been standardized and short runs practically eliminated. 
Since papermakers were constantly weighing quality versus production, 
once they had agreed on a level for standardization, they could match 
or exceed it while paying closest attention to production. This meant 
continuous operation, high production and low costs, and all could 
best be done on a specialized machine. 42 

Besides specialization another postwar trend was the conquest 
of what many "experts" had considered to be insurmountable speed 
barriers. Speed was constantly increasing so that by the late 1940's 

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speed ranges for some specialized machines were: 43 

Greaseproof. ............................................................ .450 to 550  fpm 
Sulfite papers ........................................................... .900 to 1200 fpm
Machine coated ........................................................ 900 to 1200 fpm
Newsprint. ............................................................. .1400 to 1600 fpm
Kraft containerboard ... ............................................1200 to 1500 fpm
Kraft paper. ........................................................... .1400 to 1600 fpm
Creped tissues .........................................................1500 to 2400 fpm

More importantly as speed was rapidly increasing sheet characteristics 
also showed marked improvements. Customers did not have to make a 
choice between better or faster machines; they could have both. For 
the future the sky was the limit on speed or as 3. E. Goodwillie, an 
Iron Works Vice-President, said, "There are no supersonic barriers." 
He meant that each section of the machine could be and was being 
improved and that there were no intrinsic limitations in any part 
of a paper machine that would prohibit higher speeds, production, or 
efficiency. 44 

The root of the improvements that resulted in Goodwillie's 
statement was World War II and the effects it had on paper machine 
manufacturers. This emergency required all manufacturers to redouble 
their efforts to improve the quality of their products and the speed 
in which they made them. Even though paper machine manufacturers 
all converted to war work, they used new materials and processes during 
the war most of which could be adapted after the war to aid in improving 
paper machines. 

During the war numerous new alloys were developed, and improved 
manufacturing methods for known materials were devised. These new 
alloys gradually became available to the papermaking industry after 
the war and resulted in lighter, stronger, and less corrosive equipment. 
The improved manufacturing methods resulted in more uniform 

Page 141

and dependable products. 

Metallurgy was advanced by wartime experimentation and necessity. 
Welding improved through the use of new equipment and advances in 
knowledge that allowed the welding of dissimilar metals. New tools 
were acquired and were utilized in many new ways. Many of these 
were high speed heavy duty types that were equipped with the latest 
micrometer adjustments and push button control. 45 

Other improvements were made in foundries, material handling 
methods, and in the use of personnel, but Beloit gained also from 
wartime engineering work. A good example of this was wartime breakthroughs 
in electronic control techniques. Later these techniques 
were adapted and used in the running of postwar paper machines. Per-haps 
the most significant invention was made by Lloyd Hornbostel. 
Hornbostel was hard at work trying to improve powder mills then being 
made for the Baraboo Ordinance Plant. In the old process flange 
pulleys were used in passing the wire, but this process was dangerous 
because the pulleys increased the dangers of explosions. Hornbostel 
realized that the wire needed guides without flange pulleys. Consequently, 
he came up with an air guide that automatically guided the wire through the mill without flange pulleys. The Iron Works made about 130 of these during the war. 46 

Once the war was over Hornbostel adapted this air operated felt 
guide to paper machines. The machines ran faster, smoother, and 
safer, and it was practically maintenance-free. The result was 
higher production which encouraged paper mills to buy it. The idea 
was soon universally adopted and is now a part of every paper machine 
built. 47 

Page 142 

In general, steady evolutionary progress was being made in the 
late 1940's and early 1950's. 48 Beloit participated in and often 
led that progress. Speed and size were always newsworthy items and 
during this period a number of Beloit machines set records. A tissue 
machine made for Kimberly Clark in 1947 was designed for 2800 f. p. m. -but 
this was topped in a Scott tissue machine in 1950 that was de-signed 
for3CDO f. p. m. Other notable Iron Works machines were the 
1947 "Altonian," the world's largest cylinder machine, installed at 
the Alton Box Board plant in Alton, Illinois; the 1948 Ripco Maid, 
the world's largest glassine machine, made for the Rhinelander Paper 
Company in Wisconsin; the 1948 "Buccaneer," a 540 feet long Kraft 
machine that produced nearly 840 tons in 24 hours; the 1949 Coosa 
River, Alabama newsprint machines which were the first of that type 
built by the company in 20 years; and the 1951 130 inch Fourdrinier 
for Lee, the first machine in 20 years designed to produce high grade, 
rag content bond paper. 49 

Of more significance than these records were some of the inventions 
and innovations that allowed Beloit to continue to dominate 
its field within the United States. Besides Hornbostel's air operated 
felt guide and enclosed helical gears for dryers 50 at least three 
other innovations were significant. These include headbox developments 
particularly the Beloit Air-Cushioned Controlled Flow Inlet; the 
Suction-Pickup and Suction-Transfer, first used on "The Pioneer," 
a machine built for Crossett in 1948; and the Differential Drive, 
first used on a machine exported to Norway in 1950. 
Headbox developments were not as dramatic as the latter two 
because they were partially dependent on other innovations. There 

Page 143

also were a number of innovations that improved the headbox but none 
were dramatic breakthroughs. Yet innovations in this part of the 
machine greatly aided production. Hornbostel and his staff were 
particularly cognizant of the problems and potential in headbox and 
slice design. By the early 1950's they had perfected the Beloit Air-Cushioned 
Controlled-Flow Inlet. The headbox and the slice were 
enclosed and the stock put under air pressure. It eliminated the 
old bulky headbox and made possible a more even sheet formation. The 
end result was increased speed without use of additional steam in the 
dryer section. This combined with other smaller changes removed the 
speed and quality limitations that previously existed in this section 
of the machine. 51 

Throughout this period, Hornbostel promoted many inventions with 
a single goal -the development of a better headbox. Better stock 
delivery required this, and Hornbostel did his best to cover his 
improvements with lots of patents. As a consequence by the early 
1950's Beloit was a leader in headbox design. 52 
In contrast to these evolutionary headbox innovations, Hornbostel's 
Suction Pickup and Suction Transfer brought about a revolutionary 
change by allowing a breakthrough in speed. In the 1940's newsprint 
machines seemed to have reached an impasse at speeds of around 1600 
f. p. m. When they tried higher speeds, the sheet was under too much 
strain in the draw between the wire and the first press, and it would 
usually break. K. 0. Elderkin, a man with great experience in news-print, 
became general manager of the Crossett Vi11 in Arkansas, and 
in early 1948 he issued a set of preliminary specifications for a 
new high speed Kraft paper machine. These specifications required a 
suction pickup between the wire and the press. 

Page 144

Earl Berry had experimented with a suction pickup back in the 
1930's but an experimental installation in a Scott paper mill had 
failed. With this experience and with their desire to remove a 
barrier to speed, the Beloit engineers led by Hornbostel designed 
an attractive machine with a suction pickup and transfer. Beloit got 
the order from Crossett and installed the machine in 1949. It worked 
immediately and allowed a production of light weight Kraft paper at 
speeds of 1900 f. p. m. 

Elderkin and Hornbostel were elated, and Elderkin then predicted 
that all high speed newsprint machines would have to be fitted with a 
suction pickup. Beloit soon found that this was true after rebuilding 
a machine at the Port Angeles Mill of Crown Zellerbach. With the new 
arrangement the machine was capable of speeds exceeding 2000 f. p. m. 
With this breakthrough the sky was the limit on speed. Although Horn-bostel's 
design was copied, his worked better than the cornpetition's. 
As a result of this big gamble the company received a great number 
of rebuild orders as well as new machine orders. The original design 
with only some minor modifications is still in use today and still is 
significant in the paper industry. 53 

The other major innovation developed by the company during this 
time was the Differential Drive, also a Hornbostel idea. The Iron 
Works had long promoted mechanical drives believing that they were 
superior to electric drives. Wartime and postwar electric technology 
had improved electric drives so Beloit was looking for ways to improve 
their mechanical drives. The solution was in the Differential Drive. 
It eliminated the old basement or overhead line shafts with their 
pulleys, belts, and belt pullers. In their place was a long series 

Page 145

of gear housing units connected by a line shaft only about 16 inches 
off the floor of the machine room. The arrangement was much neater 
and safer because with the differential drive, each machine section 
had its own completely enclosed gear unit. An adjustable speed steam 
turbine or motor was located in about the middle of the machine and 
it would power the whole unit. For each separate driven section, 
speed adjustment was made by its differential gear unit, after which 
the power was transmitted to the driven section through a transfer 
gear unit. As a result the Beloit mechanical drive was neat and 
compact, and it was also power efficient. 54 This invention allowed 
the company successfully to promote the superiority of their mechanical 
drives even though electric drives continued to improve in the 1950's 
and afterwards.

While these were the major internal inventions, one outside 
invention greatly aided the Iron Works during this time and for years 
afterwards. This was Harry Ostertag's invention of the Suction Breast 
Roll. Ostertag, who had been chief engineer for Kimberly Clark for 
a number of years, was working for their major competitor, Scott, 
when he developed the Suction Breast Roll in 1948. His development 
helped solve the long-standing problem that tissue machines had with 
the formation of the sheet. Both facial and toilet grades are comparatively 
light weight sheets and quite porous. Because of this the 
water drains away from the fibers quite quickly, and with the older 
arrangements on a machine, streaking was common and quality was often 
not very good. As machine speeds increased so did the problem. 
Ostertag's Suction Breast Roll attacked the problem just at the point 
where the flow of stock and water left the slice to go on the Fourdrinier 

Page 146

wire. The Suction Breast Roll was positioned to put the wire under 
vacuum at that point and to keep it under vacuum until the wire was 
taken away from the roll. Through this process a substantial amount 
of water was removed by the shell perforations on the breast roll. 
As a result the sheet was quickly set and streaks were usually avoided? 
This invention revolutionized the sanitary paper business, and 
directly aided the Iron Works because it got the order to make the 
rolls for Scott. This significant breakthrough allowed higher operating 
speeds without loss in quality. Sheet softness, sheet uniformity, 
and crepe uniformity were all superior to any previous former. Equally 
important, there was no known upward speed limitation. Because of 
dominant patents Ostertag's invention gave a tremendous market advantage 
to Scott who used it and Beloit who made it. Throughout the 1950's 
Beloit installed these on a large number of Scott machines. Finally 
by 1960 the entire industry began to benefit from the breakthrough. 
Beloit continued its advantage by building about 80% of all the high 
speed machines made in the United States. 56 

As tissue machines rapidly increased in speed, Yankee dryer improvements 
were needed. Fortunately new metals and casting techniques had 
been developed in the 1940's, partially because of wartime necessity, 
and they played a vital role in improving dryers. Better metal strength 
made it possible to use higher steam pressures in Yankee dryers while 
keeping the shell thickness down to around 2 inches. By 1950, Beloit 
was making high pressure Yankees 12 feet in diameter with shell thick-nesses 
of less than 2 inches. These became standard for a time before 
they were improved again later in the 1950's. Host importantly as 
tissue machine speed rapidly increased, dryer capacity increased with 
it.  57 . Both aided Beloit's domination of the tissue machine market. 

Page 147

All the business that Beloit expected to get and got after World 
lrlar II required continued good relations with paper mill men and a 
rapid expansion of plant facilities. These good relations were 
certainly aided by the longstanding prestige of the company, its 
officers, and its sales engineers. One of these sales engineers, 
Cash Whipple, stands out as a superior salesman, as a great idea man, 
and as the resident company "character." Cash began with the Iron 
Works in 1904 and served with distinction for over 52 continuous 
years. Because he was gregarious and knowledgeable, he eventually 
ended up in sales where he was known for his unusual methods of making 
and pleasing customers. In the 1930's, after his sons became pilots, 
he used a single engine Cessna monoplane to make his wide ranging sales 
calls. Later, he arranged to have a piano lifted by a crane into the 
convention suite of a particularly valued customer who had expressed 
the desire to play a tune. Perhaps the best idea he had was to charter 
a train to bring more than 300 leading pulp and paper mill engineers and 
technicians from a Technical Association of the Pulp and Paper Industry engineering conference in Milwaukee to Beloit? 

This event, held on October 3, 1946, was both a social occasion 
and a great plant promotion for the Iron Works. There was no better 
way to prove to paper industry leaders that Beloit was number one than 
by showing them the modern plant and new equipment. The company pro-vided 
a souvenir booklet outlining Iron Works and community history, 
took the men on a plant tour which included a cornerstone laying 
ceremony for a new machine shop, and then fed and entertained them at 
the Wagon Wheel in Rockton, Illinois. After all the careful planning 
and coordination, a humorous mishap occurred when the special train 

Page 148

proceeded to jump the track just as it entered the Iron Works yard. 
Since practically everyone on the train was in a "fairly relaxed mood," 
the incident was laughed off then but periodically remembered with glee 
ever since. 59 

Increasingly larger numbers of visitors from the pulp and paper 
industry inspected the Iron Works facilities in the expansion years 
after World War II. There was a lot to inspect as the company bought 
tools, land, and buildings or erected new buildings every year from 
1946 to 1952. In 1947 the land and buildings of the R. J. Dowd Knife 
Works were purchased and more land was acquired in 1948. Part of the 
former Thompson Plow and Engine Company property changed hands in 1949, 
and a new pipe roll and turret lathe facility was constructed in 1950. 

Also in that year more land was acquired from neighbors and from filling 
in river channels. In 1951 the Iron Works exchanged property with The 
Charles H. Besley Company. This sent to the Iron Works all the adjacent 
Besly land and buildings in return for property in South Beloit, Illinois. 
A small acquisition followed in 1952. This made company property add up 
to a total of almost 17 acres of contiguous land. Also in that year a 
new dryer shop, shipping facilities, erecting floor addition, and steel 
stores were built and occupied. 60 The multimillion dollar costs of 
all these facilities and the tools that filled them was paid for by the 
good profits of these same years. 

Beloit had poured almost $5 million into capital expenditures 
since 1946 and had committed another $1.8 million in 1952 and 1953 
to complete its expansion and modernization program then underway. 
They thought they would have to borrow money for the first time since 
the 1880's, but although borrowing was authorized by the Board of 
Directors, good earnings precluded the necessity of using the authorization 

Page 149

at that time. 61 

At the same time this decision was made in April, 1952, Elbert 
H. Neese, Sr. was elevated to Chairman of the Board and Harry C. Moore 
became President of the Beloit Iron Works. Beloit was a very different 
company in 1952 than it was in 1916 when Neese had joined the firm. 
Sales had increased over 5000% from a little less than $500,000 to 
more than $25.5 million. Employment had gone from under 200 to over 
1700 and ownership had changed from a closely held corporation to one 
owned 100% by the Neese family. The company was non unionized and very 
paternal in 1916 but by 1952 this paternalism was breaking down and 
the Machinists' Union had been recognized since 1944. They had threatened 
a strike in 1945 and had actually gone on strike for almost 2 
months in 1951. Paper machines which had typically cost in the tens 
of thousands of dollars in 1916 were routinely in multimillion figures 
by the 1950's. On the national and international scene, two major 
wars had been fought since 1916 but in 1952 the United States was 
involved in two more -a hot war with North Korea and the Peoples 
Republic of China and the Cold War with the Soviet Union. The United 
States had gone from a relatively weak but safe and secure country 
in 1916 to one which was probably the most powerful country in the 
world in 1952 but relatively insecure because since 1949 the Russians 
had their finger on the same atomic trigger as the United States. 
There had been demagogues around during the Wilson years, but people 
like Big Bill Haywood and his Industrial Workers of the World were 
weak in comparison to the major demagogue of the early 1950's. 
American paranoia about internal communism promoted by Truman administration edicts like loyalty oaths and the Attorney General's list of 1

Page 150

subversive organizations aided the rise of Wisconsin's own home grown 
demagogue Senator Joe McCarthy who was reaching the zenith of his 
influence in 1952. The Zeitgeist of the early 1950's was increasingly 
conservative and, after Eisenhower's election in 1952, increasingly 
favorable for business. Ike's cabinet consisted of "8 millionaires 
and a plumber," and Ike was known to admire and surround himself with 
big business advisers. 

Beloit was not exactly a big business in 1952 but it was rapidly 
growing and interested in foreign sales. It had sold machines on the 
international market even before 1900 but foreign sales were never 
very significant until after World War II. With the destruction, reparations, 
and the need for capital investment Beloit got increasingly interested. 
The company was visited frequently in the late 1940's and early 1950's 
by western European managers, technicians, and workers, and management 
cooperated fully with the United States sponsored Economic Cooperation 
Administration and the other agencies of the Marshall Plan that were 
getting western Europe back on its feet. 62 

As the company got more interested in foreign sales, Harry Moore 
and Elbert H. Neese, Jr. went to Europe on a fact-finding trip in 1949. 
As a result of their recommendations the company opened a Paris sales 
office in 1949 and in late 1950 set up the Beloit Export Corporation, 
A Delaware Corporation, that was used to obtain tax benefits for 
overseas sales. By this time the company had the time and the capacity 
to pursue these sales actively, and 5 machines were sold in the early 
1950's, one to Norway and four to Finland. 63 Foreign sales were increasingly 
important to the Iron Works after this time reaching l/ 5 
of all sales by the mid 1950's. Thus as the transition from Neese to 

Page 151

Moore began the company was in the process of changing its direction. 
This movement would continue and accelerate during the rest of the 
1950's. 

Page 152

1 Manchester, pp. 238-239. 

2 Ibid., p. 239. 

3 The paper industry was running at 99% capacity as early as October, 1939. At that time industry capacity was 16 l/ 2 million tons while 1941 needs 
were projected at 18 l/ 2 million tons. David Smith, History of Paper-making, pp. 478, 481. 

4 Paperchine, February, 1942, p. 1. 

5 Ibid., p. 1; Essential repairs of paper machinery was continued but no new paper machines were made after early 1942 until the war was over 
in 1945. 

6 Paperchine, December 1943; Francis Ramsden interview, April 14, 1979; BDN, November 10, 1943. 

7 Harry Moore interview, September 6, 1979. 

8 Paperchine, March, 1942; Goodwillie interview, May 30, 1979; Paperchine. April, 1942, July, 1942. 

9 Paperchine, March, 1942. 

10 Ibid., April and May, 1942. 

11 Ibid., June 1942, at two plant meetings Neese urged more production, noting that Beloit's production percentage was only 75% of what it should have been. 

12  Ibid., August, 1942. 

13 Ed Beachler interview, July 26, 1979. 

14 J. E. Goodwillie interview, May 30, 1979; Paperchine, September, 1943. 

15 Goodwillie interview, May 30, 1979. 

16 Paperchine, September, 1943. 

17 Paperchine, November, 1943; Goodwillie interview, May 30, 1979. 

18 Paperchine, March, 1943 and December, 1944. 

19 Paperchine, December, 1944. 

20 Neese quoted in BDN, November 1, 1943. 

21 Profit figures from E. H. Neese, Jr. letter, May 15, 1979. 

22 Milwaukee Journal, November 21, 1943. 155 

Page 153

23 BDN, November 27, 1943; Paperchine, December, 1943. 

24 Paperchine, August, 1944; BDN, December 12, 1944. 

25 E. J. Justus interview, July 20, 1979; Harry Moore interview, August 2, 1979; Ed Beachler interview, July 26, 1979. 

261bid., Hornbostel, also known for his honesty, once added the cost of new shoes to an expense account because they had been ruined during a 
machine startup. The item was refused but Hornbostel resubmitted the entire expense account for the same amount without itemizing the shoes. When he was asked why he had submitted the same amount he said, "The shoes are still in there but now you can't find them!" He got his money. 

27 E. H. Neese, Sr. letter to employees, May 2, 1944, Beloit Corporation 
Archives. 

28 Harry Moore interview, September 6, 1979. 

29 The Golden Book of American Industry (Industrial Publishing Company: 
Palisades Park, New Jersey, 1945), pp. 357-358. 

30 Anyone who was forced to find a double use for newspapers during the war can appreciate what shortages of creped and semi-creped paper meant. 

31 E. H. Neese, Sr. letter to employees, October 24, 1945, Beloit Corporation 
Archives. 

32 E. H. Neese, Sr. letters to servicemen, September 6, 1945, December 1, 1945, Beloit Corporation Archives. 

33 E. H. Neese, Sr. letter to all employees, July 20, 1945, August 14, 1945, Beloit Corporation Archives. 

34 Ibid. 

35 Figures from E. H. Neese, Jr. letter, May 15, 1979; Harry Moore inter-view, 
September 6, 1979. 

36 Smith, Papermaking in the U. S., pp. 531, 538. 

37 Sales figures for E. H. Neese, Jr. letter, May 15, 1979. 

38 Francis Ramsden, "Post War Planning and the Paper Machine," speech dated 
September 2, 1944, in author's possession; George Spencer, 'The Post-War Fourdrinier," Paper Kill News, December 26, 1942; Harry C. Moore,  Trends in Paper Machine Design , PTJ, May 31, 1945. 

39 Ibid., p. 535. 

40 Ibid., pp. 532-537 

41 H. C. Moore, "Trends in Paper Machine Design," PTJ, May 31, 1945, p. 215. 

Page  154

42 H. C. Mioore, "Paper Making Developments and Trends Since the War," 
Paper Mill News, July 15, 1950, p. 38. !% st foreign mills were not yet specialized and were constantly changing the types of paper they 
made. They often spoke of the United States economy as an economy of waste and less than superior quality. However, they found it difficult to compete with the high production found in the United States. 

43J. E. Goodwillie, "Machine Possibilities," Pulp and Paper, February, 1950, p. 27. 

44 1bid., p. 27; Moore, "Trends in Paper Machine Design," PTJ, May 31, 1945, p. 215. 

45 Robert Petrie, "Contribution of War Industries to the Paper Machinery 
Industry, " Paper Mill News, February 9, 1946, p. 12. A good example of this was wartime breakthroughs in electronic control techniques. Later 
these techniques were adapted and used in the running of postwar paper machines. 

46 Harry Moore interview, August 2, 1979. 

47 Moore interview, August 2,1979; Ed Beachler interview, July 26, 1979; 
E. J. Justus interview, July 20, 1979. 

48 This kind of progress has typified the industry since then as well. 

49 Neese and Dundore, pp. 101-102, 104-105, 107. 

50 The latter was detailed in the previous chapter. 

51 "Beloit Engineering Progress," Paper Mill News, September 15, 1951, p. 46; Goodwillie, "Machine Possibilities," Pulp and Paper, February, 1950, p. 84. 

52 E. J. Justus interview, July 20, 1979. 

53 Goodwillie interview tape, April 19, 1979; E. J. Justus interview, July 
20, 1979; "Suction Pick-up System Speeds Up Newsprint Production," Paper Mill News, July 18,. 1953, p. 62. 

54 Goodwillie interview tape, April 19, 1979; Justus interview, July 20, 
1979; "Five New Beloit Machines," Paper Mill News, July 18, 1953, p. 60; "Beloit Engineering Progress," Paper Mill News, September 15, 1951, 
pp. 46, 120. 

55 Goodwillie interview tape, May 30, 1979. 

56 E.. J. Justus interview, July 20, 1979; F. E. Weisshuhn, "Tissue Machines: Their History and Development," Paper Technology, May, 1965, pp. 448-49. 

57 Weisshuhn, Paper Technology May, 1965, p. 457. 
updated in the chapter on tie 1950's. This issue will be 

58 Tom Jones, "In Memorium--Cash Whipple," Beloit Corporation Archives. 157 

Page 155 

59 Harry Moore, "1946-1967--What Next?", speech for 22nd TAPPI Conference, September 19, 1967, Beloit Corporation Archives 

60 Neese and Dundore, pp. 101-108. 

61 Minute Book, April 12, 1952. 

62 Letter, Economic Cooperation Administration to Beloit Iron Works, December 29, 1951, Beloit Corporation Archives. 

63 Ironically, the Finns learned fast from these Beloit machines and later 
set up their own papermaking companies which have become Beloit's biggest competitors.